

**EXILE IN HOMERIC EPIC**

by

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A thesis in conformity with the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of Classics

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*Exile in Homeric Epic*  
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## **ABSTRACT**

This dissertation examines exile in Homeric epic and in particular the relationship between exile as a narrative motif and the thematic significance of exile in specific contexts. The Homeric exile motif is defined and found to include four stock elements involving the causes of exile, the role of compulsion in exile, the permanence of exile, and the possible outcomes of exile. The more thematic issues surrounding exile are also considered, especially in the light of ancient and modern theoretical discussions of exile. Three examples of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are then analyzed. In each case, close attention is paid to the way in which the exile narrative fits into the immediate context and is thematically relevant to it. The exile narrative delivered by Phoenix to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 is interpreted as an attempt to dissuade Achilles from carrying out his threat to abandon the expedition against Troy. More precisely, it is argued that Phoenix uses the parallels between his own exile and the situation facing Achilles to suggest that in abandoning the expedition Achilles would become something close to an exile himself, thereby compromising his heroic standing. It is argued that the ghost of the unburied Patroclus uses his exile narrative to Achilles in *Iliad* 23 to present his experience of death as a parallel to his experience of exile in life and does so in order to persuade Achilles to

provide him with ‘hospitality’ in the form of burial, just as Achilles’ family provided Patroclus with hospitality as an exile. Finally, the false exile narrative delivered by Odysseus to Athena (disguised as a shepherd) in *Odyssey* 13 is interpreted as a reaction to Odysseus’ uncertainty as to whether or not he has reached Ithaca. It is argued that Odysseus uses his exile narrative to contrast the possibility that he is finally home with the possibility that he is still a nameless wanderer. The exile motif is found to be flexible enough to be adapted to the thematic requirements of the contexts in which these three exile narratives occur.

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## INTRODUCTION

### *Exile in Homeric Epic*

Exile, as Seneca so succinctly puts it, is simply a *loci commutatio*, a ‘change of place’ (*ad Helviam* 6.1).<sup>1</sup> Seneca is well aware, however, that his definition runs the risk of ‘narrowing the force’ (*angustare...vim, ad Helviam* 6.1) of exile, for this change of place at times turns out to be surprisingly complex. Both the simplicity and complexity of exile are on full display in Homeric epic. Sometimes exile is indeed nothing more than a simple explanation for an individual’s change of place. On a number of occasions, however, exile is given a greater significance – a significance that goes beyond the purely spatial – and becomes something more: a powerful tool of persuasion (or dissuasion), a metaphor, or even a temptation.

Despite exile’s potential for complexity – not to mention its versatility – it is a theme that has been largely ignored in the scholarship on Homeric epic. Perhaps this is because none of the major protagonists of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – Agamemnon, Achilles, Hector, Odysseus, Telemachus etc. – is an exile. And yet, exile is never far away in Homeric epic. In the *Iliad*, Achilles in particular seems to be surrounded by exiles and, significantly, to attract tales of exile; three exiles in the house of Achilles’ father Peleus – Phoenix, Patroclus, and the more minor figure Epeigeus – are members of the contingent led by Achilles at Troy, and Phoenix and Patroclus both relate their experiences of exile to Achilles in the course of the poem. Moreover, in a famous simile

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<sup>1</sup> For all quotations from ancient authors I have used the most recent OCT edition, unless otherwise noted. All translations are my own.



the Trojan king Priam is compared to an exile when he enters Achilles' hut seeking the return of the body of his son Hector. In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus himself falsely claims to be an exile at one point and Telemachus is accompanied by the exile Theoclymenus when he returns to Ithaca from the mainland. And these are only the most prominent examples of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – there is, in addition, a number of more minor cases of exile in each poem.

The thematic significance of three of the most important instances of exile in Homeric epic – the exile narratives of Phoenix, Patroclus, and Odysseus – will be analyzed in detail in the later chapters of this dissertation. First, however, it will be necessary in this introductory chapter to provide a foundation for such an analysis by clarifying what is meant by exile in Homeric epic and by discussing some of the broader conceptual issues surrounding exile, especially as they relate to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

### ***The Exile Motif***

Our first task, then, is to ascertain exactly what is meant by exile, for as Forsdyke points out, “exile has many forms.”<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, it can be defined in terms of its cause, which allows for distinctions to be made between, for example, “political exile, religious exile, judicial exile, economic exile.” On the other hand, it can be defined in terms of its result, in which case it ranges from exile in a strict sense as “physical separation from the place where one previously lived” to “‘internal exile,’ in which an individual or group is removed from the immediate surroundings but not expelled from the country altogether,”

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<sup>2</sup> Forsdyke (2005) 7; the quotations in this paragraph are all from Forsdyke's discussion of the types of exile at Forsdyke (2005) 7-8.

and even “‘inner exile’ as a way of describing the alienation of a writer or artist from his native community.” Fortunately, the causes and results of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are not hard to identify, though they may be complicated. This is because exile in Homeric epic takes the form of a distinct motif – a fixed and recurring narrative sequence.

Many critics have noted the existence of the exile motif in Homeric epic. Janko, for example, describes exile as a “traditional topos,”<sup>3</sup> and both he and Richardson refer to it as a “common motif.”<sup>4</sup> In a similar vein, Hoekstra speaks of exile as “a frequent theme in Homer.”<sup>5</sup> This list of passing references could easily be extended. Somewhat surprisingly, however, no real attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive analysis of the structure of the motif. The few, brief studies that focus on Homeric exile seem to take its status as a motif for granted and make little effort to describe it or define its parameters. Schlunk, for example, in his study of the figure of the suppliant-exile in the *Iliad*, does no more than to note the following pattern: “a man, because he has committed murder, flees his native land and seeks refuge as an exile at the house of another lord.”<sup>6</sup> This is accurate as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. Heiden, in his study of the exile simile in *Iliad* 24, is similarly vague. Like Schlunk, he discusses several prominent examples of exile in the *Iliad*, but the closest he comes to a definition of the motif is his comment that “the image of the murderer seeking refuge has associations

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<sup>3</sup> Janko (1992) *ad Il.* 13.694-697.

<sup>4</sup> Janko (1992) *ad Il.* 16.570-574; Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.85-90.

<sup>5</sup> Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 13.259.

<sup>6</sup> Schlunk (1976) 201.

within the *Iliad* and within heroic mythology that...deepen and complicate the resonances of this simile.”<sup>7</sup>

The most thorough descriptions of Homeric exile can be found, in fact, in the discussions of homicide in Homeric epic by Bonner and Smith and, more recently, by Gagarin.<sup>8</sup> Since these scholars discuss Homeric exile from the point of view of legal history and only as part of their discussions of homicide, they naturally do not attempt to describe or define exile as a poetic motif. In particular, some of the specifically legal issues that these discussions raise – such as the apparent lack of any distinction in Homeric epic between intentional and unintentional homicide<sup>9</sup> – are of peripheral relevance for our purposes. Nevertheless, several of the observations made by Bonner and Smith and by Gagarin relate directly to the exile motif. Both Bonner and Smith and Gagarin note that exile is the standard response to homicide in Homeric epic,<sup>10</sup> with Gagarin adding that it is “the direct consequence of the necessity to escape death at the hands of the victim’s relatives seeking revenge.”<sup>11</sup> On the question of vengeance, Bonner and Smith distinguish between banishment in cases where the victim is a kinsman of the killer and flight from vengeance in other cases,<sup>12</sup> but there is no evidence in the texts for such a distinction. Somewhat more persuasively, Bonner and Smith also argue that while “Public sentiment...demanded that men should avenge the death of their kinsmen,”<sup>13</sup> “Outside of the circle of the dead man’s kinsmen and friends, there is no indication of

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<sup>7</sup> Heiden (1998) 4.

<sup>8</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 15-21; Gagarin (1981) 6-18.

<sup>9</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 21; Gagarin (1981) 11-13.

<sup>10</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 19; Gagarin (1981) 10.

<sup>11</sup> Gagarin (1981) 10.

<sup>12</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 19.

<sup>13</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 17.

any popular sentiment against ordinary homicide.”<sup>14</sup> Gagarin is of the opinion that the exile is not truly safe from vengeful kinsmen of the victim until he is accepted into another community, at which point any “moral stigma” resulting from his deed disappears.<sup>15</sup> Both Bonner and Smith and Gagarin also argue that pollution resulting from homicide is entirely absent from Homeric epic.<sup>16</sup> Several of the features of Homeric exile identified by Bonner and Smith and by Gagarin – the prominence of homicide, the need to flee, and acceptance into another community – will be of central importance to my analysis of the exile motif.

Finally, it is necessary to address Bowie’s recent suggestion that “‘exile’ might be a misleading concept” in Homeric epic.<sup>17</sup> Bowie bases this suggestion on the observation that “in the Homeric poems much stronger expressions of longing are uttered by characters for their native land or city, for members of their family or for their possessions, by individuals who have left home more or less voluntarily...than by those who have been forced to leave.”<sup>18</sup> After reviewing the cases of Phoenix in *Iliad* 9, Patroclus in *Iliad* 23, and Odysseus (pretending to be a Cretan) in *Odyssey* 13, Bowie concludes that “For Homer...voluntary and involuntary exile are close if not overlapping, and he does not give his characters a rhetoric which marks either out as a deprivation that is extreme or *sui generis* – that is reserved for women or old men who see their male relatives of fighting age slain and are themselves captured or killed in the sack of a

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<sup>14</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 16.

<sup>15</sup> Gagarin (1981) 11.

<sup>16</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 15-16; Gagarin (1981) 17-18.

<sup>17</sup> Bowie (2007) 25.

<sup>18</sup> Bowie (2007) 25.

city.”<sup>19</sup> It is difficult to see, however, why the lack of a distinction between voluntary and involuntary exile and/or the lack of a specific ‘rhetoric of deprivation’ would make an individual any less of an exile. And in any case, as we shall see, voluntary exile is either very rare or non-existent in Homeric epic, though there are self-exiles, and Homeric exiles certainly do express their deprivation, though admittedly less explicitly and for different reasons than those who are bereaved and captured in war.

A comprehensive analysis of the structure of the exile motif is lacking, then, in the scholarly literature on Homeric epic. Such an analysis, in conjunction with an analysis of the conceptual issues surrounding exile, would greatly improve our understanding of how individual instances of exile work within the poems. I intend, therefore, to undertake just such an analysis of the structure of the exile motif. More precisely, I shall examine the various narrative features that recur consistently enough in depictions of exile in Homeric epic to be considered the stock, and even defining, elements of the motif. I shall discuss these stock elements of exile under four headings: the causes of exile; compulsion; permanence; and dependence.

*a) The Causes of Exile – Homicide and Dispute*

Exile in Homeric epic is never arbitrary or unexplained but always results from a particular act committed by the exile or a particular event in which he – all exiles in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* being male – is intimately involved. In practice, this ‘action or event’ comes in two forms: an act of homicide or a dispute. In cases of exile resulting

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<sup>19</sup> Bowie (2007) 27.

from homicide the exile is directly responsible for his displacement. This responsibility does not take the form of moral accountability, however – it simply involves recognition of the fact that the exile’s act of homicide is causally related to his displacement.<sup>20</sup> In other words, homicides go into exile because of what they have done, but exile for homicide is never presented as a punishment for a morally blameworthy act. In cases of exile resulting from a dispute, on the other hand, the exile is at best only partly responsible for his displacement. For although his involvement in the dispute leads to his displacement it is ultimately, as we shall see, the relative status of the two participants that determines which of the participants goes into exile. In other words, the exile does not face displacement solely because he was involved in a dispute – after all, the participant who does not go into exile was also involved – but because he was the less powerful participant in a dispute.

Of these two causes of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* most scholars focus on homicide.<sup>21</sup> Given, however, that in each poem displacement resulting from homicide and displacement resulting from a dispute are very similar in most important respects – and

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<sup>20</sup> The relationship between the act of homicide and displacement is expressed in a variety of ways, all of which either express or imply causality. Most common is the past participle of a verb of killing – Medon, for example, is described as living in Phylace ἄνδρα κατακτάς (*Il.* 13.696; cf. *Il.* 15.334, 16.573, 24.481, *Od.* 14. 380, 15.224, 15.272, 23.118) – which can be taken either to be temporal (‘having killed a man’) or causal (‘because he killed a man’), but which in either case makes it clear that the act of homicide led directly to exile. Elsewhere the adverb ἐπεὶ (‘since’) with a finite form of the verb of killing is found, and can be interpreted in an identical manner (*Il.* 15.432, *Od.* 13.259). Most explicit is the case of Patroclus, who says that he came to the house of Peleus ἀνδροκτασίης ὑπο λυγρῆς (‘because of baneful man-slaying,’ *Il.* 23.86).

<sup>21</sup> In some cases, such as those of Bonner and Smith (1930: 15-21) and of Gagarin (1981: 6-18), this is because exile is being discussed as part of a broader discussion of homicide. But both Schlunk (1976: 201) and Heiden (1998: 4) also mention homicide specifically when they describe the exile motif.

especially with respect to the fate of the individual once he has left his original community – it is best, and usual, to treat them both as part of the exile motif, rather than as two separate motifs, and to regard the different causes as variations within the motif.<sup>22</sup> Homicide is certainly the more common of the two causes, however – exile as the result of homicide is found on eight occasions in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* while exile resulting from a dispute is found on only three occasions.<sup>23</sup>

Although the action or event that leads to exile, whether an act of homicide or a dispute, is always identified, it is rarely described at any length.<sup>24</sup> One detail, however, recurs consistently and is worth mentioning. In the cases of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* that result from homicide the victim is on several occasions identified as a

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<sup>22</sup> For all that Schlunk (1976) and Heiden (1981) mention homicide specifically when they describe the exile motif (see above, 7 n. 21), both naturally identify Phoenix as an exile, even though he is not a murderer (Schlunk (1976) 199; Heiden (1981) 4). See also Hainsworth (1993) *ad Il.* 9.479-484.

<sup>23</sup> For details see Appendix A, which lists all of the instances of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. To the eight concrete instances of exile resulting from homicide can be added the simile of the exile-homicide at *Il.* 24.480-484 and Odysseus' general remarks to Telemachus about exile as a consequence of homicide (*Od.* 23.118-120). To the three instances of exile resulting from an argument should perhaps be added the case of Melampus (*Od.* 15.226-229, 238-239, cf. *Od.* 11.285-297), though the details of his exile, if it is an exile, are unclear. At *Od.* 15.226-229 Melampus is described as fleeing Neleus and coming to another land, though no specific reason is given (and in the version of the story provided by Schol. V *ad Od.* 11.287, who is summarising Pherecydes' account, Melampus leaves of his own accord in order to steal the cattle of Iphiclus, which have been set by Neleus as the bride-price of his daughter Pero). Gantz (1993: 186) suggests, probably correctly, that we have here the conflation of two stories, one involving exile and the other the voluntary undertaking of a quest. The issue is complicated further at *Od.* 15.238-239, where Melampus is described leaving for a second time – this time for Argos – after avenging himself on Neleus, apparently because Neleus had confiscated Melampus' property during his first absence (*Od.* 15.230-231). Melampus does not, apparently, kill Neleus, and no dispute is specifically mentioned, but Melampus' departure for Argos bears many of the hallmarks of exile.

<sup>24</sup> The exceptions are the (fictitious) killing of Orsilochus by the Cretan invented by Odysseus (*Od.* 13.262-270), for which see Chapter Three, and Phoenix' dispute with his father Amyntor (*Il.* 9.449-461), for which see Chapter One.

kinsman of the (future) exile, though never as a member of his immediate family.<sup>25</sup> Tlepolemus kills his great-uncle Licymnius (*Il.* 2.662-663); Medon kills a kinsman of his stepmother Eriopis (*Il.* 13.696-697=15.335-336); and Epeigeus and Theoclymenus kill unidentified kinsmen (*Il.* 16.573; *Od.* 15.272-273).<sup>26</sup> In the case of better-known heroes, such as Tlepolemus, the narrator no doubt includes the identity of the victim as part of the *Faktenkanon* of the established tradition. In the case of minor heroes, however, where the identification of the victim as a kinsman may well be *ad hoc*, the aim may be to stress the seriousness of the crime or even to imbue it with a touch of pathos. Alternatively, the victim's identification as a kinsman may simply be a realistic reflection of the close-knit nature of Homeric society.

The situation is similar in cases of exile resulting from a dispute. In all such cases the other party to the dispute is again identified as a relative, though this time as the exile's father.<sup>27</sup> Phyleus becomes angry with his father, who is not named (*Il.* 2.629); Phoenix argues with his father Amyntor (*Il.* 9.449-461); and Polypheides becomes angry with his father Mantius (*Od.* 15.254). It is clear enough that, whatever the circumstances of the dispute, in each of these three cases relative status determines which party goes into exile – in each case it is the son, the figure with less authority, who leaves. Beyond this, however, it is hard to draw any firm conclusions from the fact that in cases of exile

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<sup>25</sup> There are, of course, famous examples in Greek myth of killings within the immediate family – Peleus and Telamon kill their half-brother Phocus (Pin. *Nem.* 5.14-16; Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.12.160), Heracles kills his children (Stesich. 53 *PMG*; Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.4.72) and in some versions his wife Megara as well (Eur. *Heracles* 967-1000) etc. – but these and other such episodes are not recounted in Homeric epic. The one exception is the story of Oedipus, summarised at *Od.* 11.271-280, where it appears that the gods prevent Oedipus from going into exile despite his killing of his father (and marriage with his mother).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Amphytrio's killing of his father-in-law Electryon in the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield* (*Sc.* 11).

<sup>27</sup> The one possible exception is Melampus; see above, 8 n. 23.



resulting from a dispute the dispute is always between a father and son, especially given that in the whole of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* exile results from a dispute on only three occasions and is only described once in any detail. It is possible that in all three cases the poet is again simply following the *Faktenkanon*, since each of the three exiles in question is either a significant figure in his own right or belongs to a prominent family.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, it may be that in each case the fact that the other party to the dispute is the exile's father is meant to add to the dispute's seriousness and make exile a more credible outcome.

#### *b) Compulsion*

The next element of the exile motif that I wish to discuss is compulsion. Here there is something of a distinction between exile resulting from homicide and exile resulting from a dispute, for while those who go into exile as the result of homicide are, or seem to see themselves as being, compelled to leave their communities, this is not so obviously the case with those who go into exile as the result of a dispute.

It should be noted immediately that there is no evidence in Homeric epic for a public, legally sanctioned means to compel another to go into exile, even in cases of homicide. The few passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* that describe, or even allude to, legal practices in cases of homicide are frustratingly vague, especially when it comes to

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<sup>28</sup> Phyleus' unnamed father is almost certainly Augeias – he is identified as such by later sources such as Strabo (10.459) – whose famous stables it was Heracles' task to clean. Phoenix' exile may have been adapted from a much longer version; see West (2001). Polyphides is a member of the most famous family of seers in Greek myth, the Melampodids (*Od.* 15.241-249).

the role of exile. The famous scene on the shield of Achilles that shows the judgement of a case of homicide (*Il.* 18.497-508) – the most overtly legalistic scene in the whole of Homeric epic – omits any reference to exile, and we are certainly not in a position to state that the judges have the option of recommending, still less of enforcing, exile as a punishment.<sup>29</sup> It is not even clear that the settlement of cases of homicide need be a legal affair at all – in fact, given the nature of the dispute described on the shield of Achilles it seems likely that in the system envisioned in Homeric epic the resolution of such issues takes place, where possible, in the private sphere and that only disputed cases require public arbitration.

The most obvious private, non-legal (though not *illegal*) means of compelling a homicide to go into exile is through vengeance, or rather through the threat of vengeance.<sup>30</sup> The threat of vengeance is explicitly made the compelling factor in the

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<sup>29</sup> The scene is problematic in many ways, not least because the details of the dispute remain uncertain. For discussion see especially Bonner and Smith (1930) 31-41, Wolff (1946) 34-49; Thür (1970); Gagarin (1981) 13-16 and (1986) 26-33; Edwards (1991) *ad Il.* 18.498-500; and Westbrook (1992).

<sup>30</sup> That is not to say that exile in order to escape vengeance is the only outcome of homicide in Homeric epic, though it is by far the most common. Though there are no concrete instances of it, the payment of compensation is mentioned twice in Homeric epic: Ajax states during the embassy to Achilles that compensation is accepted even for the slaying of a brother or a son (*Il.* 9.632-636) and it is behind the dispute in the trial scene on the shield of Achilles (*Il.* 18.497-508). For the payment of compensation in Homeric epic, see further Bonner and Smith (1930) 21 and Gagarin (1981) 13. Moreover, there is one prominent instance of vengeance actually being taken: Orestes kills Aegisthus as vengeance for the murder of Agamemnon (*Od.* 3.305-310) and he apparently kills Clytemnestra too, either for acting as Aegisthus' accomplice or possibly as vengeance for the murder of Cassandra (*Od.* 3.309-310, 11.421-423). For Orestes' act of vengeance see further Bonner and Smith (1930) 17; Gagarin (1981) 7, 17-18; and Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988) *ad Od.* 3.309-310. More problematic is the case of Meleager. The death of Meleager as the result of his mother's curse is suggested at *Il.* 9.571-572, but it is unclear whether Meleager's slaying of his mother's brother, the cause of his mother's vengeful anger, was murder or took place in battle (cf. *Il.* 9.547-549). The bibliography on Meleager is extensive; see Page (1959) 329, Bannert

cases of two exiled murderers: Tlepolemus, who is described as fleeing the threats of the sons and grandsons of Heracles (*Il.* 2.665-666); and Theoclymenus, who says he is fleeing death at the hands of his victim's kinsmen (*Od.* 15.273-276). The sense of compulsion felt by the exiles in these cases is particularly evident from the prominence of the notion of 'flight.'<sup>31</sup> The verb φεύγω ('to flee') is used by the narrator of Tlepolemus, and is explicitly linked to the threats of vengeance that he has received: φεύγων ἐπὶ πόντον· ἀπέιλησαν γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι | υἱέες υἰωνοί τε βίης Ἡρακλείης ('fleeing over the sea, for the other sons and grandsons of mighty Heracles threatened him,' *Il.* 2.665-666). In the case of Theoclymenus the verb φεύγω is used both by the narrator (*Od.* 15.224) and twice by Theoclymenus himself (*Od.* 15.276, 277) to describe his departure from his original community. Moreover, Theoclymenus explicitly links his flight to the threat of vengeance at the hands of the kinsmen of his victim (*Od.* 15.273-278):

πολλοὶ δὲ κασίγνητοὶ τε ἔται τε  
 Ἄργος ἄν' ἵππόβοτον, μέγα δὲ κρατέουσιν Ἀχαιῶν.  
 τῶν ὑπαλευόμενος θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν  
 φεύγω, ἐπεὶ νύ μοι αἴσα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλησθαι.

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(1981) 69 n. 1, and Hainsworth (1993) *ad Il.* 9.524-605, who provide (only partially overlapping) lists of references, to which should be added Alden (2000) 179-290. Finally, there are two cases of murderers staying in their communities without apparently suffering any consequences for their deeds. Despite killing his father Oedipus continues to rule in Thebes (*Od.* 11.273-276); no explanation is given except that this happened θεῶν ὀλοῶς διὰ βουλᾶς ('through the deadly plans of the gods,' *Od.* 11.276). For Oedipus in the *Odyssey* see further Gagarin (1981) 10 and (1986) 14, and Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 11.271-280 (with references). Heracles apparently remains in his community after killing Iphitus (*Od.* 21.24-30). Again, there is no explanation as to why he is able to do so. For the Heracles episode see further Bonner and Smith (1930) 20 and Gagarin (1981) 10 and (1986) 14.

<sup>31</sup> The closeness of the association between exile and flight is well demonstrated by the fact that, while in Homeric Greek there is no term for exile, in the Archaic period such terms were developed using the root \*φυγ-. Thus we find φεύγων used to mean 'an exiled individual,' and φυγή used to mean 'the state of exile.' See, for example, *Theog.* 209-210.

ἀλλά με νηὸς ἔφεσσαι, ἐπεὶ σε φυγῶν ἰκέτευσα,  
μὴ με κατακτείνωσι· διωκόμεναι γὰρ οἴω.

*And there are many brothers and kinsmen of his throughout Argos, grazed by horses, and they rule mightily over the Achaeans. Avoiding death and a black fate at their hands do I flee, since now it is my fate to wander among men. But set me on your ship, since in my flight I have supplicated you, in order that they might not kill me. For I think that they are pursuing.*

Theoclymenus' words suggest that the victim's kinsmen may even pursue the murderer into foreign lands, though this scenario is not mentioned elsewhere and it is possible that Theoclymenus is exaggerating in order to add to the urgency of his appeal.

In fact, it is likely that the threat of vengeance is the compelling factor in the numerous cases of exile where no such threat is specifically mentioned. The case of the Cretan exile invented by Odysseus at *Od.* 13.256-286 is instructive. Odysseus describes how, having murdered Idomeneus' son Orsilochus, he left Crete before anyone else was even aware of the crime (*Od.* 13.269-275). Significantly, even though Odysseus does not mention the threat of vengeance, he does use the verb φεύγω to describe his departure from Crete (*Od.* 13.259), and his insistence upon the covert nature both of the murder and of his subsequent flight (*Od.* 13.269-275) also suggests that he feared the consequences of his actions. While Odysseus presents himself as a self-exile his exile is not voluntary, since if he were to stay in Crete his situation would quickly become untenable – the likelihood of vengeance compels him to leave, especially given the status and power of Orsilochus' father. Given that a desire for vengeance is presented as the natural result of homicide while failure to take vengeance is a cause for disgrace – the immediate reaction of the other suitors to Odysseus' slaying of Antinous is to express their intention to kill the perpetrator (*Od.* 22.27-30), while Antinous' father Eupheithes declares that all those

concerned will be κατηφέες ('ashamed') and that it will be a λώβη ('disgrace') if the slaying of the suitors is not avenged (*Od.* 24.432-435) – fear of vengeance can likewise be assumed in the numerous cases where it is said simply that 'X departed/lived away from home because he had killed Y' (*Il.* 13.695-697, 15.431-432, 16.573-574, 23.85-86).<sup>32</sup>

The threat of vengeance alone may not be sufficient, however, to explain exile as a result of homicide in Homeric epic. Consider, for example, Odysseus' words to Telemachus at *Od.* 23.118-120:

καὶ γὰρ τίς θ' ἕνα φῶτα κατακτείνας ἐνὶ δήμῳ,  
ᾧ μὴ πολλοὶ ἕωσιν ἄοσητῆρες ὀπίσσω,  
φεύγει πηούς τε προλιπῶν καὶ πατρίδα γαῖαν·

*For even someone who has killed one man among the people, a man for whom there are not left behind many avengers, abandons his kinsmen and fatherland and flees.*

Odysseus' words not only appear to rule out the possibility of paying compensation and thereby staying in the community – a possibility that is, at any rate, only rarely mentioned in Homeric epic<sup>33</sup> – they also show that the threat of vengeance is not the only possible factor that compels a murderer to depart into exile. For that compulsion is still involved, though the threat of vengeance is explicitly rejected, is indicated by Odysseus' use of the verb φεύγω. But if the threat of vengeance is not behind this compulsion, what is?

A possible answer to this question can be found in the concepts of pollution and its purification, concepts that have often been thought to be entirely absent from Homeric

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<sup>32</sup> Gagarin (1981: 10) notes that the desire for vengeance may be stronger in some cases than others, citing the case of Patroclus as one in which leniency might be expected, but concedes that "the threat of vengeance probably lay ultimately behind every case of exile for homicide."

<sup>33</sup> See above, 11 n. 30.

epic.<sup>34</sup> Given that in later periods homicide invariably entails pollution,<sup>35</sup> the obvious conclusion is that there was a shift in the religious attitude towards homicide and that this shift included the introduction of the concept of pollution. This conclusion has been effectively challenged, however, by Parker, the main thrust of whose argument is that “the customary responses to homicide that appear in the [Homeric] poems...are quite reconcilable with the institution [of pollution]...and may even be taken to presuppose it.”<sup>36</sup> More precisely, Parker notes the presence in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* of various phenomena, including exile, that, in Classical texts at least, “constitute, or are explained by, pollution.” Also present is an epithet of Ares that seems to mean “one who kills in a polluting way” (μιαιφόνος, *Il.* 5.844, 21.402). Indeed, all that is absent is “the actual rite of purification,”<sup>37</sup> and even this, Parker argues, may be implicit in the acceptance of suppliant-exiles into another community, but left unexpressed either as assumed or because only the concept, but not the actual ritual, of purification is known to the poet.<sup>38</sup>

Parker’s analysis would explain Odysseus’ claim that, even when there is no threat of vengeance, a homicide flees into exile – the compelling factor is pollution. While acute, Parker’s analysis can only lead so far; it suggests that Homeric exile may well be associated with and a response to pollution and that the acceptance of an exile may implicitly involve purification, but it does not explain why this is the case. Why does a murderer’s pollution necessitate his leaving of the community? Why can he not be

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<sup>34</sup> Bonner and Smith (1930) 15-16; Gagarin (1981) 17-18.

<sup>35</sup> For later views on pollution resulting from homicide see Parker (1983) 104-130 and Bendlin (2007) 184-189 (with references).

<sup>36</sup> Parker (1983) 131; see generally Parker (1983) 130-143.

<sup>37</sup> Parker (1983) 134.

<sup>38</sup> Parker (1983) 134-135.

purified in his own country? Here, unfortunately, the lack of evidence becomes an insurmountable obstacle and we are left to speculate with Giordano that, in addition to the guilt that attaches to the murderer, there is a “legame particolare tra il sangue versato e la terra che lo accoglie con sofferenza.”<sup>39</sup> Moreover, it is important to note that the presence of pollution would not reduce the compulsion that results from any threat of vengeance. In cases where such a threat is present, as should normally be assumed, the murderer’s departure into exile would simply be over-determined – that is, it would have more than one motivating factor.<sup>40</sup>

Thus far we have been considering only those cases in which exile results from an act of homicide, and have found that – notwithstanding the possible presence of pollution – on a number of occasions the threat of vengeance is presented as the compelling factor in an exile’s departure from his community and can be assumed in most other cases. But the threat of vengeance is absent, of course, in those cases where exile results from a dispute. What motivates the exile to leave his community in such cases is hard to ascertain since of the three examples in Homeric epic only the exile of Phoenix is described in any detail. Phyleus and Polyphoides, the other two characters who go into exile as the result of a dispute, are both described simply as having become angry at their fathers (πατρὶ χολωθείς, *Il.* 2.629, *Od.* 15.254), and though we may safely assume that their anger is reciprocated there is no indication as to whether they choose to leave their communities or are somehow compelled to do so. The situation in the case of Phoenix is complicated. On the one hand, it seems that Phoenix chooses to leave, since he states that (*Il.* 9.462-463):

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<sup>39</sup> Giordano (1999) 99.

<sup>40</sup> See Edwards (1987: 135), who prefers the term “double motivation.”

ἔνθ' ἔμοι οὐκέτι πάμπαν ἔρητύετ' ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς  
πατρὸς χωμόμενοιο κατὰ μέγαρα στρωφᾶσθαι.

*No longer then in any way could the heart within my breast keep me living in the halls of my angered father.*

At the same time, however, Phoenix seems to see himself as being compelled to leave. This sense of compulsion comes through most clearly in his insistence that he fled to Phthia (*Il.* 9.447-449, 478):

λίπον Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα,  
φεύγων νείκεα πατρὸς Ἀμύντορος Ὀρμενίδαο,  
ὅς μοι παλλακίδος περιχώσατο καλλικόμοιο  
...  
φεῦγον...ἀπάνευθε δι' Ἑλλάδος εὐρυχόροιο

*I left Hellas, land of beautiful women, fleeing the reproaches of my father Amyntor, son of Ormenus, who was angry at me over a fair-haired concubine.... I fled...far away through broad Hellas.*

Flight is, as we have seen, a common indicator of compulsion when exile results from homicide. In Phoenix' case, however, since there has been no homicide – though there may have been intent<sup>41</sup> – there is obviously neither the threat of vengeance nor the possibility of pollution. Instead, it is the reproaches (νείκεα) of his father that Phoenix identifies as the compelling factor in his flight, perhaps because of the shame that results from them. We can conclude from the case of Phoenix, then, that when exile results from a dispute there is, at the very least, room for compulsion as a contributing factor in the exile's displacement.

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<sup>41</sup> If Phoenix' remarks at *Il.* 9.458-461 are genuine then he does actually plan to murder his father, but a god prevents him from carrying out his plan. These lines may well have been interpolated, however; see below, 60 n. 21.



c) *Permanence*

The third stock element of the exile motif is the idea of permanence – the exiles of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, whether they go into exile as the result of an act of homicide or as the result of a dispute, are all sundered *permanently* from their original communities. In other words, the exile loses his νόστος (‘homecoming’ or ‘return home’), and even his desire for νόστος.<sup>42</sup> Given the importance of the concept of νόστος in the early Greek epic tradition – not only does Odysseus’ homecoming furnish the central theme of the *Odyssey*, but the same poem features an extended account of Menelaus’ homecoming, and the homecomings of various other heroes were recounted in the Cyclic *Nostoi* – one would expect much weight to be given to the exile’s loss of νόστος. It is surprising, therefore, to discover that this loss of νόστος is never made explicit – we simply never hear of an exile returning home or even contemplating his return. Nevertheless, there seems to be an awareness in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* of the significance of the exile’s loss of νόστος, for we shall see in later chapters that the narrator sometimes invokes, or has characters invoke, the experience of exile at moments of potential or actual νόστος.

Since the exile’s loss of νόστος is never explicitly expressed, let alone explained, it is hard to ascertain exactly why Homeric exile is permanent. In some cases the exile finds a good enough life in exile to make any thoughts of νόστος unnecessary, or even undesirable (consider *Il.* 2.667-670, 9.480-484, 15.436-441). More generally, it may simply be that the threat of vengeance (or the stain of pollution) is deemed persistent

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<sup>42</sup> For the only possible exception, which it turns out is probably not an exception at all, see below, 80 n. 12.

enough – either by the exiles themselves or by the narrator – to make νόστος impossible, or at least unthinkable.

*d) Dependence – Integration and Wandering*

Finally we come to the fate of the exile in exile. The Homeric exile never gets to go home, so what does happen to him? Two possible fates await the exile in Homeric epic, both of which confirm the exile as a secondary, dependent figure. On the one hand, he may find permanent hospitality by integrating himself into another community.<sup>43</sup> On the other hand, the exile may become a wanderer, receiving temporary hospitality as he moves from place to place. These two possible outcomes for the exile need not be regarded as strict alternatives, for there is little evidence that those exiles who become wanderers give up on the idea of integration. It is also important to note that the fate of the exile in exile is not influenced by the circumstances of the exile – by whether, for example, it results from an act of homicide or from a dispute. Rather, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, with their different plots and different thematic emphases, focus on different aspects of exile. All of the exiles of the *Iliad* have already achieved integration, while most of the exiles of the *Odyssey*, even if they have not settled into a life of wandering, are still very much on the move.

It would, of course, be wrong to characterize the *Iliad* as an entirely static poem, even on the human level. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that human movement is a less important theme in this poem than in the *Odyssey*. It is perhaps unsurprising then that in

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<sup>43</sup> An important variation is Tlepolemus, who instead of integrating into an existing community founds a new community of his own (*Il.* 2.661-670).

the *Iliad*'s depiction of exile, integration into another community has in every case already taken place. This being the case, the process of integration is only ever described retrospectively, and never in detail, but the end result is clear enough: the exile is received into another's house and finds permanent hospitality there. Judging from the cases of Phoenix and Patroclus, this seems to be a one-step process, for each of these exiles is, it appears, treated as a permanent member of his host's household as soon as he has been received into it (*Il.* 9.480-484; *Il.* 23.89-90). That is not to say that the reception of an exile is not attended by a certain amount of ceremony – in the case of Epeigeus the exile is described as supplicating his (future) host (*Il.* 16.574), and Giordano may well be right when she argues that even in cases where supplication is not specifically mentioned, some form of the ritual should be assumed.<sup>44</sup> The fact that supplication is explicitly mentioned as part of the reception of an exile only in the case of Epeigeus should probably be taken to suggest that an exile would, whenever possible, seek integration into a community with which he already has strong ties, based either on kinship or ξενία ('hospitality'), which would render supplication little more than a formality. A preexisting relationship between host and exile would also explain the apparent willingness with which exiles such as Phoenix and Patroclus are received, as well as the fact that Patroclus' father Menoetius seems to have deliberately chosen the place where his son will live in exile (*Il.* 23.85-86).

Hospitality in Homeric society is a reciprocal arrangement, however, so how does the integrated exile of the *Iliad* pay for the permanent hospitality he receives, given that he is not in a position to offer hospitality in return? The standard solution is for the exile

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<sup>44</sup> Giordano (1999) 101; for supplication as a feature of Homeric hospitality, especially when the guest's need is greater than normal (as is the case with an exile), see Reece (1993) 16-17.

to become the attendant of his host (or to be appointed as the attendant of someone in his host's family). Whatever the exact function he fulfils, the fact that the exile must pay for his place through his services makes him a secondary, dependent figure. As one might expect given the general context of the *Iliad*, the exile's attendance on his host usually has a military meaning – the exile functions as the battlefield companion of his host. As such, Lycophron and Patroclus are each described as the θεράπων ('attendant') of their respective hosts, Aias and Achilles (*Il.* 15.431; *Il.* 23.90), the term θεράπων being reserved in the *Iliad* almost exclusively for the attendants of important warriors and being found most often in battlefield contexts (*Il.* 5.580, 6.53, 11.322).<sup>45</sup> Both Lycophron and Patroclus also have the more general term ἑταῖρος ('companion') applied to them, a word that, again, has strong military connotations (*Il.* 2.417, 4.491, 17.589). The vocabulary of sending is also used prominently in the *Iliad* to express the exile's dependent status: both Phoenix and Epeigeus are sent to Troy with Achilles (Phoenix: ἔπεμπε, προέηκε, *Il.* 9.438, 442; Epeigeus: πέμπων ἔπεσθαι, *Il.* 16.575). In the latter case, at least, this again implies attendance on the battlefield since Epeigeus is sent to Troy with Achilles specifically ἵνα Τρώεσσι μάχοιτο ('in order that he might fight with the Trojans,' *Il.* 16.576). In the case of Phoenix, however, who is not fit for such service, another suitable role is found. Since Phoenix is too old to fight, Peleus sends him to advise Achilles and instruct him in speech and action (με προέηκε διδασκόμεναι τάδε πάντα, | μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων, *Il.* 9.442-443).

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<sup>45</sup> Moreover, a group of warriors can be described as θεράποντες Ἄρης ('attendants of Ares,' *Il.* 2.110, 6.67, 8.79 etc.). The etymology and meaning of the term θεράπων are both extremely vexed issues; see van Brock (1959) 117-126, Chantraine (1970) *ad loc.*, Nagy (1979) 292-293, Lowenstam (1981) 126-131, and Tarenzi (2005).

The most important consequence of the exile's secondary, dependent status, which manifests itself in the *Iliad* through his service as the attendant of another hero, is that it prevents the exile from fulfilling his own potential as a hero, since this is closely tied to status. The case of Epeigeus – who, it seems, leaves his original community rather later in his career than most other exiles – is a particularly good example of this. In his original community Epeigeus is king (*Il.* 16.571-573). In exile, though still a warrior, he is relegated to the position of follower of Achilles (*Il.* 16.575-576). Even the exile Patroclus, a warrior capable of driving the Trojans back from the ships, remains an essentially dependent figure. Achilles points out that Patroclus' hands ἄπτοι | μᾶινονθ' ('rage invincible,' *Il.* 16.244-245) when Achilles himself is present on the battlefield, but he is unsure whether οἷος ἐπίστηται πολεμίζειν | ἡμέτερος θεράπων ('my attendant knows how to fight on his own,' *Il.* 16.243-244).<sup>46</sup> Achilles' doubts prove prophetic; after initial success fighting in Achilles' absence, Patroclus falls at the hands of Hector.

If the presentation of the exile as having already gained integration into another community is the norm in the *Iliad*, quite the opposite state of affairs prevails in the *Odyssey*, an epic of νόστος that is deeply interested in human movement of all sorts, and wandering in particular. That is not to say, of course, that all of the exiles of the *Odyssey* are already wanderers, but certainly in the majority of cases – including the two most important cases of exile in the *Odyssey* – the exile has not yet managed to integrate

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<sup>46</sup> Patroclus' designation in this passage as a θεράπων of Achilles is particularly fitting, for during his *aristeia* Patroclus is clearly acting as a substitute for Achilles, and van Brock (1959) has shown that 'substitute' was the original meaning of θεράπων. As a substitute for Achilles, Patroclus should stay "within his limits as the recessive equivalent of the dominant hero" (Sinos in Nagy (1979) 292).

himself into another community, and wandering, even if not yet a reality, is a definite possibility.

Wandering as a potential outcome of exile is not entirely absent from the *Iliad* – the exile Tlepolemus, who founds a new community in Rhodes, is described as coming there ‘in his wandering’ (ἀλώμενος, *Il.* 2.667). Likewise, integration into a new community is not entirely absent from the *Odyssey* – the exile Polyphides, father of the exile Theoclymenus, establishes himself permanently in Hyperesia (*Od.* 15.254-255). Nevertheless, the connection between exile and wandering is particularly strong in the *Odyssey*. On at least one occasion we hear of an exile actually becoming a wanderer: Eumaeus describes how he once gave (temporary) hospitality to an unnamed Aetolian who arrived at his hut πολλήν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀληθείς (‘having wandered much over the earth,’ *Od.* 14.380). In other cases, the exile is not yet a wanderer but is on the way – or sees himself as being on the way – to becoming one. Theoclymenus, whose exile appears to be recent since he believes that his victim’s kinsmen are still in pursuit (*Od.* 15.277-278), clearly thinks that wandering is his likely fate, as his words to Telemachus show: φεύγω, ἐπεὶ νύ μοι αἴσα κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλησθαι (‘I flee, since now it is my fate to wander among men,’ *Od.* 15.276). And the Cretan exile invented by Odysseus, abandoned on an unknown shore (*Od.* 13.276-286), appears to believe that he faces similarly bleak prospects, as we shall see in Chapter Three.

Since most of the exiles of the *Odyssey* have not yet won for themselves the security that comes with integration into another community, they are, if anything, even more dependent on others than the exiles of the *Iliad*. This secondary, dependent status takes two forms for the exiles of the *Odyssey*. First, both the Cretan exile invented by

Odysseus and the real exile Theoclymenus rely on the assistance of others in making their escape into exile.<sup>47</sup> Odysseus in his Cretan persona tells how, even though he is a wealthy man who held an independent command at Troy (*Od.* 13.257-259, 265-266), he beseeched (ἐλλισάμην, *Od.* 13.273) some Phoenicians to grant him passage from Crete; and Theoclymenus supplicates (ικέτευσσα, *Od.* 15.277; cf. *Od.* 15.261) Telemachus to take him to safety on board his ship. It is striking that both Odysseus' and Theoclymenus' requests for passage involve supplication, which, as we have seen, is also mentioned once in the *Iliad* in the context of exile. The presence of supplication further suggests the secondary, dependent status of the exile, since supplication, as Gould notes, involves the physical and verbal expression of inferiority.<sup>48</sup> In addition to depending upon others for aid in fleeing into exile, the exiles of the *Odyssey*, like those of the *Iliad*, also depend upon others for hospitality, though this time of a temporary nature. The unnamed Aetolian exile mentioned by Eumaeus is welcomed warmly in the swineherd's hut (*Od.* 14.381), but is only given temporary hospitality, since Eumaeus' account clearly implies that he is no longer there. Similarly, Telemachus asks Peiraeus to provide the exile Theoclymenus with hospitality and it seems from Peiraeus' response that, though he is willing to entertain Theoclymenus for as long as is required, he envisages only a temporary stay since he still refers to Theoclymenus as a stranger (*Od.* 15.546).

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<sup>47</sup> For whatever reason, the exile's dependence on others in making good his escape is not a feature of any of the exile scenes in the *Iliad* – except in the case of Patroclus, who (presumably because he is a child) is escorted into exile by his father Menoetius; see below, 80 n. 12 – but even in the case of adult exiles this form of dependence is not, of course, incompatible with the ultimate outcome of exile that prevails in the *Iliad*, viz. integration.

<sup>48</sup> Gould (1973) 94; for supplication as a ritual expression of the powerlessness of the suppliant and power of the supplicated see further Seaford (1994) 70.

Though exile and wandering are closely related in the *Odyssey*, it would be wrong to assume that exile is simply a subset of wandering. In cases where an exile becomes a wanderer, as with the unnamed Aetolian, there are, to be sure, many similarities between exiled wanderers and wanderers more generally, but some important differences remain. As we have seen already, owing to the nature of the events that lead to exile, any exile, including one who becomes a wanderer, is at least partly responsible for his departure from his original community, whereas other victims of displacement often bear little or no responsibility for their wanderings. Odysseus' wandering, for example, begins when a storm drives his fleet off course as it rounds Malea (*Od.* 9.80-81), and in his lying tales to Eumaeus and Antinous his life of wandering begins when he is defeated in battle, through no fault of his own (*Od.* 14.259-284; *Od.* 17.428-444). Moreover, while exile is permanent, wanderers who are not exiles can return home, as Odysseus finally manages to do. For the exile, then, any resistance to wandering must come not in the form of trying to return home, as is the case with other wanderers, but of trying to gain integration into another community.

As we have seen, the *Odyssey* avoids depicting the integration of exiles, though there is one minor example of it. Segal has even concluded that “In this post-Iliadic world, such a man can no longer be absorbed into a hero's retinue,” basing this opinion not only on the *Odyssey*'s apparent lack of interest in integration but also on the poem's interest in the potential benefits of travel<sup>49</sup> – in his false tale to Penelope, for example, Odysseus claims to have heard that ‘Odysseus’ has delayed his νόστος because οἱ τό γε κέρδιον εἶσατο θυμῷ, | χρήματ' ἀγυρτάζειν πολλὴν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἰόντι· (‘it seemed more

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<sup>49</sup> Segal (1994) 175; for the potential of travel to bring profit see also Dougherty (2001) 43-50, 102-121.



profitable to his mind to gather possessions, travelling far over the earth,' *Il.* 19.283-284). It is likely, however, that integration remains the preferred outcome for the exiles of the *Odyssey* – especially since wandering, the alternative to integration, seems to have rather less potential for profit than is found in the more directed travel mentioned by Odysseus in his tale to Penelope.<sup>50</sup> Integration would seem to be a real possibility for an exile like Theoclymenus.<sup>51</sup> Unlike the exiles of the *Iliad*, Theoclymenus is unable to win immediately permanent hospitality from Telemachus, partly because of the state of affairs in Telemachus' household but perhaps also because there is no preexisting relationship between them. There is a suggestion, however, that permanent hospitality is what Theoclymenus is aiming at. The pathetic emphasis that he places at *Od.* 15.276 on his fate as a wanderer, for example, should perhaps be read as an offer to Telemachus to read between the lines and prevent this outcome. Furthermore, Theoclymenus' ultimate fate is left open – we never hear whether he ends up winning permanent hospitality from Telemachus or whether he has to move on. The usefulness of Theoclymenus' skills as a prophet, however, would no doubt increase his chances of gaining integration, as is suggested by the fate of Theoclymenus' father Polyphides, also an exile, who moved to Hyperesia and μαντεύετο πᾶσι βροτοῖσι ('prophesied to all mortals,' *Od.* 15.255). Far

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<sup>50</sup> It should be noted, for instance, that in the lying tale to Penelope the narrator is careful to have Odysseus avoid using the vocabulary of wandering when speaking of travel for profit – the neutral phrase πολλὴν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἰόντι ('travelling far over the earth,' *Od.* 19.284) is used to describe the movements of 'Odysseus'; cf. the phrase πολλὴν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀληθείς ('having wandered far over the earth,' *Od.* 14.380), which is applied to the Aetolian exile who once came to Eumaeus' hut.

<sup>51</sup> Adhering to a well-established scholarly tradition, Segal (1994: 175) has a rather poor opinion of Theoclymenus' place in the *Odyssey*, calling him a "remnant of the Iliadic pattern" and "somewhat of an embarrassment" for Telemachus.

from wandering as an outcome of exile simply being subsumed by wandering more generally, then, there is a real tension, even in the *Odyssey*, between exile and wandering.

It remains, then, to explain why wandering is a fate to be avoided. We have just seen that the *Odyssey* can depict more directed travel as potentially having positive consequences in the form of material gain, and it should be pointed out that even wandering is depicted in the *Odyssey* as being not entirely without its compensations, albeit entirely incidental ones. Even in his wanderings Odysseus has an eye for profit – it is this that leads him to linger in the Cyclops’ cave (*Od.* 9.228-229). Moreover, as Silvia Montiglio has shown, for example, wandering is regarded as ambiguous in ancient Greek culture, including Homeric epic; the wanderer gains superior knowledge from his experiences, but he does this at the cost of great suffering.<sup>52</sup> The *locus classicus* for the expression of this idea is the proem of the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 1.1-4):

Ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα, πολύτροπον, ὃς μάλα πολλὰ  
πλάγχθη, ἐπεὶ Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε·  
πολλῶν δ’ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω,  
πολλὰ δ’ ὄ γ’ ἐν πόντῳ πάθεν ἄλγεα ὃν κατὰ θυμόν

*Tell me, Muse, of the man of many turns, who was driven far when he had sacked the holy citadel of Troy. And he saw the cities and knew the minds of many men, and he suffered in his heart many pains on the sea.*

Despite this ambiguity, however, it is the suffering that attends wandering that is usually emphasized. The link between wandering and suffering is less prevalent in the *Iliad*, probably because wandering is generally less important in this poem. Nevertheless, the wandering of Tlepolemus, who is not just a wanderer but a wandering exile, is accompanied by ἄλγεα (‘pains,’ *Il.* 2.667), and Achilles twice complains that

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<sup>52</sup> See Montiglio (2005) 3-5, 24-37.

Agamemnon is treating him like a ἀτίμητον μετανάστην ('worthless vagrant,' *Il.* 9.648, 16.59), which – if μετανάστης should indeed be taken to mean something close to 'wanderer' or 'vagrant' – presents a less than positive view of wandering.<sup>53</sup> In the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, we very often find wandering linked with suffering. The most concise expression of this link is Odysseus' remark that πλαγκτοσύνης δ' οὐκ ἔστι κακώτερον ἄλλο βροτοῖσιν ('there is nothing more evil for mortals than wandering,' *Od.* 15.343), and he goes on to add that wanderers κακὰ κήδε' ἔχουσιν ('have evil woes,' *Od.* 15.344). Elsewhere Odysseus remarks how much he himself has suffered in the course of his wanderings: ἐπεὶ δὴ δηθὰ φίλων ἄπο πῆματα πάσχω ('since, in truth, I have long been suffering ills far from those dear to me,' *Od.* 7.152). Alcinous agrees, and remarks at the end of Odysseus' tale of his wanderings: μάλα πολλὰ πέπονθας ('you have suffered very much,' *Od.* 13.6). Likewise, Eumaeus responds to one of Odysseus'

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<sup>53</sup> These are the only two occurrences in Homeric epic of the word μετανάστης, the precise meaning of which remains unclear. Two lines of interpretation have been followed, both taking μετανάστης to derive from μεταναίω ('to change one's dwelling place'). (A derivation from μετανασθῆναι ('to remove (from a place)'), current in antiquity and once supported by modern scholars, is now widely rejected; see Chantraine (1968) *ad loc.*) Some scholars have taken μετανάστης to refer to anyone who has moved from his or her original community to live in another (see Leaf (1960) *ad Il.* 9.648, who defines the μετανάστης as "one who has changed his home"; and Calhoun (1962) 434, who defines the μετανάστης as a "permanent resident in a *polis* not his own"). If this is the case, even the exile who has successfully integrated himself into a new community could be considered a μετανάστης and, indeed, Martin applies the term to Phoenix: "Phoenix is technically a *metanastês*" (Martin (1992) 18, followed by Kelly (2008) 197 n. 61 and Tsagalis (2008) 123; cf. Mackie (1996) 147-148). The second, and in my opinion more convincing, line of interpretation takes μετανάστης to refer to anyone who is constantly changing his or her place of dwelling (see Chantraine (1968) *ad loc.*, who favours the translation "émigrant, fugitif"; Adkins (1972) 14, who says that the μετανάστης is a "wanderer" who has "nowhere to lay his head save by the favour of others"; Schlunk (1976) 205-206 and Hammer (1996-1997) 344-347, who translate "vagabond"; and Hainsworth (1993) *ad Il.* 9.648, who translates "refugee"). In this case, only an exile who has not yet found a permanent place in a new community would be a μετανάστης – such a figure as the Aetolian exile who comes wandering to the hut of Eumaeus (*Od.* 14.379-381).

fictitious tales of wandering by explicitly linking wandering to suffering (*Od.* 14.361-362):

ἄ δειλὲ ξείνων, ἧ μοι μάλα θυμὸν ὄρινας  
ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθεις ἦδ' ὅσ' ἀλήθης.

*Ah, wretched stranger, indeed you have greatly stirred my heart, telling all these things –  
how much you have suffered and how much you have wandered.*

Finally, the term ἀλήτης, which is derived from ἀλόμαι ('to wander') and should literally mean 'wanderer,' is only used in Homeric epic of beggars and seems to mean 'vagrant' (*Od.* 17.578, 18.18; cf. ἀλήμονες, *Od.* 17.376, 19.74). Life as a wanderer, then, is an unattractive proposition, and it is little wonder that exiles seek an alternative.

### ***Theoretical Perspectives***

Thus far I have limited my discussion of exile in Homeric epic to structural considerations. That is, I have discussed exile only as a motif – a fixed and recurring narrative sequence. But this analysis of the structure of the exile motif provides only part of the foundation required for the detailed analysis of the thematic significance of individual instances of exile that will follow in subsequent chapters. For in order to explain the thematic significance of exile in Homeric epic it is necessary to consider some of the conceptual issues surrounding exile. With this in mind, it will be useful to consider some recent, and not so recent, theoretical discussions of exile (and closely related forms of displacement) whether as a purely literary phenomenon or as an historical one. Exile has become increasingly prominent as the object of theoretical discussion, though theoretical interest in it goes back to antiquity. As one would expect,

however, and as is the case with any complex issue, no definitive ‘theory of exile’ has emerged, but rather there has been a steady accumulation of sometimes competing, sometimes complementary approaches. It would be impossible to cover here all of the various opinions and arguments that have been put forward, but three areas that have received a good deal of attention in theoretical discussions of exile will prove to be of particular interest with regard to exile in Homeric epic: the relationship between exile and the concepts of home and homecoming (νόστος); the relationship between exile and identity; and the ambiguous and even paradoxical nature of exile.

*a) Exile and Home*

The concepts of exile and home are naturally opposed – exile involves, precisely, displacement from one’s home. And indeed, the importance of this opposition has certainly been acknowledged in theoretical discussions of exile as both an historical and literary phenomenon. Said, for example, a central figure in the theoretical discussion of exile, describes exile as the “unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, between the self and its true home.”<sup>54</sup> As such, Said argues, the exile is “always out of place” and faced with the question, “What is it like to be born in a place, to stay and live there, to know that you are of it, more or less forever?”<sup>55</sup> This sense of estrangement experienced by the exile in another community, this sense of not feeling ‘at

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<sup>54</sup> Said (2000) 173.

<sup>55</sup> Said (2000) 180-181.

home’ – a phenomenon that occupies an important place in modernist aesthetics<sup>56</sup> – is informed by a conception of the community that has been left behind as the exile’s ‘real’ home. In a similar vein, it has long been recognised that the memory of home and longing for home, or nostalgia, play a central role in shaping the experience of exile.<sup>57</sup>

The conception of the native place or original community as the exile’s ‘real’ home, and the consequent relegation of the rest of the world to a place of estrangement, has not gone unchallenged. Said himself, it should be noted, is aware that the concept of home is easy to take for granted, with the result that its “underlying assumptions recede into dogma and orthodoxy.”<sup>58</sup> The most important challenge, for our purposes, to the ‘orthodox’ view of home, and the relationship between home and exile, comes in the form of the argument that anywhere – or, at least, many places other than one’s native land or original community – has the potential to be home. Such arguments are, in fact, already found in ancient discussions of exile. Plutarch, for example, argues in his treatise *On Exile* that a place is ‘native’ only insofar as it is considered so (*de Ex.* 600E), and concludes that even if an individual is deprived of one part of the world, he or she can find a home somewhere else (*de Ex.* 602B-C):<sup>59</sup>

οὐ δὲ ἡ τύχη τὴν ἰδίαν ἀφήρηται, τούτῳ δίδωσιν ἔχειν τὴν ἀρέσασαν. τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐκεῖνο παράγγελμα τῶν Πυθαγορείων· “ἔλοῦ βίον τὸν ἄριστον, ἡδὺν δὲ αὐτὸν ἢ συνήθεια

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<sup>56</sup> See Boym (1996) and Kaplan (1996) 28, 94, both of whom concentrate specifically on the artist as exile, but whose conclusions are applicable to the figure of the exile more generally.

<sup>57</sup> See, for example, Levin (1966) *passim*; for nostalgia in particular see Levin (1966) 70, Boym (1996) 511-512, and Kaplan (1996) 33-34.

<sup>58</sup> Said (2000) 185.

<sup>59</sup> Quotations from Plutarch’s *On Exile* are taken from the most recent Budé edition.

ποιήσει,” κἀνταῦθα σοφόν ἐστὶ καὶ χρήσιμον· “ἐλοῦ πόλιν τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ ἡδίστην, πατρίδα δὲ αὐτὴν ὁ χρόνος ποιήσει”<sup>60</sup>

*To the man whom she has deprived of his own city fortune gives whatever city pleases him to be his own. For that fine precept of the Pythagoreans – ‘choose the best life, and habit will make it pleasant’ – is wise and useful here too: ‘choose the best and most pleasant city, and time will make it your fatherland.’*

Rather more recently, Malkki has adopted a strikingly similar position, though this time with regard to the mass displacement of refugees rather than exile at the level of the individual.<sup>61</sup> Malkki argues that the usual “‘making strange’ of the asylum country” operates on “the assumption that the homeland or country of origin is not only the normal but the ideal habitat for any person...the place where one fits in.” Rejecting this assumption on the grounds that it ignores the fact that displacement occurs “precisely when one’s own, accustomed society has become ‘strange and frightening’”<sup>62</sup> – estrangement, that is, is much more the cause of displacement than the result – Malkki raises the possibility that “‘home’ is where one feels most safe and at ease, instead of some essentialized point on the map.”<sup>63</sup> In other words, Malkki (like Plutarch) divorces the concept of home from a static native place or original community, and instead adopts a conception of home that suggests the potential for anywhere to be home, provided that it feels like home. It is worth pointing out that Malkki’s conception of the relationship

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<sup>60</sup> Such a position is not unique to Plutarch in the ancient world. In Aristophanes’ *Wealth*, for example, Hermes remarks: πατρις γάρ ἐστι πᾶσ’ ἕν’ ἂν πράττη τις εὖ (‘for each man has his fatherland where he does well,’ *Plut.* 1151); cf. Cicero’s quotation of a similar remark from Pacuvius’ *Teucer* during his brief discussion of exile at *Tusc. Disp.* 5.37.106-109.

<sup>61</sup> See Malkki (1995) 509; although Malkki focuses on mass displacement in particular, her discussion is sensitive to the experiences of the individual participants in such mass movements.

<sup>62</sup> Malkki (1995) 509.

<sup>63</sup> Malkki (1995) 509; for the destabilization of the relationship between place, and more specifically home, and geographical location see further Massey (1992) 11-15.

between exile and home implies not the resolution of the ‘orthodox’ exile/home opposition, but rather the inversion of it; for Malkki, home becomes the place of estrangement, and the rest of the world a potential home.

From the importance of the concept of home for an understanding of the concept of exile there naturally arises the question of homecoming, or νόστος. Interestingly, although constructions of the relationship between exile and home differ, it is generally agreed that, for the exile, homecoming is impossible. As we have seen already, Said describes exile as an ‘unhealable rift,’ and he goes to add that “The pathos of exile is the loss of contact with the solidity and satisfaction of earth: homecoming is out of the question.”<sup>64</sup> Said never really explains why he thinks that homecoming is ‘out of the question’ – he seems simply to assume this as a defining feature of exile. Malkki’s construction of the relationship between exile and home, however, does provide an explanation of the impossibility of homecoming. Since, according to Malkki, estrangement is as much the cause of displacement as its result and home is where one is ‘most at ease,’ “it is far from clear that returning where one fled from is the same thing as ‘going home’”<sup>65</sup> – homecoming, in the ‘orthodox’ sense of returning to one’s native place or original community, is impossible if that place is no longer home. Moreover, it is unnecessary, provided that one has been able to find a home elsewhere. A similar explanation of the impossibility of homecoming has been advanced by Buruma. Like Malkki, Buruma argues that the exile’s original home becomes a place of estrangement, although unlike Malkki he sees this estrangement as taking place after the exile has left: “After a life in exile, it is often too late to go back. Too much had happened while you

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<sup>64</sup> Said (2000) 179.

<sup>65</sup> Malkki (1995) 509.



were away. You have become a stranger. The country that you remember is no longer the country that you left.”<sup>66</sup> Again, homecoming in the usual sense is impossible if home is no longer home.

So how do these theoretical discussions of the relationship between exile and home and between exile and homecoming relate to exile in Homeric epic? As one might expect, given the emphasis on integration in the *Iliad* and on wandering in the *Odyssey*, these theoretical discussions of exile have the potential to contribute to our understanding of exile in different ways with regard to each poem.

The *Iliad*, in most ways at least, fits the model proposed by Malkki, according to which the exile is estranged from his or her old home but can potentially find a new home elsewhere. Moreover, and this is not part of Malkki’s model, for the exiles of the *Iliad* this search for a new home is (usually) rather painless. Estrangement from the exile’s original home is not stressed in the *Iliad*, but the exile is nevertheless, as we have seen, compelled to leave, whether because of the threat of vengeance or for religious reasons. Whatever it is that compels him to leave, the Iliadic exile is not destined to be homeless. Indeed, if the experience of Tlepolemus is anything to go by, the Iliadic exile has the potential to make his home almost anywhere – after going into exile as the result of the murder of his great-uncle Lycymnius, Tlepolemus is able to found an entirely new community in Rhodes and make his home there (*Il.* 2.661-668), though first he ‘suffers pains in his wandering’ (ἀλώμενος, ἄλγεα πάσχω, *Il.* 2.667). Tlepolemus’ experience of exile is unique, since he is the only Iliadic, or indeed Homeric, exile to found an entirely new community – the other Iliadic exiles are able to find new homes for

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<sup>66</sup> Buruma (2001) 35.

themselves through integration into existing communities. As we have seen, such integration seems to be achieved with little trouble, probably as a result of preexisting relationships between the exiles and their hosts. That the communities in which the Iliadic exiles find themselves qualify as new homes, at least in accordance with Malkki's proposed definition of home as the place in which a person feels 'most safe and at ease,' is evidenced by the fact that the exiles of the *Iliad* have every reason to feel this way in their new surroundings – Tlepolemus' foundation is favoured by Zeus and flourishes (*Il.* 2.668-670), while those who integrate themselves into existing communities are honoured and treated like members of the family (*Il.* 9.480-482; 15.437-439). It is important to note, however, that the *Iliad* does not eschew entirely the privileging of the original community as the exile's 'real' home. This privileging manifests itself in the fact that Iliadic exiles are – for all the good treatment they receive – secondary, dependent figures who, as we have seen, are never able to realise in their new homes the full heroic potential that they would have, and in some cases already have, realised in their old homes. The exile's new home, in other words, remains inferior in that it stunts heroic development. This loss of heroic potential in his new home must simply be accepted by the exile, for there is never any question of an exile returning to his original home – the exiles in the *Iliad*, like all exiles in Homeric epic, are sundered permanently from their original communities. This does not mean, however, that the concept of νόστος is irrelevant to the concept of the exile in the *Iliad* – as we shall see in Chapter One, the two concepts are paradoxically conflated in Phoenix' exile narrative to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, a narrative that aims, I shall argue, to dissuade Achilles from returning home by suggesting that in doing so he would, in a certain sense, turn himself into an exile.

The process of integration into a new community that allows the exiles of the *Iliad* to find new homes is, as we have seen, almost entirely absent from the *Odyssey*. Though there is nothing in the *Odyssey* to suggest that such integration is not possible, and the exile Polyphides in fact provides a minor example of it, the exiles of the *Odyssey* are nearly always presented as on the move. As a result, the ‘orthodox’ concept of native place or original community as a person’s ‘real’ home is rather more prominent in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad* – in the absence of a new community, and with it a new home, the exiles of the *Odyssey* continue to look back to, and to be defined by others in terms of, their old homes. Odysseus, for example, as part of his false claim to be an exile, remarks that he still has both children and possessions in Crete (*Od.* 13.257-259), which is perhaps meant to imply that he still views it as his real home. Similarly, Eumaeus refers to an exile who passed through his house only in terms of where he came from, calling him simply an Αἰτωλὸς ἀνὴρ (‘Aetolian man,’ *Od.* 14.379). As one might expect, however, it is the relationship between exile and νόστος, rather than exile and home, that is crucial in the *Odyssey*. Though they are presented as not yet having new homes, a return to their original homes is, to use Said’s phrase, as ‘out of the question’ for the exiles of the *Odyssey* as for those of the *Iliad*. Particularly important in this regard is the figure of Odysseus himself, who, though he is not an exile as I have defined the term, does claim to be one at the very moment of his return to Ithaca – we shall see in Chapter Three that, as with Phoenix’s exile narrative in *Iliad* 9, a delicate tension is thereby set up in Odysseus’ false exile narrative in *Odyssey* 13 between the concepts of exile and νόστος, and that it is ultimately his ability to return home that distinguishes Odysseus from genuine exiles.

b) *Exile and Identity*

Theoretical discussions of exile often characterize it in terms of loss. But what is lost, what is “left behind forever,” as Said puts it,<sup>67</sup> is more than just a location. In addition to this geographical loss, theoretical discussions have also considered the loss entailed by exile with relation to a nexus of concepts involving culture, language, and identity.<sup>68</sup> Of these three concepts, the loss of culture and language as the result of exile is not much of an issue in Homeric epic. It is, in general, “doubtful that most people’s social universe stops abruptly at the border of their own country,”<sup>69</sup> and this is certainly true for the characters in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* – nowhere in the text of either poem is there any hint of a cultural or linguistic divide between an exile and the community in which he finds himself, whether he has gained integration into that community or is merely passing through. Loss of identity, however, in the sense of losing what one takes to be one’s defining qualities, is a concern for the Homeric exile.

According to Julia Kristeva, this loss of identity, or loss of self as she terms it, manifests itself as a crisis of confidence:

*This means that, settled within himself, the foreigner has no self. Barely an empty confidence, valueless, which focuses his possibilities of being constantly other, according*

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<sup>67</sup> Said (2000) 173.

<sup>68</sup> A few examples will have to suffice. Said’s (2000) analysis of the conflict between nationalism and exile sets up exile as antithetical to nationalism’s affirmation of “the home created by a community of language, culture and customs” (176) – this ‘community of language, culture and customs’ is what the exile leaves behind. Similarly, Stein (1981) argues that victims of displacement “confront the loss of their culture – their identity, their habits” (325). For the loss of language in exile see Kristeva (1991: 15-16), who comments that the exile’s “realm is silence” (15).

<sup>69</sup> Malkki (1995) 509.

*to others' wishes and to circumstances. I do what they want me to, but it is not "me" – "me" is elsewhere, "me" belongs to no one, "me" does not belong to "me," ...does "me" exist?*<sup>70</sup>

Not everyone agrees with Kristeva, however, that exile involves such a radical loss of identity. Iain Chambers, for example, notes that exiles carry with them many aspects of their former lives, including a sense of identity:

*Our previous sense of knowledge, language and identity, our peculiar inheritance, cannot be simply rubbed out of the story, cancelled. What we have inherited – as culture, as history, as language, as tradition, as a sense of identity – is not destroyed but taken apart, opened up to questioning, rewriting and re-routing.*<sup>71</sup>

Identity, in other words, like culture and language, is not simply lost through the process of exile, though it has to be reassessed.

Applied to Homeric exile, Kristeva's analysis of the loss of identity that results from displacement rather overstates the case. There are, however, definite points of contact. All of the exiles of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are aristocratic; they are members of the class of heroes, and so share an heroic identity.<sup>72</sup> Heroic identity in Homeric epic is closely tied to social status, and in particular to an individual's ability to assert his claim to τιμή ('honour' or 'worth'), the most important marker of a hero's status while he is alive, and his ability to win more.<sup>73</sup> As we have seen, the Homeric exile's status is adversely affected, if not entirely lost, as the result of his displacement – even in the

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<sup>70</sup> Kristeva (1991) 8.

<sup>71</sup> Chambers (1994) 24.

<sup>72</sup> The only possible exception is the Aetolian exile mentioned briefly by Eumaeus at *Od.* 14.378-381, though the status of this exile is not evident from Eumaeus' words.

<sup>73</sup> For further discussion of heroic ideals see below, 48-53 ("Achilles and Heroism").

*Iliad*, where the exile routinely finds a new home, he must accept that he is of secondary, dependent status. As a result, the exile not only has less of a claim to τιμή but also significantly less say in where and when he goes about winning τιμή – in Kristeva’s words, quoted above, ‘I do what *they* want *me* to...“me” does not belong to “me.”’ Phoenix, Patroclus, and Epeigeus, for example, all come, or are sent, to Troy as followers of Achilles – and as we have seen already, and will consider more fully in Chapter Two, when Patroclus undertakes to act as an independent hero, disaster results. The exiles of the *Odyssey* are in an even more precarious position when it comes to loss of status – and thus loss of heroic identity – since, unlike their counterparts in the *Iliad*, they have not (yet) found permanent hospitality. There is nothing to suggest that the exiles of the *Odyssey* will not be able to gain integration into a new community – Theoclymenus, for example, would seem to be a likely candidate to gain a permanent place as the attendant of Telemachus – but until they do they are in no position to assert any claim to τιμή that they may have, let alone to win more.

Despite the fact, however, that the Homeric exile becomes a secondary, dependent figure – whether he has managed to integrate himself into a new community or must still rely on temporary hospitality – he still retains some of his heroic potential and thus some of his heroic identity. This is most evident in the *Iliad*, where the exile regularly appears alongside other heroes in battle – a key location for the winning of τιμή – usually in a secondary role, but sometimes even as a leader (*Il.* 13.693-697). Moreover, we are explicitly told that one exile at least, Lycophron, is honoured (ἐτίομεν, *Il.* 15.439) in his new home,<sup>74</sup> and other exiles are treated in such a way as to suggest that they are held in

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<sup>74</sup> For the relationship between τ(ι)ω and τιμή see Zanker (1994) 6-7 (with n. 9, which gives references).

similarly high regard (*Il.* 9.480-484, 23.89-90). The Homeric exile, then, is far from completely ‘valueless,’ to use Kristeva’s term, it is just that his claim to τιμή and his ability to win τιμή is no longer independent but tied instead to his relationship with his host. His identity – and more specifically his heroic identity – must, as Chambers suggests, be reassessed, but the result is downward revaluation rather than total loss.

*c) The Ambiguity of Exile*

Despite its negative consequences, a common theme in both ancient and modern thinking on exile is its ambiguous and even paradoxical nature – not everything about exile, it has often been argued, is bad. Ancient theoretical studies of exile either belong to or spring directly from the genre of consolation literature.<sup>75</sup> As such, these works naturally look, on the one hand, to play down, deny, or even invert what is usually regarded as the negative nature of exile and, on the other, to find in exile some unexpected benefit. The less convincing of the surviving examples of this sort of work smack of the rhetorical exercise of making the weaker argument the stronger. In his treatise *On Exile*, for example, Teles responds to a number of questions posed by an unnamed interlocutor regarding apparently negative consequences of exile and sets out to show that, without exception, these consequences are in fact either neutral or even positive. Other authors, such as Plutarch, take a more nuanced approach. Plutarch argues that even if exile is δεινόν (‘terrible,’ *de Ex.* 599f) or a σύμπτωμα (‘misfortune,’ *de Ex.* 600a), whatever negatives it contains can be mitigated by whatever positives remain in the specific circumstances,

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<sup>75</sup> The most important of these works are the treatises entitled *On Exile* by Teles, Musonius, Plutarch, and Favorinus, and Seneca’s *Consolatio ad Helviam*.

such as wealth and friends (*de Ex.* 600a). Moreover, Plutarch goes on to add, exile actually brings with it certain advantages. In particular, Plutarch mentions that the exile escapes noisome financial, political, and social obligations (*de Ex.* 602c) and that though the exile suffers a loss of power and renown he receives in return τὴν σχολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ('leisure and freedom,' *de Ex.* 604c). According to Plutarch, such advantages provide ample compensation for the disadvantages of exile and make it bearable, and in a sense even desirable.

Modern theoretical discussions of exile, too, are alive to its ambiguous and even paradoxical nature. Unlike ancient discussions of exile, however, modern discussions stress the distinction between exile as an actual, historical phenomenon and exile as an artistic, and especially literary, phenomenon, and note that only the latter is ambiguous and balances suffering with some sort of reward, the former being unambiguously negative.<sup>76</sup> Modern theoretical discussions of literary exile are certainly not ignorant of earlier models – Odysseus is frequently invoked as an Ur-exile<sup>77</sup> – but, naturally enough, tend to concentrate on modern, and specifically modernist, depictions of exile. As a result, the positive aspects of exile identified in modern theoretical discussions of exile – the aspects of exile, that is, that allow exile to be ambiguous – are rather different from the positive aspects of exile identified in ancient discussions. In particular, modern discussions of exile stress that the exile, as an outsider, gains a valuable critical perspective on his surroundings. This critical perspective is easily aestheticized and

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<sup>76</sup> Thus Said (2000: 173) distinguishes between “true exile” as a “condition of terminal loss” and exile as a “potent, even enriching, motif of modern culture.” Similarly, Buruma (2001: 33) argues, with a touch of hyperbole, that the two conditions have “nothing in common.” See also Malkki (1995) 512-515.

<sup>77</sup> See, for example, Buruma (2001) 35; but cf. Said (2000) 181-182.



produces the modern image of the exile as lonely intellectual.<sup>78</sup> The resulting ambiguity is nicely summarised by Kaplan: “the celebration and valuation of exile in Euro-American modernist critical practices privileges distance and separation as aesthetic benefits even while simultaneously deploring any political or psychological crises that such conditions may engender.”<sup>79</sup>

The ambiguous nature of exile that is identified by both ancient and modern thinkers is certainly in evidence in the depiction of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. In the *Iliad* in particular, where integration is the norm, plenty of positives of the sort mentioned by Plutarch remain in the exile’s situation. Though the exiles of the *Iliad* are secondary figures who depend upon the permanent hospitality of their hosts, they nevertheless have all their needs provided for and in some cases evidently occupy positions of honour, wealth, and power (*Il.* 9.483-484, 15.437-439). There are fewer positives, perhaps, for the exiles of the *Odyssey*. Since they are always depicted as not yet having achieved integration into a new community their position is rather less secure and is closely associated, as we have seen, with the suffering that results from wandering of any sort. Nevertheless, even these exiles seem to have little difficulty finding temporary hospitality (*Od.* 14.380-381, 15.271-281). In addition to presenting exiles as, at the very least, being in a position to meet their basic needs, Homeric epic also makes use of the notion that the exile is blessed with an enhanced critical perspective, an aspect of exile that is particularly prominent in modern theoretical discussions of the topic. In Homeric

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<sup>78</sup> Already in antiquity there is an appreciation of the potential intellectual benefits of displacement, but these are associated with the wanderer more generally rather than the exile in particular; for the figure of the wandering intellectual in antiquity see Montiglio (2005) 91-117, 180-203.

<sup>79</sup> Kaplan (1996) 94.

epic, this aspect of exile can be seen most clearly in the fact that a number of exiles are given the role of wise adviser. This is most obviously the case in the *Iliad*, where the exiles Phoenix and Patroclus are expected to advise Achilles and moderate his behaviour (*Il.* 9.438-443; 11.785-789). The exile Theoclymenus plays a somewhat similar role in the *Odyssey*, though he is able to offer encouragement rather than advice (*Od.* 15.529-534; 17.151-161). The enhanced perspective of the exile is especially important in the case of Phoenix – as we shall see in Chapter One, it is specifically Phoenix’ experiences as an exile that put him in such an excellent position to be able to advise Achilles during the embassy scene in *Iliad* 9, since (I shall argue) Phoenix views Achilles as being at risk of become an exile of sorts himself.

No one theoretical approach is adequate, then, to describe and explain the depiction of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. In particular, we have seen that a given approach does not necessarily suit both poems. Instead, different approaches often work better with each poem’s handling of exile. We should be very cautious, however, about using this as evidence that the two poems have fundamentally different views of exile, still less that they describe fundamentally different social systems. Rather, the different ways in which the poems handle exile, and the consequent necessity to apply different theoretical approaches, result from the differences in plot and emphasis that have already been discussed – the *Odyssey* is an epic of νόστος and is broadly interested in all forms of human movement, whereas the *Iliad* is rather more static. This affects the handling of exile in each poem, but they both describe the same phenomenon within the same social system.

## ***Methodology***

The aim of this introductory chapter, in which I have discussed the structure of the exile motif in Homeric epic as well as some of the more conceptual issues surrounding exile, has been to lay a foundation for the analysis of three specific passages involving exile, an analysis that will occupy the following three chapters. The three passages to be analyzed in detail are the exile narratives delivered by Phoenix (*Il.* 9.444-495), by Patroclus (*Il.* 23.82-92), and by Odysseus pretending to be a Cretan (*Od.* 13.256-286). In my analysis of these three exile narratives, I shall concentrate on the significance of exile in its own right in the specific contexts in which the narratives are found. For the relationship between exile and the contexts in which it is found is something that the existing scholarly literature all but ignores, preferring instead either to focus on how the exile narratives fit into the large-scale structure of the poem in question or to pass over exile in favour of other themes that are present in the narratives. Thus Phoenix' exile narrative has been discussed primarily in terms of the parallels between it and the dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 1; Patroclus' exile narrative, which is delivered to a sleeping Achilles by a ghost, in terms of what it can tell us about dreams and the afterlife in Homeric epic; and Odysseus' (false) exile narrative in terms of its position at the start of a series of lying tales delivered by the hero. While these approaches are perfectly valid in their own right, and will have an important role to play in my own analysis of these passages, they tend to overlook the significance of these narratives precisely as *exile* narratives in the contexts in which they are found.

My analysis of the exile narratives of Phoenix, Patroclus, and Odysseus and of how they relate to their various contexts will focus closely on the texts themselves rather than on the application of a particular theoretical approach. Where necessary, however, a narratological approach will be used to supplement this text-based analysis. It is, of course, significant that each of the exile narratives in question is put into the mouth of a character, and more specifically into the mouth of the actual exile. The embedding of each of the three narratives in this way within the overall narrative complicates somewhat their interpretation. A complex relationship arises between the two levels of narration: the diegetic level and the metadiegetic level.<sup>80</sup> Although the diegetic narrator ultimately retains control over both levels, it is not always a simple matter to determine how much control over the narration of his own story the diegetic audience is asked to attribute to each exile. This is a very important question, however, for the amount of narrative control that is attributed to the exile helps to determine in turn the significance of the exile's narrative on both the metadiegetic and diegetic levels. A narratological approach – and, in particular, a sensitivity to the different levels of narration operating within the texts – will be of use in disentangling some of these complex relationships.

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<sup>80</sup> I adopt the terms 'diegetic' and 'metadiegetic' from Genette's (1972: 238-241) discussion of the levels of narration. The diegetic narrative, what de Jong (2001: xv) calls the "main story," is addressed by the 'main' narrator – that is, "the representative of the author in the text" (de Jong (2001) xv) – to the 'main' narratee – that is, "the representative of the hearers/readers in the text" (de Jong (2001) xv). A metadiegetic narrative, on the other hand, is a narrative addressed by one character in the diegetic narrative to another character. For the sake of consistency I shall refer to the main narrator as the 'diegetic narrator' and the main narratee as the 'diegetic audience,' and to a character-as-narrator as a 'metadiegetic narrator' and a character-as-narratee as a 'metadiegetic audience.' For the levels of narration (and their narrators and narratees) see further Prince (1982) 7-26 and Bal (1995) 43-75. For discussion of these issues with reference to Homeric epic, but with a particular focus on the *Iliad*, see de Jong (1987) 41-99, 149-194.

## CHAPTER ONE – PHOENIX

### *Introduction*

Having analyzed in detail the structure of the exile motif and having explored some of the more conceptual issues surrounding exile, we are now in a position to proceed to the interpretation of individual passages in which exile features. The first such passage that I wish to discuss is the exile narrative delivered by Phoenix to Achilles at *Il.* 9.444-495. This exile narrative occurs at a crucial point in the poem, during the embassy to Achilles. By the time Phoenix speaks, Achilles – who has already withdrawn to his hut and refused to fight as a result of his dispute with Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 – is threatening to return to Phthia. Phoenix’ exile narrative, I shall argue, represents an attempt on the part of the old man to dissuade Achilles from carrying out this threat.

Phoenix’ speech during the embassy to Achilles is one of the most controversial and widely discussed speeches in the *Iliad*. Much of the controversy stems from doubts that have been cast upon Phoenix’ inclusion in the embassy scene, and indeed the poem.<sup>1</sup> When the actual content of Phoenix’ speech is discussed, it is Phoenix’ use of the Meleager story as an exemplum that tends to receive the most attention, at the expense of the exile narrative with which Phoenix begins.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, when the exile narrative *is*

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<sup>1</sup> Interpretation of the use of duals for the members of the embassy (*Il.* 9.182, 185, 192, 196, 197) has proved particularly difficult; see especially Page (1959) 297-300, Köhnken (1975 and 1978), Nagy (1979) 49-55. The conclusion has often been drawn that there was an earlier version of the embassy scene that did not include Phoenix, a view most fully expressed by Page (1959) 297-304.

<sup>2</sup> Rosner (1976: 322) describes the Meleager story as “at once the most difficult and compelling of Phoenix’ arguments,” while Held (1987: 248) refers to the Meleager story as Phoenix’ “major plea” and

discussed, this discussion often limits itself to two areas. First, and in particular, many critics place a great deal of weight on Phoenix' appeal to the close emotional bond between himself and Achilles,<sup>3</sup> this despite Schlunk's important observation that the exile narrative is too "long and discursive" to be intended merely as an appeal to emotion.<sup>4</sup> Second, several critics have enumerated the parallels between the situation that Phoenix faces in his exile narrative and the situation faced by Achilles in the broader context of the *Iliad* – both Achilles and Phoenix argue with a figure of authority over a woman before withdrawing into isolation.<sup>5</sup> There is much to be said for such an approach to Phoenix' exile narrative, and the parallels between Phoenix and Achilles will play an important role in my analysis. Nevertheless, by focusing solely on the parallels between Phoenix' exile narrative and Achilles' situation in the broader context of the poem, such an approach runs the risk of suggesting that Phoenix is doing little more than pointing out that he once found himself in a similar position to the one in which Achilles finds himself. By paying attention to the immediate context – and, in particular, to the continuing commitment to heroic ideals expressed by Achilles in the immediately

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Phoenix' account of his exile as his "minor plea." For full bibliography on the Meleager narrative see above, 11-12 n. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Jaeger (1947) 27-28; Rosner (1976) 318; Tsagarakis (1979) 237-238; Martin (1992) 16; Mackie (1996) 147; Alden (2000) 215; West (2001) 10; and Kelly (2008) 197 n. 61.

<sup>4</sup> Schlunk (1976) 204-205.

<sup>5</sup> These parallels have been set out most clearly by Schein (1984) 111-112. For an overly complicated, and less convincing, analysis see Rosner (1976) 315-318. See also Ebel (1972) 86-89. The relevance of the parallels between the situation currently facing Achilles and the situation that faced Phoenix has been questioned by Held (1987: 247) on the rather weak grounds that Phoenix does not make the parallels explicit – as we shall see, given Achilles' state of mind Phoenix is in no position to do so. Others, such as Lohmann (1970) 261-271 and Bannert (1981), note that the parallels that connect Phoenix' exile narrative with Achilles' dispute with Agamemnon also connect both of these with the Meleager narrative later in Phoenix' speech (*Il.* 9.527-599).

preceding speech – it can be seen, I shall argue, that Phoenix is using these parallels for a particular purpose, which is to suggest to Achilles that by returning home he would in fact give up much of his heroic identity and become something close to an exile. In other words, Phoenix is able to use his own experience of exile to advise Achilles against exposing himself to a similar fate.<sup>6</sup>

### *Achilles and Heroism*

The speech in which Phoenix' exile narrative appears (*Il.* 9.434-605) is the third speech of the embassy to Achilles. It follows a speech in which Odysseus sets out Agamemnon's offer of reconciliation (*Il.* 9.225-306) and a speech in response by Achilles (*Il.* 9.308-429) in which he rejects Agamemnon's offer and threatens to return to Phthia. In order to understand how Phoenix attempts to influence Achilles' behaviour by means of his exile narrative – our particular concern – it is first necessary to assess the position that Achilles has adopted in his own speech, especially regarding the norms that govern heroic behaviour. A number of scholars have argued that Achilles adopts a position outside of the norms of heroic behaviour, which norms they often reconstruct solely on the basis of Sarpedon's famous speech at *Il.* 12.310-328.<sup>7</sup> As Gill has argued, however, such an

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<sup>6</sup> Martin (1992) has argued persuasively that Hesiod's self-characterization in the *Works and Days* as a figure with the authority to dispense advice is founded upon his status as an outsider – a position akin to the modernist recognition of the enhanced critical perspective of the exile – and has identified a similar 'metanastic poetics' in Phoenix' speech during the embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 (16-18). Martin accepts, however, the established view that Phoenix' actual exile narrative is designed simply to establish an emotional bond between Achilles and Patroclus (16) and does not argue that it contains any advice in its own right. See also Kelly (2008) 197 n. 61.

<sup>7</sup> See especially Parry (1956) 3-4 and Redfield (1975) 99-105.

approach is flawed in that it a) assumes that Sarpedon's speech is "*the* normative statement of Homeric ethical principles,"<sup>8</sup> and b) tends to compare "Sarpedon's whole speech with the generalizations or quasi-generalizations in Achilles' speech, wrenched from their context in Achilles' argument."<sup>9</sup> Gill goes on to demonstrate that once the argument of Achilles' speech is taken as a whole it clearly conforms in all important respects to the normative statements regarding heroic behaviour made by Sarpedon and other heroes in the poem. Though I focus on different details, the following discussion of Achilles' speech owes much to Gill's analysis.<sup>10</sup>

In the opening speech of the embassy, Odysseus reports to Achilles the desperate straits in which the Achaeans find themselves (*Il.* 9.229-246), urges Achilles to come to their aid (*Il.* 9.247-260), lists the lavish gifts that Agamemnon is prepared to give Achilles in addition to restoring Briseis to him (*Il.* 9.260-299), and concludes by suggesting the honour and glory that Achilles' return to battle would win for him from the Achaeans, especially if he were to kill Hector (*Il.* 9.300-306). Odysseus' speech is designed, then, to lure Achilles back into action with what Hainsworth calls the "twin carrots of κῦδος ['glory'] and τιμή."<sup>11</sup> Though Odysseus remarks in general terms that the Achaeans 'will honour Achilles like a god' (οἷ σε θεὸν ὦς | τεῖσουσ', *Il.* 9.302-303), it is the return of Briseis – who as Achilles' γέρας ('prize') was a material marker of his τιμή – along with lavish gifts that is the most important part of the 'carrot of τιμή.' Achilles, however, rejects Agamemnon's offer to return Briseis, along with the additional

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<sup>8</sup> Gill (1996) 132 (emphasis in original).

<sup>9</sup> Gill (1996) 132.

<sup>10</sup> Gill (1996) 131-154.

<sup>11</sup> Hainsworth (1993) *ad* 9.307-429.



gifts (*Il.* 9.336-337, 378-387). It is tempting to see Achilles' position here as a rejection of τιμή as a motivation for heroic action, but in fact Achilles is careful to distance his refusal to accept Agamemnon's offer from such a position. Achilles does this by distinguishing the τιμή usually conferred by gifts from the mere wealth involved in Agamemnon's offer. For the ability of gifts to confer τιμή depends as much on the character of the giver as on the value of the gifts themselves, as is clear from Achilles' remark that Agamemnon could pay ὅσ' ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν ποτινίσεται... ὅσα Θήβας | Αἰγυπτίας ('as much wealth as goes to Orchomenus, as much as goes to Egyptian Thebes,' *Il.* 9.381-382), but it would still not pay back the θυμολγέα λώβην ('outrage that pains the heart,' *Il.* 9.387) that he has done Achilles – that is, it would not make good his loss of τιμή, which cannot be measured in wealth alone.<sup>12</sup> The fact that Briseis herself, Achilles' original γέρας, is included in the offer makes no difference – Briseis was a γέρας when given by the Achaeans (*Il.* 1.162), but when offered by Agamemnon she is reduced to the level of the other gifts. The same line of reasoning is behind Achilles' claim that οὐ... ψυχῆς ἀντάξιον οὐδ' ὅσα φασὶν | Ἴλιον ἐκτῆσθαι ('not of the same worth as life is all that they say Ilium possessed,' *Il.* 9.401-402). In other words, Achilles is not prepared to risk death in exchange for mere wealth, of which he already has plenty (*Il.* 9.364-367).<sup>13</sup>

Achilles, then, by rejecting Agamemnon's offer, is not necessarily rejecting τιμή *per se*. In fact, Achilles' position in *Iliad* 9 as regards τιμή remains completely unchanged from his position in *Iliad* 1, where he showed himself a staunch defender of

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<sup>12</sup> For the importance of the character of the giver see Gill (1996) 145.

<sup>13</sup> For Achilles' refusal to be 'bought' see further Whitman (1958) 192-193, Claus (1975) 23-24, and King (1987) 30.

heroic norms in the face of Agamemnon's abuses. Achilles' general position in *Iliad* 1 is that he is inadequately rewarded for the fighting he does – Achilles complains that he never receives an ἴσον...γέρας ('equal prize,' *Il.* 1.163) to that received by Agamemnon, even though he does the lion's share of the fighting (τὸ...πλεῖον πολυαἰκός πολέμοιο | χεῖρες ἔμαϊ διέπουσ', *Il.* 1.165-166). On the contrary, Agamemnon receives a γέρας πολὺ μείζον ('much greater prize,' *Il.* 1.167). In *Iliad* 9, Achilles repeats exactly the same arguments in support of this position as those he used in *Iliad* 1, and even expands upon them. He states that οὐκ...τις χάρις ἦεν | μάρνασθαι δηίοισιν ἐπ' ἀνδράσι νωλεμές αἰεὶ ('there was no gratitude for fighting ever unceasingly against the enemy,' *Il.* 9.316-317), then adds the general comment that ἐν...ἰῆ τιμῇ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἡδὲ καὶ ἔσθλός ('in like honour is the coward and the brave man,' *Il.* 9.319). The suggested contrast between Achilles as ἔσθλός and Agamemnon as κακός is made explicit when Achilles goes on to describe how he is always risking his life in battle (αἰεὶ ἔμην ψυχὴν παραβαλλόμενος πολεμίζειν, *Il.* 9.322) and how he has sacked twenty-one cities in the course of the war (*Il.* 9.328-329). Agamemnon, meanwhile, μένων παρὰ νηυσὶ θεῶσι | δεξάμενος διὰ παῦρα δασάσκετο, πολλὰ δ' ἔχεσκεν ('remaining beside the ships would distribute a few things, once he had received them, but would hold on to much,' *Il.* 9.332-333). Achilles' withdrawal from the fighting in *Iliad* 1 and his refusal to return in *Iliad* 9 are, then, evidence for his commitment to τιμὴ as a motivation for heroic action, not for his rejection of it.

The second 'carrot' that Odysseus offers Achilles is κῦδος, which Odysseus suggests that Achilles can win by returning to the battlefield and killing Hector: ἦ γάρ κέ σφι [the Achaeans] μάλα μέγα κῦδος ἄροιο. | νῦν γάρ χ' Ἔκτορ' ἔλοις (*Il.* 9.303-304).

Achilles does not mention κῦδος in the course of his reply to Odysseus, but his comments on the closely related concept of κλέος ('fame') reveal his attitude towards Odysseus' proposal. Immediately after rejecting the lavish gifts offered by Agamemnon on the grounds that they would merely provide wealth, not a restitution of τιμή, and that wealth is not enough to risk death for, Achilles goes on to add (*Il.* 9.410-416):

μήτηρ γάρ τέ μέ φησι θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα  
 διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλοσδε.  
 εἰ μὲν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,  
 ὤλετο μὲν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται.  
 εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,  
 ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν  
 ἔσσεται, οὐδέ κέ μ' ὤκα τέλος θανάτοιο κιχεῖη.

*For my mother, the silver-footed goddess Thetis, tells me that twofold fates bear me towards the end that death brings. If, remaining here, I fight around the city of the Trojans, my return home is lost, but my fame will be imperishable; but if I go home to my dear fatherland my fair fame is lost, though I will have a long life and the end that death brings will not come swiftly upon me.*

The fact that Achilles has decided to go home – a decision that he now reveals will result in a long life, but will cost him his κλέος – appears, therefore, to be a rejection of κλέος as a motivation for heroic action. What Achilles is rejecting as a motivation for such action is not, however, κλέος itself, but attempts to win κλέος that do not conform to the norms of heroic behaviour. The proper route to κλέος requires the hero to prove his ability to defend his τιμή or to win more, which for the Achaean warriors at Troy can be achieved through the appropriate distribution of spoils won in battle. Agamemnon, however, has abused this system by taking Briseis back from Achilles and is now trying to make amends not with a true restitution of τιμή but with lavish gifts, with the result that if Achilles returns to the battlefield he will, in effect, be a mercenary. Since fighting

Hector in the service of Agamemnon brings no τιμή, and in the absence of any personal grievance between himself on the one hand and Hector and the Trojans on the other (*Il.* 1.152-157; *Il.* 9.337-338, cf. *Il.* 9.356) – a grievance that will only be provided by the death of Patroclus – any κῦδος or κλέος that Achilles might win by killing Hector would be hollow indeed. In these circumstances, it is better, Achilles says, to return home and enjoy the wealth he already possesses, a course of action that he repeatedly insists that he will follow (*Il.* 9.357-367, 393, 417-418, 427-429; cf. *Il.* 1.169-170). As was the case with τιμή, then, Achilles’ refusal to accept Agamemnon’s offer is evidence for his commitment to κλέος as an heroic ideal – if there is no κλέος to be won, which there cannot be in the absence of τιμή, then Achilles is not prepared to fight.

Achilles, then, rejects the offer made by Agamemnon through Odysseus and, what is worse, he also appears to be ready to abandon the Achaean expedition entirely. In taking this position Achilles is not, however, rejecting the norms that govern heroic behaviour, and in particular τιμή and κλέος as motivations for such behaviour. Rather, through his actions he demonstrates his steadfast commitment to these norms.

### ***Phoenix and Achilles in Exile***

Phoenix’ ultimate aim in responding to Achilles’ speech is to persuade Achilles to reconcile with Agamemnon and return to the fighting – an aim he tries to achieve through the parable of the Prayers (*Il.* 9.502-512) and the Meleager narrative (*Il.* 9.527-599) – but his first concern must be to prevent Achilles’ threatened departure for Phthia. Scodel, one of the few scholars to consider how Phoenix actually sets out to achieve this, argues

convincingly that Phoenix employs his exile narrative, at least in part, to persuade Achilles to stay. More specifically, Scodel argues that Phoenix deliberately presents his escape and flight from Hellas as ridiculous – in effect, he describes himself “gallantly evading a crowd of slave women”<sup>14</sup> (the *δμῳάς...γυναικας* of *Il.* 9.477). Achilles, Scodel contends, is being invited to see how he too will end up looking ridiculous if he follows Phoenix’ example by departing. Scodel goes on to note that Phoenix’ description of the fate he met with in Phthia is suggestive of what waits for Achilles if he returns home – a long, rich, but “sterile” life.<sup>15</sup> Scodel’s discussion of Phoenix’ exile narrative restricts itself, then, to these fairly specific points: Phoenix’ attempt to persuade Achilles of the ridiculousness of his departure from Troy and of the sterility of the life that awaits him in Phthia. But it is possible, I believe, to add greater depth to Scodel’s argument by extending it beyond the analysis of specific details in Phoenix’ narrative and considering in addition the significance of the respective positions of the speaker and the addressee – in other words, by asking how the fact that Phoenix is an exile and Achilles a staunch defender of heroic norms relates to what Phoenix has to say. By taking this contrast between heroic and exilic identity into account, it becomes possible to read Phoenix’ exile narrative, with its close parallels to Achilles’ own situation, as a warning to Achilles that by returning to Phthia he will risk becoming something close to an exile himself.

In the first part of his exile narrative, Phoenix describes how he became embroiled in a dispute with his father over a concubine (*Il.* 9.447-456). This dispute was the event that led directly to his exile, an action or event for which the exile is responsible or in which he is at least intimately involved being, as we have seen, a prerequisite of Homeric

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<sup>14</sup> Scodel (1982) 133.

<sup>15</sup> Scodel (1982) 133.

exile. That prerequisite has also been met in the case of Achilles, and in a way that bears a striking resemblance to Phoenix' story – Achilles has quarreled with Agamemnon, a figure of authority, over Briseis, a spear-bride. Even more important perhaps for our purposes is Phoenix' actual flight (*Il.* 9.474-480), which corresponds exactly to Achilles' proposed departure from Troy – Achilles will be leaving for the same reason as Phoenix fled (a dispute), and will even be going to the same place (Phthia) to be greeted by the same man (Peleus). Scodel limits herself to pointing out the ridiculous manner of Phoenix' flight, emphasizing that Phoenix makes good his escape λαθῶν φύλακας τ' ἄνδρας δμῳάς τε γυναῖκας ('unseen by the guards and slave women,' *Il.* 9.477). But it is not just the identity of the people whom Phoenix evades in the course of his flight that is at issue; the mere fact of fleeing has important implications. Flight to another country, which Phoenix refers to specifically twice in the course of his speech (φεύγω, *Il.* 9.448, 478), is a particular mark of the exile. It is not the sort of action called for by the norms of heroic behaviour. Achilles might like to view his departure as a principled and exemplary retreat (*Il.* 9.357-372, 417-418), but Phoenix responds by using the parallels between Achilles' situation and his own experience of exile to suggest that in leaving for Phthia Achilles will in fact be acting in a manner that will mark him out as an exile, or something dangerously close to it, rather than as a hero.

Achilles has presented his decision to leave as being founded upon the contention that there is nothing at Troy for which it is worth staying (*Il.* 9.316-322, 356). Phoenix responds to this contention by describing the sterility, both literal and figurative, of a life spent in exile (*Il.* 9.481-494) – he has lived a long, prosperous life in Phthia, but a life devoid not only of a son of his own (*Il.* 9.493-494), but also of heroic achievements and

even of the potential for such achievements. It is in this section of the exile narrative that Phoenix is able to suggest most forcefully to Achilles the potentially disastrous effects on the young warrior's heroism of a departure from Troy. Most significantly, Phoenix' exile has condemned him, like all exiles, to a secondary, dependent status. He is rich and rules over many people, but his wealth is not something he has won for himself, he was given it by Peleus, and his people are, like himself, peripheral (*Il.* 9.483-484):

καί μ' ἄφνειὸν ἔθηκε, πολὺν δέ μοι ὤπασε λαόν·  
ναῖτον δ' ἐσχατιὴν Φθίης, Δολόππεσιν ἀνάσσων.

*And he made me rich, and he granted me many people; and I dwelt in furthest part of  
Phthia, ruling over the Dolopians.*

Exile, Phoenix concedes, is not without its positives – positives of the sort mentioned by Plutarch in his theoretical discussion of exile. But the way in which these positive aspects of exile are gained and their peripheral nature points to their being counterbalanced, and even outweighed, by a loss, or at least reassessment, of identity (and in this case specifically heroic identity), a consequence of exile identified by Kristeva and Chambers. Phoenix' prime function in the *Iliad*, as educator and adviser of Achilles – which marks him out as the distant forebear of the modernist exile, who is notable for enjoying an enhanced critical perspective – also reveals his secondary, even unheroic, status. Himself the son of a king, Phoenix has had to endure much indignity and toil as an exile (*Il.* 9.490-492):

πολλάκι μοι κατέδευσας ἐπὶ στήθεσσι χιτῶνα  
οἴνου ἀποβλύζων ἐν νηπιέῃ ἀλεγεινῇ.  
ὥς ἐπὶ σοὶ μάλα πόλλ' ἔπαθον καὶ πόλλ' ἐμόγησα.

*Often you made wet the tunic on my breast, spitting out the wine in you troublesome  
childishness. Thus for you I have suffered very much and toiled much.*

These lines are no doubt intended to strike an emotional chord with Achilles – Phoenix goes on to say that he acted as he did in the hope that Achilles would become a son to him (*Il.* 9.493-495) – but they also show Phoenix as a secondary figure, an attendant, engaged in undeniably unheroic tasks.

Phoenix’ ability to act as a hero was greatly diminished, then, when he became an exile – in particular, his claim to *τιμή* and his ability to win more *τιμή* and, ultimately, *κλέος* became dependent upon another – and the parallels between the life that Phoenix found in Phthia and the life that awaits Achilles there should suggest to Achilles that he will suffer a similar diminution of heroic potential if he leaves Troy. In terms of *τιμή*, Achilles carries out his plan to return to Phthia and enjoy the wealth already stored up in his father’s house, together with whatever (insufficient) booty he has won at Troy,<sup>16</sup> he will be putting himself into much the same position as Phoenix occupied. He will be wealthy, but his wealth will be a gift from another rather than won with his own hands,<sup>17</sup> and so it will bring him limited *τιμή* – in fact, it will be little different from the wealth that has been offered to him by Agamemnon. In terms of *κλέος*, Achilles will fare even worse; his mother has already told him that by returning to Phthia he will forfeit his *κλέος ἄφθιτον* (‘imperishable fame,’ *Il.* 9.413), as one would expect of a man who has

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<sup>16</sup> Beyond his outrage over Agamemnon’s confiscation of Briseis, Achilles is not entirely consistent when it comes to the spoils he has won at Troy. In *Iliad* 1, where his sole aim is to stress his poor treatment at the hands of Agamemnon, he says that he receives only “something small” (*ὄλιγον*, *Il.* 1.167). In *Iliad* 9, however, where he is arguing that he can survive perfectly well without Agamemnon’s gifts, he says that he has acquired χρυσὸν καὶ χαλκὸν ἐρυθρὸν | ἠδὲ γυναῖκας εὐζώνους πολίων τε σίδηρον (‘gold and red bronze and well-girdled women and grey iron,’ *Il.* 9.365-366).

<sup>17</sup> At *Il.* 9.364 Achilles mentions wealth of his own that he has left in Phthia, although it is unclear whether he means wealth that he has won for himself or is simply referring to Peleus’ wealth as his own. At *Il.* 9.400 he speaks unambiguously of enjoying the possessions τὰ γέρων ἐκτήσατο Πηλεΐδης (‘that the old man Peleus has gained’).



chosen a life devoid of opportunities to win τιμή for himself. In other words, Achilles will become a secondary, dependent figure only slightly better off than Phoenix himself – and even once Peleus dies he will be no more than the king of a prosperous but only moderately powerful people.<sup>18</sup> Having chosen a life in which his claim to τιμή will depend upon what is given to him and in which he will not have the opportunity to increase his τιμή through his own exploits, thereby forfeiting his chance to win κλέος, Achilles will be left on the margins of heroic society.

Phoenix' exile narrative suggests two further negative aspects of the departure for Phthia being threatened by Achilles: the voluntary nature of Achilles' departure and its permanence. As Scodel remarks, "there is not a trace of remorse"<sup>19</sup> in Phoenix' exile narrative – as we have seen, Phoenix' description of his departure into exile in terms of flight indicates that he felt compelled to leave. Achilles, on the other hand, is by his own admission in a position to choose whether he stays or leaves (*Il.* 9.410-416). If he leaves, therefore, his 'exile' will be all the more galling in that it will be voluntary. Moreover, by representing Achilles' departure from Troy as a departure into exile, or something closely akin to it, Phoenix is able to suggest not only that to leave would be the wrong choice, but also that it would be an irreversible choice. The way in which Achilles himself presents the issue – as a choice between two competing fates – gives the impression of finality. Achilles words at *Il.* 9.410-411 in particular – μέ φησι θεὰ Θέτις ἀργυρόπεζα | διχθαδίας κῆρας φερέμεν θανάτοιο τέλοςδε ('the silver-footed goddess Thetis tells me

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<sup>18</sup> The number of ships led by Achilles, fifty (*Il.* 2.685), is only half what Agamemnon brings (*Il.* 2.576), and is also exceeded by Nestor (who brings ninety, *Il.* 2.602), Diomedes and Idomeneus (who bring eighty each, *Il.* 2.568, 652), and Menelaus (who brings sixty, *Il.* 2.587).

<sup>19</sup> Scodel (1982) 133.

that twofold fates bear me towards the end that death brings’) – suggest that whatever choice he makes, its consequences will last until his death. That is to say, if he leaves Troy he will not be able to return. Phoenix’ account of his own exile naturally confirms this impression, for (as we have seen) exile in Homeric epic is always permanent. Phoenix found a permanent home in Phthia, along with wealth and a measure of power (*Il.* 9.483-484); Achilles will be able to do the same, but like Phoenix he will also have to give up the pursuit of τιμή and κλέος *forever*.

Achilles’ potential loss of heroic status is no more than suggested by Phoenix’ account of his life as an exile, and Phoenix must rely on Achilles’ ability to see the parallels between the old man’s experience of exile and his own situation. This lack of explicitness can be explained with reference to context: Phoenix is addressing an over-sensitive and currently angry hero – a man who τάχα κεν καὶ ἀνάτιον αἰτιόωτο (‘would be quick to blame even a blameless man,’ *Il.* 11.654) – over a delicate issue. To counter this lack of explicitness, Phoenix does his best to tighten the parallels between his experience of exile and Achilles’ situation through the inclusion of significant details. The fact that Phoenix’ exile results from a dispute rather than a murder already brings it into close alignment with Achilles’ situation,<sup>20</sup> and this is made even closer by the fact that, as we have seen, in each case the dispute is over a low-status woman. We have also noted already that Achilles, just as Phoenix did, would be departing for Phthia to be greeted by Peleus, and that Phoenix and Achilles each react to their respective quarrels by retreating into some sort of isolation – Phoenix being confined to his chamber (*Il.* 9.470-473), Achilles withdrawing to his hut (*Il.* 1.306-307). Such a period of isolation is not a

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<sup>20</sup> Murder, as we have seen, is a much more common reason for exile in Homeric epic, though a quarrel leading to exile is not unparalleled (*Il.* 2.629 and *Od.* 15.254).

feature of other exile scenes in Homer, and it serves once again to alert Achilles to the particular relevance of Phoenix' narrative to Achilles' own situation. The similarity between Phoenix' exile narrative and Achilles' situation becomes even more striking if Phoenix' brief description at *Il.* 9.458-461 of how he considered killing his father but was prevented by one of the gods is accepted as genuine.<sup>21</sup> This would correspond exactly to the scene in which Athena prevents Achilles from killing Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.188-222). Finally, Phoenix' remark that Peleus loved him ὡς εἴ τε πατήρ ὄν παῖδα φιλήσῃ | μούνον τηλύγετον πολλοῖσιν ἐπὶ κτεάτεσσι ('like a father loves his only, beloved son, heir to many possessions,' *Il.* 9.481-482) exactly mirrors Achilles' own relationship with Peleus.

The sterile, unheroic nature of a life spent in exile contrasts with Achilles' continuing commitment to the norms that govern heroic behaviour. Through his withdrawal from the battlefield Achilles has been championing these norms in the face of Agamemnon's abuse of them, and his speech in response to Odysseus has served notice that he is prepared to continue to champion them, even to the point of returning home from Troy. Phoenix' experience of exile points to the possibility, however, that if Achilles carries his championing of heroic norms that far he will, paradoxically, reduce his potential for heroic action. In this way, Phoenix is able to develop an alternative conception of Achilles' departure to the one developed by Achilles himself in his speech in response to Odysseus. He is able, more precisely, to present Achilles' continuing commitment to heroic ideals as a reason to stay rather than a reason to leave. This analysis of Phoenix' exile narrative leaves open three questions concerning a) whether

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<sup>21</sup> These four lines, quoted by Plutarch (*Mor.* 26), are not in the MSS. See Bolling (1925) 120-122, Apthorp (1980) 91-99, and Hainsworth (1993) *ad Il.* 9.458-461.

Phoenix is conscious of the force of his own narrative, b) whether Phoenix' message is meant to be taken literally or whether he is using exile as a metaphor for the loss of heroic status, and c) whether Phoenix' narrative is successful. It is to these questions that I now turn.

### *Levels of Narrative*

First, then, is Phoenix, as a character, *consciously* using his own experiences to suggest to Achilles the diminution of heroic status involved in returning to Phthia (as I have been assuming thus far)? Or, alternatively, is the diegetic narrator using Phoenix' exile narrative to alert the diegetic audience to the diminution in heroic status that would result from Achilles' departure from Troy, but without wishing to present Phoenix as being conscious of this aspect of his narrative's significance? To put it another way, does my interpretation of Phoenix' exile narrative, if it is correct, reveal the narrative's "argument-function" – that is, its significance for its metadiegetic audience – or does it reveal only the narrative's "key-function" – that is, its significance for the diegetic audience?<sup>22</sup>

The fact that Phoenix nowhere explicitly states the similarity between his exile narrative and Achilles' situation may seem to imply that any suggestion contained in Phoenix' narrative that Achilles' departure will involve something close to exile and a consequent diminution of heroic identity is the narrative's key-function. In other words, Phoenix' lack of explicitness may seem to imply that the diegetic narrator means for the diegetic audience to take Phoenix, the metadiegetic narrator, to be oblivious to the full

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<sup>22</sup> For the terms 'argument-function' and 'key-function' see Andersen (1987) 3-7 and de Jong (2001) xii ('argument-function') and xv ('key-function').

significance of his narrative. As we have seen, however, Phoenix' lack of explicitness is explicable in the circumstances, and many of the details that the diegetic narrator has Phoenix include in the exile narrative seem designed to make the parallels between Phoenix' own experiences and Achilles' situation more evident to the young hero. In any case, there is certainly nothing in the text to suggest that the diegetic narrator means for these parallels to be evident only to the diegetic audience.

There is a further objection, however, to interpreting solely as the narrative's key-function any suggestion contained in the narrative that Achilles would risk an exile of sorts if he were to leave Troy. If any such suggestion is only the key-function of Phoenix' exile-narrative and not its argument-function, it is hard to see what the narrative's argument-function could be; and comparison with other autobiographical narratives in the *Iliad* shows that it would be highly unusual for such a narrative not to have an argument-function.<sup>23</sup> To be sure, argument-functions for Phoenix' exile narrative that do not involve it functioning as a warning to Achilles to avoid exile have been proposed, but they have been unconvincing or incomplete. Most obviously, a number of scholars have

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<sup>23</sup> Nestor often describes episodes from his past but these reminiscences always have a clear point for the metadiegetic audience. In *Iliad* 1, for example, when Nestor lists for Agamemnon and Achilles the great heroes of the past with whom he used to associate (*Il.* 1.260-272) he makes it clear that the point of this reminiscence is to establish his credentials as an adviser, and concludes, καὶ μὲν μευ βουλέων ξύνιεν πείθοντό τε μύθω· | ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ὕμμες ('Even they listened to my counsels and obeyed my words; and you also, obey me!' *Il.* 1.273-274). Likewise, in *Iliad* 11, where Nestor gives an extended account to Patroclus of a conflict between the Pylians and the Eleans in which he played a leading part, he makes explicit to Achilles' companion the relevance of the story with regard to Achilles' continuing intransigence. Having described the services he performed for his community (and the glory he won as a result), Nestor remarks, αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς | οἷος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπονήσεται ('But Achilles alone will have joy of his valour,' *Il.* 11.762-763). It may, of course, be possible to identify a key-function in Nestor's narratives in addition to these argument-functions, but the important point is that the argument-function is always there.

argued that the exile narrative aims to remind Achilles of the emotional ties between himself and Phoenix.<sup>24</sup> There is something to be said for this interpretation, but as Schlunk notes, such an aim hardly justifies so long a digression,<sup>25</sup> especially when one considers that Phoenix' remarks on his close ties with Achilles are restricted to the very end of the narrative (*Il.* 9.485-495). Schlunk himself provides an alternative interpretation of the exile narrative's intended significance for Achilles, arguing that Phoenix' point is that Achilles should forgive Agamemnon just as Peleus forgave Phoenix.<sup>26</sup> As Scodel notes, however, this is a "feeble argument: the paradigm would have force only if Amyntor forgave Phoenix."<sup>27</sup>

If, however, Phoenix's exile narrative is interpreted as being intended to suggest *to Achilles* that he should avoid what will effectively be exile, then an argument-function – a significance for the narrative on the metadiegetic level – is established, and one that responds directly to the explicit and repeated threats to return to Phthia made by Achilles in the preceding speech. It should be of no surprise that Phoenix should wish to tackle these threats directly, if inexplicitly, since the ultimate aim of the embassy – Achilles' reconciliation with Agamemnon and return to the battlefield – is obviously rendered impossible if Achilles carries out his threats to return to Phthia.

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<sup>24</sup> See above, 47 n. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Schlunk (1976) 204-205.

<sup>26</sup> Schlunk (1976) 205; Schlunk derives this interpretation from Schol. bT *ad Il.* 9.449. For a similar interpretation see Rosner (1976) 318.

<sup>27</sup> Scodel (1982) 131.

### *The Home of Achilles*

Phoenix' argument, as I have analysed it, is highly paradoxical, for he is saying that by returning to Phthia Achilles will effectively be going into exile, but of course by returning to Phthia Achilles will also be going home, at least in the orthodox sense of home as one's native place or original community. This paradox brings us to the second of the three questions mentioned above. To what extent is Achilles meant to understand Phoenix literally when he hints at parallels between his own life of exile and the life that awaits Achilles if he returns to Phthia? In other words, is Phoenix suggesting that Achilles will literally be an exile, or something close enough to one to make the difference negligible, or is he using his own experience of exile to symbolize the loss of heroic potential that Achilles will face if he leaves Troy? From a rhetorical standpoint, this question is perhaps misguided. As long as Achilles is persuaded by the argument it is unimportant whether he understands Phoenix to be speaking literally or figuratively. Nevertheless, insofar as Achilles' chances of being persuaded may well be influenced, in the eyes of the diegetic audience, by how literal he perceives the threat to his heroism to be, it is worth attempting an answer.

The first thing to point out is that the suggestive nature of Phoenix' argument – the fact that he is never allowed to say openly 'you will be an exile,' but is made to rely instead on Achilles' ability to interpret his words – does not in itself prove that Phoenix is being made to speak symbolically. It merely suggests that he is not in a position to present the argument explicitly, which is unsurprising given its paradoxical nature and the need to tread carefully around Achilles. But more positive arguments for the

literalness of the exile facing Achilles can also be adduced. As we have seen, exile in Homeric epic involves leaving one community – which in normal circumstances is the exile’s original, native community, or home in the orthodox sense – and, ideally, establishing oneself in another community. For Achilles’ exile to be literal, therefore, the Achaean camp at Troy would need to function as Achilles’ original community – effectively, the Achaean camp would have to qualify as Achilles’ home. But to what extent is Phoenix able to present the Achaean camp as Achilles’ home – or even a community at all – and to what extent can he deny that Phthia is Achilles’ home?

The Achaean camp certainly incorporates many of the standard features of more established communities described elsewhere in Homeric epic.<sup>28</sup> But can it qualify as Achilles’ home? According to the orthodox definition of home as a person’s native place or original community, Achilles’ home is clearly Phthia. But is that necessarily the conception of home that is at work here? As we have seen, an alternative conception of home – something closer to Malkki’s definition of home as “where one feels most safe and at ease,”<sup>29</sup> – is particularly suited to the *Iliad*’s depiction of exile. Such a conception of home can also be applied very plausibly to Achilles’ relationship with the Achaean camp. It is worth remembering that Achilles, a very young man, has now been at Troy for

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<sup>28</sup> Like other Homeric communities, the Achaean expedition is headed by an individual king supported by a council (*Il.* 2.53-54, 9.89-94, 10.194-197). These leaders meet in the presence of the people to discuss issues of importance to the expedition (*Il.* 1.53-56, 9.9-12). Each warrior is in charge of his own οἶκος-like unit, which, although it is less developed than actual οἶκοι (‘households’), includes a wife (or spear-bride) and handmaidens (*Il.* 1.137-139, *Il.* 24.643) and is equipped to receive guests (*Il.* 24.643-648). The Achaean expedition also engages in joint religious observances (*Il.* 1.308-317), and, of course, military operations (*Iliad passim*). Finally, the Achaean camp has some of the physical characteristics of other communities in Homeric epic, such as a fixed place of assembly (*Il.* 11.806-808) and, more recently, a wall (*Il.* 7.433-441).

<sup>29</sup> Malkki (1995) 509.



nearly ten years. Any attempt to estimate Achilles' precise age would be misguided since myth is neither logical nor consistent in such matters, but he was young enough when he left Phthia still to require Phoenix' education in how to become a hero (*Il.* 9.438-443). Given that Achilles' identity is bound inextricably to his heroism, as his passionate and unyielding commitment to heroic ideals shows, and given that he learned his heroism fighting as a member of the expedition against Troy, it is reasonable to assume that the Achaean camp is not only the most influential community that Achilles has known, but also where he has, until recently, felt most 'at ease,' and hence most 'at home.'<sup>30</sup>

If this is the conception of home at work in Phoenix' exile narrative, then there is suddenly a much more literal force behind Phoenix' suggestion that by leaving the Achaean camp Achilles will be going into exile. His departure from Troy for Phthia would follow the model of exile proposed by Malkki, which involves displacement in search of a new home – a new community in which to feel 'safe and at ease' – as the result of alienation from one's old home. Until recently, Achilles has felt at home in the Achaean camp and so Phthia has been relegated to second place, its status further weakened by the fact that Achilles' mother, Thetis, has evidently left Phthia and returned to her father's house in the sea (*Il.* 1.357-358, 18.35-36). But now Phthia is beginning to appeal to Achilles, alienated as he is by Agamemnon's abuse of the norms of heroic behaviour, as the place in which he might feel 'most at ease.' This growing appeal of Phthia for Achilles is suggested in particular by his idealized depiction of it (*Il.* 9.364, 398-400; cf. 1.154-157).

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Taplin (1992) 79-82, who argues that in Achilles' reception of guests at his hut, and especially in his reception of Priam in *Iliad* 24, "there is...an echo of the hospitality-scene *at home*" (82, my emphasis).

Even if this interpretation is accepted, however, it must be noted that several important differences remain between the situation faced by exiles elsewhere in Homeric epic and the situation faced by Achilles. For example, though he will be a secondary figure if he returns to Phthia in the sense that his wealth and position will come in the form of a gift from someone else, Achilles will not end up as a θεράπων in the same way as Phoenix and other exiles do. Furthermore, unlike other exiles, Achilles has the option to stay where he is. Most important of all, of course, Phthia, despite any attempts on Phoenix' part to cast it as a place of exile, remains Achilles' home in at least one important sense – it is to there that he will return if he leaves Troy, whether now or at the end of the war. If Achilles leaves the Achaean camp and returns to Phthia he may be leaving the most influential community he has known – a community in which he has 'grown up' as a hero and in which he has felt at home for nearly ten years – but, unlike other Homeric exiles, he will not be faced with the task of finding and integrating himself into an entirely new community.

Phoenix is unable, therefore, to deny that, in one sense, by leaving for Phthia Achilles would be leaving for home – and indeed, he himself initially refers to Achilles' threatened departure as a νόστος (*Il.* 9.434). But he is at least able to present an alternative way of conceiving of the situation – by leaving for Phthia Achilles will, in another sense, be rejecting a life of heroism in favour of a life of dependence.

### *Achilles' Response to Phoenix*

One final question remains, then – does Phoenix succeed in persuading Achilles to stay, which is, I have argued, his aim in recounting his experiences as an exile? To answer this question it is necessary to consider Achilles' response to Phoenix' speech. The second half of Phoenix' speech contains the parable of the Prayers (*Il.* 9.502-512) and the famous story of Meleager (*Il.* 9.527-599), which Phoenix explicitly uses to urge Achilles to accept Agamemnon's offer (*Il.* 9.513-523) and to return to the fighting (*Il.* 9.600-605). Achilles begins his response by once again rejecting the 'honour' being offered by Agamemnon (οὐ τί με ταύτης | χρεὼ τιμῆς, *Il.* 9.607-608).<sup>31</sup> He goes on to state that he receives his τιμή directly from Zeus (*Il.* 9.608-610):

φρονέω δὲ τετιμῆσθαι Διὸς αἴση,  
ἢ μ' ἔξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἰς ὃ κ' ἀϋτμῆ  
ἐν στήθεσσι μένη καί μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρη.

*I think that I have been honoured by the dispensation of Zeus, which I will have among the curved ships as long as the breath remains in my breast and my knees have their vigour.*

As Hainsworth notes, Achilles' language is “more impressive than clear,”<sup>32</sup> but the difficult phrase ἢ μ' ἔξει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν, εἰς ὃ κ' ἀϋτμῆ ἐν στήθεσσι μένη – the second half of which effectively means ‘as long as I live’ – seems to be a first indication that Achilles is coming around to the idea of staying. It could even be taken to refer to Thetis' prophecy and to imply that Achilles has chosen the path whereby he will stay at Troy and die there. Moreover, the reference to the strength of his knees indicates that

<sup>31</sup> I take Achilles to be being ironic here, as if οὐτός had the same force as τοιοῦτος; cf. King (1987) 30-31.

<sup>32</sup> Hainsworth (1993) *ad* 9.608-609.

Achilles is aware that his *τιμή* from Zeus relies on his prowess in war,<sup>33</sup> and may well have drawn the logical conclusion that if he wants to keep this *τιμή* he will need to stay in Troy rather than return to a peaceful life in Phthia.<sup>34</sup> After warning Phoenix not to use emotion as a tool of persuasion, Achilles softens and invites Phoenix to share in his kingship and take half his *τιμή* (*Il.* 9.616). This unexpected offer can also be interpreted as a reaction to Phoenix' exile narrative. Phoenix has warned Achilles not to put himself in a position where he can only be a receiver of *τιμή*; Achilles responds by reassuringly showing the old man that he is still in a position to be a generous giver. Finally, Achilles closes his short speech in response to Phoenix by requesting that Phoenix pass the night in his hut, and says that they will decide in the morning whether or not to leave for Phthia (*Il.* 9.617-619) – another clear indication that Achilles is now at the very least open to the idea of staying at Troy.

It is perhaps worth noting briefly at this point that there is some suggestion that Aias too is sensitive to Phoenix' use of his exile narrative to warn Achilles of the consequences of leaving for Phthia. As we have seen, Phoenix uses his dispute with his father and subsequent exile as a negative exemplum designed to dissuade Achilles from leaving. He concludes his speech by trying another negative exemplum, the Meleager narrative, which aims to dissuade Achilles from continuing to reject Agamemnon's offer and to persuade him instead to return to the battlefield. Achilles, as we have just seen,

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<sup>33</sup> The loosing of knees is a common euphemism in Homer for death on the battlefield (*Il.* 11.578, 13.360, 13.412, 21.114 etc.), so the phrase [εἰς ὃ κε] μοι φίλα γούνατ' ὀρώρη effectively means 'so long as I (am alive and able to) fight.'

<sup>34</sup> Achilles wins his *τιμή* from Zeus in a peculiar way – through the defeat of the Achaeans in his absence – but in a way directly linked to his military prowess. This link with military prowess is what distinguishes the *τιμή* that he receives from Zeus from the mere wealth he could have from Agamemnon or Peleus.

responds somewhat positively to the first exemplum but rejects the second. Aias, in his speech (*Il.* 9.624-642), tries a positive exemplum designed to persuade Achilles to accept Agamemnon's offer – he notes that compensation is accepted even in cases of homicide (*Il.* 9.632-636). Most obviously, this exemplum allows Aias to make an *a fortiori* argument – if compensation is acceptable when homicide is involved, it should be acceptable in the case of a dispute (*Il.* 9.636-639). If, however, Aias has Phoenix' exile narrative in mind when he uses this exemplum, he may also be suggesting that Achilles can have it both ways. Compensation is usually *paid* to avoid exile, but Achilles can avoid the exile about which Phoenix is warning him by *receiving* compensation. Aias is no more successful than Phoenix, however, for though Achilles responds favourably to Aias' words and says that Aias has spoken 'after his own heart' (κατὰ θυμόν, *Il.* 9.645), he remains steadfast in his rejection of Agamemnon's offer (*Il.* 9.646-653).<sup>35</sup>

To return to Achilles' response to Phoenix, the fact that Achilles is at least open to the idea of staying at Troy represents only a partial success for Phoenix – Achilles has still made no guarantees that he will stay – but the softening of his stance does suggest that the alternative conception of the situation presented by Phoenix, according to which

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<sup>35</sup> Achilles gives as the reason for his persistence in refusing to accept Agamemnon's offer his anger at the fact that Agamemnon has treated him like a μετανάστης (*Il.* 9.648). Martin (1992:18) has argued that the word μετανάστης is of special significance and picks up on the fact that "the first character [Phoenix] in the poem to have described himself as a true *metanastês* (albeit without using the term) is sitting within earshot." There are problems, however, with such an analysis. First of all, it is far from clear that Phoenix actually qualifies as a μετανάστης (see above, 28 n. 53). Moreover, Achilles uses the word in his speech in response to Aias (a speech in which Aias has been talking about compensation rather than exile). If Achilles wants the word to have a special significance either for Phoenix or in light of Phoenix' narrative, then why does he not use it earlier? A more likely interpretation is that Achilles is simply calling further into question Agamemnon's character and, consequently, his status as a giver – he cannot accept compensation from a man who has seen fit to treat a fellow hero in this way.

departure for Phthia can be interpreted as exile, has had some effect. Phoenix may not have been able to persuade Achilles that acceptance of Agamemnon's offer and a return to the battlefield would constitute a restitution of the τιμή owed to him and furnish the opportunity to win more τιμή and, ultimately, κλέος, but he seems at least to have persuaded him that his prospects at Troy are better than they would be in Phthia – that if he returns to Phthia his heroic career is irrevocably finished. And perhaps partial success is all Phoenix can hope for given the depth of Achilles' anger and disillusionment. Moreover, even this partial success makes the exile narrative that opens Phoenix' speech a much more successful piece of rhetoric than the parable of the Prayers and Meleager narrative that follow, the sections of the speech that are designed to persuade Achilles to accept Agamemnon's offer and return to battle – Achilles brings the embassy to an end by declaring that he will only fight once the ships have been burnt (*Il.* 9.650-653). He is unaware, of course, that the death of Patroclus will force his hand.

### ***Conclusion***

Phoenix only makes one speech in the *Iliad*, but it is a crucial one. Modern scholarship has tended to focus on the second half of this speech – and especially the story of Meleager – and its relation to the overarching plot of the *Iliad*, often at the expense of the exile narrative with which Phoenix begins. My analysis has sought to redress the balance a little by showing that Phoenix' exile narrative is just as 'compelling and difficult'<sup>36</sup> a piece of rhetoric as the Meleager narrative – and more successful. Employing the clear

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<sup>36</sup> See above, 46 n. 2.

parallels between the circumstances of his own exile and the situation in which Achilles finds himself, Phoenix is able to make a subtle argument in favour of Achilles' remaining at Troy; Achilles is presented as still desiring the life of a hero and Phoenix is made to show that this is incompatible with the 'exile' entailed by a return to Phthia. This analysis, I believe, transforms Phoenix's exile narrative from an insufficiently motivated digression into an influential piece of rhetoric developed in direct response to Achilles' concerns – it transforms Phoenix from a rambling old man into a μύθων ῥητήρ.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Cf. *Il.* 9.443.

## CHAPTER TWO – PATROCLUS

### *Introduction*

In the previous chapter I analyzed the first major exile narrative in the *Iliad*, the exile narrative addressed by Phoenix to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, and argued that it aims at, and to some extent succeeds in, dissuading Achilles from returning to Phthia. Much happens between this and the second major exile narrative in the *Iliad*, the exile narrative addressed by Patroclus to Achilles in *Iliad* 23. Not only does Achilles stay at Troy, he even returns to the fighting, a course of action that Phoenix' Meleager narrative was intended to persuade Achilles to follow. In fact, however, the Meleager narrative is, I have argued, entirely unsuccessful and Achilles is motivated to return to battle by events that neither he nor Phoenix could have foreseen: Hector having killed Patroclus (*Il.* 16.818-867), who had entered battle on Achilles' behalf (*Il.* 16.1-283), Achilles avenges the death of his friend by returning to battle and killing Hector in turn (*Iliad* 20-22). As a result of these events Achilles' anger towards Agamemnon is replaced by anger towards Hector, an anger that continues even after Hector's death and is reflected in Achilles' mistreatment of Hector's body (*Il.* 22.395-404, 23.20-26, 23.182-183; cf. 23.37). But even this anger towards Hector is outweighed by Achilles' grief for the dead Patroclus, the theme that dominates the first part of *Iliad* 23 (*Il.* 23.1-257). It is at this point that the ghost of Patroclus appears as a dream to Achilles, who has at last succumbed to sleep (*Il.* 23.62-67), and delivers a speech that includes an account of his exile (*Il.* 23.69-92).



Given the extraordinary circumstances of Patroclus' speech (and Achilles' brief reply) it is unsurprising that critics have most frequently approached this speech from the point of view of what it reveals about Homeric conceptions of dreams<sup>1</sup> and, especially, Homeric conceptions of the afterlife.<sup>2</sup> Such approaches are, of course, perfectly valid and have much to tell us about Homeric beliefs. But they are also limited. As we have seen, analyses of Phoenix' exile narrative in *Iliad* 9 tend to seek links between it and other parts of the poem while ignoring the immediate context (and especially how Phoenix' speech responds to the preceding speech by Achilles). The same is true of analyses of Patroclus' speech in *Iliad* 23 that treat it merely as evidence for Homeric views on dreams or the afterlife. Such analyses often limit themselves to seeking similarities (or differences) between Patroclus' speech and other passages in the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and beyond. Even when critics do look beyond the extraordinary circumstances of the speech and consider other themes present in it – most notably exile – they adopt a similar approach.<sup>3</sup> Again, the parallels that have been drawn between Patroclus' exile narrative and related passages elsewhere in the poem are instructive, and I shall seek to draw some of my own, but I think it will be valuable to begin by approaching Patroclus' exile narrative in a way that is more sensitive to its meaning in context; to begin, in other words, by considering not just what Patroclus' words can tell us about Homeric exile but

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<sup>1</sup> For Patroclus' speech and the Homeric conception of dreams see Kessels (1978) 53-56 and (more generally) Lévy (1982) and Morris (1983).

<sup>2</sup> For Patroclus' speech and the Homeric conception of the afterlife see, for example, Dietrich (1965) 246; Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 63-64; Clarke (1999) 187-188, 200-201, 211-213; and Johnston (1999) 21, 151.

<sup>3</sup> Schlunk (1976) 202-204, Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.85-90, and Heiden (1998) 4-5 each discuss Patroclus' exile narrative largely in terms of parallel passages elsewhere.

also what motivates those words, the specific message he is trying to communicate, why he chooses exile as the vehicle for this message, and how Achilles responds.

### *Achilles' Forgetfulness*

What, then, is the motivation for Patroclus' exile narrative? To answer this question we must first ascertain the motivation for Patroclus' speech as a whole. As noted above, the general context of Achilles' dream – and, therefore, of Patroclus' speech – is one of grief. It would be wrong, however, to assume that Achilles' dream is a psychological response to the grief that he is feeling. For as Lévy has convincingly argued, Achilles' dream, like all Homeric dreams, is not a product of Achilles (state of) mind but “vient...de l'extérieur”<sup>4</sup> – Patroclus comes to Achilles and instigates the dream (*Il.* 23.65-68). The most we can say is that Achilles' grief makes him “plus réceptif au rêve qui correspond à ses préoccupations.”<sup>5</sup> The scenes of grief and lamentation that precede Achilles' dream are, therefore, of limited help in understanding Patroclus' speech.<sup>6</sup> And since, unlike Phoenix' speech in *Iliad* 9, Patroclus' speech is delivered not in response to a preceding speech but rather initiates an exchange of speeches, we are left only with whatever evidence Patroclus himself provides regarding his reason for coming to address Achilles. This reason is not far to seek, for Patroclus opens his speech with an explicit statement of it (*Il.* 23.69-71):

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<sup>4</sup> Lévy (1982) 31.

<sup>5</sup> Lévy (1982) 30.

<sup>6</sup> This does not, of course, prevent Achilles' dream from contributing to and intensifying the general atmosphere of grief. Note in particular Patroclus' pathetic request that Achilles give him his hand (*Il.* 23.75) and Achilles' subsequent failed attempt to embrace Patroclus (*Il.* 23.99-101).

εὐδεις, αὐτὰρ ἐμείο λελασμένος ἔπλευ, Ἀχιλλεῦ.  
 οὐ μὲν μευ ζώνοντος ἀκήδεις, ἀλλὰ θανόντος·  
 θάπτε με ὅτι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἄϊδαο περήσω.

*You sleep, and you are forgetful of me, Achilles. You were not uncaring towards me while I lived, but now that I have died. Bury me as quickly as possible; let me pass through the gates of Hades.*

Patroclus chastises Achilles for his forgetfulness and for no longer showing the caring that marked their relationship when Patroclus was alive. This forgetfulness and lack of caring are evident to Patroclus from the fact that Achilles has as yet failed to give him a burial, a burial that he now demands. That Patroclus is mistaken – Achilles has clearly not forgotten him and has been active in preparing for his burial (*Il.* 23.43-53) – does not matter for our purposes. For whatever the reason for Patroclus’ misconception – and the most likely explanation for it is that he “is supposed to have no knowledge of anything that has happened after his death”<sup>7</sup> – it provides the motivation for him to come and speak with Achilles. It is in the context of Patroclus’ belief in Achilles’ forgetfulness and of his subsequent demand for burial that the rest of what Patroclus says, including his exile narrative, must be read.

### ***Patroclus’ Appeal to Emotion***

In his speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, Phoenix uses his exile narrative in part, though only in part, to stress the emotional bond between narrator and narratee in order to make the latter more amenable to a request from the former, in this case the request that Achilles stay at Troy and return to the fighting. A similar appeal to emotion is, as we have just

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<sup>7</sup> Kessels (1978) 56.

seen, already in evidence in the opening lines of Patroclus' speech, where Patroclus attempts to overcome Achilles' forgetfulness and make Achilles more amenable to his demand for burial by claiming that Achilles was 'not uncaring' of him while he lived. As we shall see, this appeal to emotion is developed further as the speech continues, and I shall argue that Patroclus' exile narrative is both a part of this appeal to emotion and also takes the significance of the close attachment between Patroclus and Achilles a step further in that it suggests not only that this close attachment existed in life, but that it can be replicated in death.

Having explained to Achilles the basic motivation for his visit, Patroclus continues as follows (*Il.* 23.72-74):

τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαί, εἶδωλα καμόντων,  
οὐδέ μέ πω μίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐῶσιν,  
ἀλλ' αὐτῶς ἀλλάγημαι ἄν' εὐρυπυλῆς Ἄϊδος δῶ.

*The spirits, images of dead men, keep me far off, and they do not allow me to mingle yet with them beyond the river, but I wander vainly beside the broad-gated house of Hades.*

Patroclus justifies the urgency of his demand for burial by describing the pitiable predicament in which Achilles' (perceived) forgetfulness has left him: Patroclus is stuck in a liminal state, isolated from the rest of the dead, and he is unable to gain entry into Hades until he has received the proper burial rites.<sup>8</sup> He goes on to contrast his current plight with happier times (*Il.* 23.75-79):

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<sup>8</sup> Richardson (1993: *ad Il.* 23.74) perceives an apparent contradiction between ἀλλάγημαι ἄν' εὐρυπυλῆς Ἄϊδος δῶ ('I wander beside the broad-gated house of Hades,' *Il.* 23.74) and πύλας Ἄϊδαο περήσω ('let me pass through the gates of Hades,' *Il.* 23.71). He presumably takes the former phrase to imply that Patroclus has already entered Hades while the latter certainly implies that he has not. As Clarke notes, however, "There is no inconsistency if we take ἄνά with accusative as referring to motion *along the edge of* Hades: the wraith will then be hovering up and down the entrance by the broad gates" (1999: 212 n. 102). Clarke

καί μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ', ὀλοφύρομαι· οὐ γὰρ ἔτ' αὖτις  
 νίσομαι ἐξ Ἄϊδαο, ἐπὴν με πυρὸς λελάχητε.  
 οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί γε φίλων ἀπάνευθεν ἑταίρων  
 βουλάς ἐζόμενοι βουλευόμεν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν κῆρ  
 ἀμφέχανε στυγερὴ, ἥ περ λάχε γιγνόμενόν περ·

*And give me your hand, I beseech you. For never again will I go out from Hades, once you have given me my share of fire. For no more in life will we take counsel, sitting apart from our dear companions, but hateful fate has gaped around me, a fate that I received when I was born.*

Clarke argues that Patroclus' words probably look "to stories in which the dead took vengeance on the living for insulting them and dishonouring their memory."<sup>9</sup> If this were the case, however, one would expect Patroclus to use threatening language, but his tone at this point is mild.<sup>10</sup> I prefer to follow Richardson, therefore, in interpreting Patroclus' words as an appeal to the "companionship" that he and Achilles enjoyed in life.<sup>11</sup> Richardson singles out Patroclus' gesture of extending his hand to Achilles as a symbol of this companionship, but equally explicit is Patroclus' reminiscence of the time he and Achilles spent together in life, sitting apart even from Achilles other 'dear companions.' This isolation, however, in contrast to Patroclus' current isolation in death, was welcome because it was shared with Achilles. Rather than aiming to arouse fear of vengeance, then, Patroclus' words are geared towards eliciting a more positive emotional response from Achilles by contrasting Patroclus' total isolation in death with the more pleasant

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has nevertheless questioned the possibility of liminal status after death (1999: 187-189); for full discussion of Clarke's analysis see Appendix B.

<sup>9</sup> Clarke (1999) 188.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Elpenor's language at *Od.* 11.73, where, however, it is the wrath of the gods rather than of the dead man that is threatened.

<sup>11</sup> Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.69-92.

isolation he and Achilles shared in life. This response should, in turn, drive Achilles to provide Patroclus with a proper burial.

After briefly predicting Achilles' own death at Troy (*Il.* 23.80-81), Patroclus concludes his speech with an account of his exile as a child (*Il.* 23.83-92):

μη ἐμὰ σῶν ἀπάνευθε τιθήμεναι ὀστέ', Ἀχιλλεῦ,  
 ἀλλ' ὄμοῦ, ὡς τράφομέν περ ἐν ὑμετέροισι δόμοισιν  
 εὔτε με τυτθὸν ἐόντα Μενόϊτιος ἐξ Ὀπόεντος  
 ἤγαγεν ὑμέτερόνδ' ἀνδροκτασίης ὑπο λυγρῆς,  
 ἤματι τῷ ὅτε παῖδα κατέκτανον Ἀμφιδάμαντος,  
 νήπιος, οὐκ ἐθέλων, ἀμφ' ἀστραγάλοισι χολωθείς·  
 ἔνθα με δεξάμενος ἐν δώμασιν ἵππότηα Πηλεὺς  
 ἔτραφέ τ' ἐνδυκέως καὶ σὸν θεράποντ' ὀνόμηνεν·  
 ὡς δὲ καὶ ὀστέα νῶϊν ὀμῆ σορὸς ἀμφικαλύπτοι  
 χρύσεος ἀμφιφορεύς, τόν τοι πόρε πότνια μήτηρ.

*Do not set my bones apart from yours, Achilles, but together, just as we were raised in your house when Menoetius brought me, still a little child, from Opoeis because of baneful man-slaying on that day when I killed the son of Amphidamas – I was a fool, but I did not intend to do it – in my anger over dice. Then the horseman Peleus, having received me in his halls, raised me with care and named me your attendant. So too let the same vessel enfold the bones of the two of us, the golden amphora that your lady mother gave you.*

Patroclus' exile narrative follows closely the narrative sequence previously identified for the exile motif. As the result of an act of homicide, the killing of the son of Amphidamas, Patroclus is forced to leave his original community, Opoeis (*Il.* 23.85-87). He comes to Phthia and manages to integrate himself successfully into the house of Peleus, being reared there and becoming Achilles' attendant (*Il.* 23.89-90). The only unusual detail is that Patroclus is escorted to Phthia by his father Menoetius, presumably, as Richardson

notes, because Patroclus is only a child at the time of his exile.<sup>12</sup> Patroclus' explicit reason for including this narrative in his speech is to justify an addition to his demand for immediate burial, for Patroclus brackets his exile narrative with a repeated request that his bones be placed in the same coffer as those of Achilles. The exile narrative justifies this request by emphasizing, as Richardson points out once again, the "closeness" of

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<sup>12</sup> See Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.85-90. It is somewhat odder that at *Il.* 11.765-790 we find Menoetius in the house of Peleus when Achilles and Patroclus leave for Troy. As Hainsworth comments, however, it is convenient for the poet to have Menoetius present at this point (1993: *ad Il.* 11.766). More specifically, it means that he is on hand to offer advice to his son as the latter leaves for war (*Il.* 11.785-790), a common motif (cf. *Il.* 6.207-210, *Il.* 9.252-259, *Il.* 11.783-784). It is not necessary to assume, however, as Hainsworth does, that Menoetius "is living in Phthie, whither he had fled with Patroklos" (1993: *ad Il.* 11.766), especially given Patroclus' remark that it was Peleus who raised him (*Il.* 23.90). The matter is complicated somewhat by Achilles' remarks at *Il.* 18.324-327, where he says that he promised to return Patroclus to Opoeis once Troy had been sacked. This would seem to confirm that Menoetius' place of residence is still Opoeis, for it is absurd to imagine that Achilles would return Patroclus to Opoeis if Menoetius was living in Phthia. Achilles' mention of Opoeis here should probably be read, however, as a slip on the part of the poet, who should have had Achilles say that he promised to return Patroclus to his new home in Phthia. For while it is dangerous to 'correct' an ancient poet on the basis of a modern reconstruction of a motif, the absolute absence anywhere else in Homeric epic and related poetry of any examples of an exile returning to his original community makes it difficult to see how Achilles could be allowed to promise to return Patroclus to Opoeis. (The only other explanation, which seems to me unlikely, is that Achilles, who at this point has just heard of the death of Patroclus, is made to exaggerate what he promised, the reason for this exaggeration being his extreme grief.) Such a slip on the part of the poet could easily result from a traditional association between Opoeis and Menoetius, whom Achilles has just mentioned as the recipient of his promise. (Hesiod's unhelpful claim, reported by Eustathius (Eust. in Hom. *Il.* 1.337 = MW frag. 212a), that Menoetius was the bother of Peleus, and so presumably from Aegina, only adds to the confusion.) In any case, minor inconsistencies (both within Homer and between Homer and Hesiod) are a common and natural feature of oral literature and should probably not be regarded as significant. It is unlikely that they would have been apparent to the original audience, and may well have escaped even the poet's notice.

Patroclus and Achilles in life.<sup>13</sup> They were raised in the same house, they should lie together in the same tomb.

Patroclus' exile narrative is more than a simple appeal to emotion, however, for by using his exile narrative to justify not just burial but burial *with Achilles*, Patroclus is not only appealing to the closeness of their relationship in life but also suggesting that this relationship can be replicated after death. Just as in life Patroclus and Achilles lived together in a house provided by Achilles' father Peleus, so in death they can lie together in a vessel provided by Achilles' mother Thetis.<sup>14</sup> In this way the shared isolation that Patroclus remembers so fondly from his life with Achilles will be possible again in death – Achilles and Patroclus will be counted among the shades in Hades, but their shared tomb will isolate them to some extent from the rest of the dead. Achilles, however, seems to Patroclus to have forgotten their closeness in life and is therefore blind to the possibility of replicating it even after death, so Patroclus uses his exile narrative to alert him to this possibility. In other words, the emotional bond between Patroclus and Achilles, which is evidenced by the exile narrative, is not just a *means* to Patroclus'

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<sup>13</sup> Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.69-92.

<sup>14</sup> The symmetry of this interpretation is made possible by the presence of *Il.* 23.92, which mentions the golden amphora that Thetis gives to Achilles to serve as a receptacle for his bones. The authenticity of this line has been suspected since antiquity, however, as an interpolation designed to make this passage accord with Agamemnon's description of Achilles' funeral at *Od.* 24.43-92, during which Agamemnon mentions Thetis' gift of a golden amphora to hold Achilles' bones (*Od.* 24.73-75). The authenticity of the line is defended by Diehl (1938) 125-126 but rejected by more recent critics such as Haslam (1991) 36-37 and Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.92 (who also discusses the opinions of ancient commentators). The removal of *Il.* 23.92 would not seriously affect my argument, however, because, even without this line Patroclus still requests burial in the same vessel as Achilles and, as I argue, a continuation in death of the relationship that he enjoyed with Achilles in life.



procurement of a burial with Achilles, its replication is also the desired *end* of such a burial.

### *Patroclus' Death as Exile*

In Patroclus' use of his exile narrative not only as part of a general strategy to remind Achilles of the closeness of their relationship in life, but also more specifically to persuade Achilles to take steps to ensure that this relationship will continue in death by their being buried together, it is already possible to detect a tying together of the themes of exile and death. But this connection between exile and death can be taken a good deal further. In life, Patroclus' relationship with Achilles is the direct result of his exile from Opoeis and reception in Phthia. Patroclus presents the replication of this relationship in death, I believe it can be shown, as the potential result of a structurally similar set of events. In other words, Patroclus' description of his liminal status and his insistence that he will never return again from the underworld are themselves structured as a (figurative) exile narrative that parallels the (literal) exile narrative with which Patroclus' speech concludes.

In his exile narrative Patroclus relates how he left his original community and integrated himself into another. In death, too, Patroclus left one community (the community of the living) and now seeks to integrate himself into another community (the community of the dead). As we have seen, when exile in Homeric epic involves homicide the exile is presented as being responsible for his displacement, if not morally then at least in the sense that there is a causal relation between his actions and his exile. This

applies to each of Patroclus' two 'exiles.' For although the events that lead to each exile are in a certain sense diametrically opposed – Patroclus' figurative exile is caused by his own death (*Il.* 23.78-79), while his literal exile was caused by the death of another, the child of Amphidamas, at Patroclus' hands (*Il.* 23.87) – they are, nevertheless, thematically related. Most obviously, both involve death. More importantly, in each case Patroclus is responsible for a death that results from his foolishness.

Four times in the course of events that lead to Patroclus' death are his actions described in terms of foolishness. First, when Patroclus returns from his visit to the huts of Nestor and Eurypylus (a visit recounted at *Il.* 11.596-848) he approaches Achilles in tears (*Il.* 16.2-4). Seeing this, Achilles compares Patroclus to a κούρη | νηπίη ('foolish girl,' *Il.* 16.7-8). He asks whether Patroclus has heard some sad news from home (*Il.* 16.12-16), though he suspects the real reason well enough: that Patroclus feels sorrow for the suffering of the Achaeans (*Il.* 16.17-18). Second, after Patroclus asks for Achilles' permission to put on Achilles' armour and lead the Myrmidons into battle in order to drive the Trojans back from the ships (*Il.* 16.36-45), the diegetic narrator describes him as a μέγα νήπιος ('great fool,' *Il.* 16.46) for requesting something that will lead to his own death (*Il.* 16.46-47). Third, when Patroclus does lead out the Myrmidons, Achilles gives him explicit and detailed instructions not to press the attack too far (*Il.* 16.83-96). Patroclus ignores these instructions, however, attacks Troy itself, and is eventually killed by Hector (*Il.* 16.684-867). At the point at which Patroclus fails to check his attack, the diegetic narrator describes Patroclus as a fool (νήπιος, *Il.* 16.686) for ignoring Achilles' instructions. Fourth, when Hector has struck the mortal blow and stands over the dying Patroclus he calls him a fool (νήπιε, *Il.* 16.833) for thinking that he could sack Troy

while Hector defended it (*Il.* 16.830-836). And by going on to speculate (incorrectly) that Achilles had forbidden Patroclus to return to the ships until Hector himself was dead (*Il.* 16.838-842), Hector inadvertently reminds Patroclus (and the diegetic audience) that Achilles had in fact set much stricter limits on the sortie. At every stage of the events that lead up to his death, then – in his sorrow for the Achaeans, in his request to borrow Achilles' armour and lead the Myrmidons into battle, in his ignoring of Achilles' instructions, and as he lies defeated at Hector's feet – Patroclus' behaviour is marked out for its foolishness.

Patroclus is not just acting foolishly, however, he is displaying a specific sort of foolishness – given that the word νήπιος literally means 'infantile,' Patroclus is acting with the lack of thought one could expect from a child.<sup>15</sup> This is particularly obvious in the scene in which Achilles compares Patroclus with a κούρη νηπίη ('foolish girl'), but it is implicit each time he is described as a νήπιος. This is not the first time, however, that Patroclus has been guilty of childish foolishness, for Patroclus uses the word νήπιος of himself in his exile narrative when he relates how as a child he murdered Amphidamas' son (*Il.* 23.88), even though he did not act intentionally (οὐκ ἐθέλων, *Il.* 23.88). In this case Patroclus at least has the excuse that he really was a child at the time (τυτθὸν ἔόντα, *Il.* 23.85). Nevertheless, by using the same word to describe his foolish actions as a child as is used to describe his foolish actions as an adult Patroclus draws further attention to the fact that, even as an adult, he has acted with childlike thoughtlessness. There is a parallel, therefore, between the circumstances of Patroclus' death and the circumstances of the death of Amphidamas' son. On both occasions Patroclus acts foolishly and is

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<sup>15</sup> LSJ (s.v.) gives the derivation νη-, ἔπιος (Latin *infans*).

responsible, at least in a causal sense, for the consequences. And on both occasions the consequence of his foolishness is an exile of sorts.

We can now turn from the events that lead to Patroclus' exile to his fate *in* exile. Following his departure from Opoeis as the result of the murder of the son of Amphidamas, Patroclus was apparently able to integrate himself without any difficulty into another community: the house of Achilles' father Peleus in Phthia. In death, however, he has been unable to gain entry into the only community available to him: the community of the dead in Hades. As a result, Patroclus has been reduced to wandering outside the gates to the underworld: ἀλλ' αὕτως ἀλλάγημαι ἄν' εὐρυπυλῆς Ἄϊδος δῶ (*Il.* 23.74). This is perhaps the point at which Patroclus presents himself most explicitly as an 'exile-in-death,' for wandering (as we have seen) is a state commonly associated with the non-integrated exile. In life, Patroclus was able to integrate himself into another community, and so avoided becoming a wanderer. In death, too, he needs to find a way to prevent – or rather, to curtail – his wandering.

So how is Patroclus to achieve integration into the house of Hades and thereby put an end to his wandering? Patroclus claims that in order to enter the house of Hades he must first receive a proper burial: θάπτε με ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας Ἄϊδαο περήσω (*Il.* 23.71). At first sight, this contrasts with Patroclus' apparently smooth integration into another community as an exile in life – he says that Peleus simply received him into his house (με δεξάμενος ἐν δώμασιν, *Il.* 23.89). As we have seen, however, behind such brief descriptions of an exile's integration into another community there may well lie an assumption that the exile's reception involves the ritual purification by his host of any pollution that attaches to the exile as the result of homicide. If this is the case, then

Patroclus' integration into the house of Hades though the ritual of burial would parallel his integration into the house of Peleus through the ritual of purification. Such an interpretation must remain to some extent speculative, of course, given the absence of any explicit reference to purification either in Patroclus' exile narrative or in other exile narratives in Homeric epic.

Whether or not the theory of the presence of purification rituals in the reception of exiles is accepted or rejected, Achilles' burying of Patroclus would still do more than simply allow a dead man entry into the land of the dead – on a more figurative level, with or without a reference to purification, it would allow an exile to integrate himself into another community. In other words, Achilles is presented as having the potential to take the place of his father Peleus by acting, as Peleus once did, as a 'host' for Patroclus. Achilles is the obvious choice, of course, to replace his absent father in this role as it was to Achilles that Peleus assigned Patroclus as an attendant when Patroclus came as an exile to Phthia, and so something close to a host-exile relationship between Achilles and Patroclus – in addition to their close emotional ties – already has a strong precedent. By identifying this precedent even as he presents himself as, once again, an exile (of sorts), Patroclus adds weight to his attempt to win proper treatment from Achilles. Moreover, Achilles' presentation as a host is aided by the fact that Patroclus comes to Achilles in a dream, since, as Arend has shown, dream scenes in Homer are based on scenes involving the arrival and reception of a guest by a host.<sup>16</sup>

One final aspect of Patroclus' description of his fate after death, and of the way in which it relates to his account of his exile in life, deserves attention: Patroclus' insistence

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<sup>16</sup> Arend (1933) 61-63.

that once he has received his share of fire – that is, once he has been duly cremated and buried – he will never again return from Hades (*Il.* 23.75-76). As we have seen, Clarke’s theory that Patroclus is referring to the vengeance wreaked on the living by those dead who do not receive proper funeral rites is hard to accord with the mildness of Patroclus’ tone at this point; he has just asked for Achilles’ hand (*Il.* 23.75), a gesture of “both affection and farewell,”<sup>17</sup> and he goes on to remark that he and Achilles will no longer be able to take private counsel together – at least, not in life (*Il.* 23.77-79). These remarks are tinged with regret and a sense of irrevocable loss (οὐ γὰρ ἔτ’ αὖτις (‘For never again’) *Il.* 23.75; οὐ μὲν γὰρ ζωοί (‘For no more in life’) *Il.* 23.77), and it is more likely that Patroclus is referring to the permanence of death – there is no return once one has entered Hades<sup>18</sup> – rather than threatening to become one of the vengeful dead.

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<sup>17</sup> Richardson (1993) *ad Il.* 23.75.

<sup>18</sup> Greek myth includes a handful of exceptions to this rule – Heracles, Odysseus, Orpheus, Theseus, and Sisyphus – but, on the evidence of Patroclus’ words, none of these is relevant for those who have both a) died and b) been buried. Of the five heroes just listed only Heracles, Odysseus and Sisyphus are mentioned in Homer in connection with the underworld (Heracles: *Il.* 8.367-369, *Od.* 11.623-626; Odysseus: *Odyssey* 11; Sisyphus: *Od.* 11.593-600), and Heracles and Odysseus travel to Hades and back while still alive. This leaves Sisyphus as the only figure to return to the world of the living after he has actually died. Only Sisyphus’ punishment in Hades is mentioned, however – there is no explanation as to why he is being punished – and it is likely, as Heubeck (Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 11.593-600) comments, that “as with Tantalus and Tityus, the cause was ὕβρις [‘hubris’] which encroached on the privilege of the gods.” But there is no evidence that the poet is referring specifically to, or even knows, the story of how Sisyphus returned to life the first time he died by instructing his wife not to bury him and then persuading Persephone to let him return to complain to her. (The earliest surviving version of this story is Pherecydes *FGrH* 3F119, where, however, it is said that Sisyphus’ ultimate punishment in the underworld results not from his deception of Persephone but from his disclosure to Asopus that Asopus’ daughter had been abducted by Zeus; but cf. the shorter accounts of Alcaeus fr. 38A.5-10 and Theognis 700-712.) Of course, even if there is an allusion in the Homeric passage to Sisyphus’ deception of Persephone – which would count as ὕβρις which encroached on the privilege of the gods’ – Sisyphus’ return to the living can be explained by the fact that, like Patroclus, he was never properly buried; see Bremmer (1983) 90. For those

Permanence is also, of course, a central feature of Homeric exile. In the same way as Patroclus' exile in life permanently sundered him from his original community in Opoeis, Patroclus' exile in death has permanently sundered him from his original community in the land of the living – the happy time he spent in life in the company of Achilles is gone forever.

To sum up, Patroclus and Achilles are each assigned two roles in Patroclus' description of his fate after death and of his reaction to that fate. Each role operates on a different level. On a literal level, Patroclus is the dead friend and attendant of Achilles, and can therefore expect Achilles, both as his friend and as the person to whom he was assigned when he was an exile in life, to provide him with a proper burial so that he can enter Hades. On a figurative level, however, Patroclus remains an 'exile' even in death; he has been forced to leave his original community – the community of the living – and, finding himself in a vulnerable, liminal position, seeks integration into another community – the community of the dead. Achilles is correspondingly presented as a 'host,' a figure who can secure this integration for Patroclus. Patroclus' experience of exile in life has led, it appears, to the structuring of his experience of death as a second exile, a structuring he adopts in order to strengthen his demand to Achilles for proper treatment in death by providing a precedent from his experience as an exile in life.

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who have both died and been properly buried, however, the division between the land of the living and the land of the dead is rigorously maintained in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. For full discussion of this division see Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 63-65; for discussion of the descents of the various heroes into Hades see Rohde (1925) 32-35, 236-237, 243 nn. 3-4.

Patroclus, then, makes complex use of exile in his speech in *Iliad* 23. On the one hand, he uses his exile as part of a general appeal to the closeness of the relationship that he and Achilles enjoyed in life. On the other hand, and more specifically, he uses his exile in order to justify his request that he and Achilles be buried in the same vessel, an arrangement that would replicate in death his experience of exile in life. But he goes further. He not only presents the possibility of his ultimate fate in death being a replication of his exile in life, but he also, and logically, presents the events that led to his exile in death as a replication of the events that led to his exile in life. If he is successful in persuading Achilles, Patroclus will not only share a tomb with Achilles just as he shared a house with him, but he will do so for much the same reasons.

### ***Achilles as a Dead-Man-Walking***

The casting of Achilles, at least on a figurative level, as a ‘host’ who is in a position to allow the ‘exile’ Patroclus to gain integration into another community has important implications, not only in the immediate context, but also more broadly. On the one hand, it complements Phoenix’s warning to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 to avoid exile and puts him instead in position to affirm his heroic identity, and at the same time it looks forward to Achilles’ hosting of Priam in *Iliad* 24. But it also has more sinister implications, for it is of course usual for the host who allows integration into another community to be himself a member of that community. Since the community in this case is the community of the dead, however, it follows that while on the literal level of Patroclus’ speech Achilles is alive, on the figurative level he is conceived of as already dead. This characterization of



Achilles in Patroclus' speech as literally alive but figuratively dead exactly parallels his more general characterization in the final books of the *Iliad*.

By presenting Achilles as a 'host' and himself as an 'exile' Patroclus is responding directly to the needs of the immediate context (as he understands it) – he perceives Achilles as forgetful and uses exile as part of his attempt to persuade Achilles to provide him with burial. The casting of Achilles as a 'host' can also, however, be seen to look back to *Iliad* 9 and forwards to *Iliad* 24. In *Iliad* 9, I have argued, Achilles has to be warned to avoid becoming an exile himself and the threat that that would pose to his heroic identity. Now, however, the situation has been inverted and Achilles has the opportunity to use exile actively to affirm his heroic identity. Filling the role of host through the provision of ξενίᾱ, including through the reception of exiles, is a standard feature of heroic behaviour, and it is likely to hold a special significance for Achilles given that his father Peleus has shown himself to be particularly willing to act as a host for exiles.<sup>19</sup> The scenes in *Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 23 both contrast with and complement each other, therefore, in that they show Achilles first being advised to avoid becoming an 'exile' himself and then being presented with the opportunity to act as the 'host' of an 'exile.'

Moreover, the compassion with which Achilles is called upon to act in filling the role of host to Patroclus' exile foreshadows his role as a (more literal) host to Priam in *Iliad* 24. In this book, after receiving a message from the gods (*Il.* 24.143-187), Priam undertakes to bring the body of Hector back to Troy from where it lies beside Achilles' hut (*Il.* 24.189-227). As we shall see, Priam's journey to and reception in Achilles' hut is

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<sup>19</sup> See Appendix A.

presented as a descent to the underworld and this, I shall argue, connects it closely in its implications to Patroclus' casting of Achilles as his potential host. For now, however, we shall concentrate on less sinister aspects of Achilles' reception of Priam. When Priam first arrives at Achilles' hut the young hero's initial reaction is surprise, which is expressed through a simile comparing Achilles to a man at whose house an exile has unexpectedly arrived (*Il.* 24.480-483). The fact that this simile involves exile already connects it thematically with the scenes in *Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 23 involving exile and featuring Achilles. In addition to expressing Achilles' surprise, however, the simile also expresses, to the diegetic audience at least, that Achilles is in a position to show compassion to a vulnerable individual by acting as a good host. This looks back in particular to Patroclus' exile narrative in *Iliad* 23, which places Achilles in exactly the same position. That this is an opportunity for compassion is then expressed directly to Achilles, and thereby confirmed for the diegetic audience, when Priam asks for Achilles' pity (*Il.* 24.503). The thematic link with exile is again prominent, for the old man supports this appeal for pity by invoking the memory of Achilles' father Peleus (*Il.* 24.503-504), a man famous for his compassionate treatment of exiles.<sup>20</sup>

Beyond these links with *Iliad* 9 and *Iliad* 23, there is also another, and rather less positive, side to Patroclus' casting of Achilles' as a host – it suggests that Achilles is already present in the land of the dead. The death of Achilles is never narrated in the *Iliad*, but it is nevertheless a constant presence. Already in *Iliad* 1 the diegetic audience (and Achilles) hear from Achilles' mother that her son has an ἀἴσα μίνυθᾶ ('brief span of life,' *Il.* 1.416) and is ὠκύμορος ('swift-doomed,' *Il.* 1.417). A little later she tells

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<sup>20</sup> For full discussion of the simile see Heiden (1998) 1-10.

Zeus that Achilles is ὠκυμωρότατος ἄλλων ('swift-doomed beyond all others,' *Il.* 1.505). In *Iliad* 9 Achilles adds further precision when he reveals his mother's prophecy that if he stays to fight at Troy he will die there (*Il.* 9.410-416). From the death of Patroclus in *Iliad* 16 on, however, the characterization of Achilles subtly expands from one who is doomed to die soon to one who in a certain sense is already dead.<sup>21</sup> By putting on Achilles' armour and leading the Myrmidons into battle Patroclus becomes Achilles' surrogate. When Patroclus dies, therefore, wearing armour that is "so intimately bound up with his [i.e. Achilles'] identity," it is Achilles who is symbolically dying.<sup>22</sup>

It is not until *Iliad* 18, however, that the characterization of Achilles as already dead is fully developed. Kakridis' thorough and persuasive analysis of the opening scenes of *Iliad* 18 shows that Thetis' reaction to Achilles' cries of grief at the news of Patroclus' death, both while she is still in her father's cave in the sea and once she has joined Achilles on land, is more appropriate to a scene in which Achilles, not Patroclus, has died and is being lamented. In particular, Kakridis notes, when Thetis first hears Achilles' cries she does not, as one would expect, rush immediately to his side, but gathers her sister Nereids and begins a formal lament for him (*Il.* 18.35-60) that exactly parallels the lament for Patroclus being performed by Achilles' captive Trojan women (*Il.* 18.28-31).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> The former, more literal, characterization of Achilles does not drop out of the poem completely, however: on learning from Achilles that he is resolved to kill Hector, Thetis remarks that Achilles' death will follow immediately after (*Il.* 18.95-96); and, likewise, the dying Hector prophesies Achilles' death at the Scaean Gates at the hands of Paris and Apollo (*Il.* 22.359-360).

<sup>22</sup> Schein (1984) 129; Schein also argues, perhaps less convincingly, that Hector's death also symbolizes Achilles' death, since he too is killed while wearing armour that belonged to Achilles.

<sup>23</sup> Kakridis (1949) 69-70. On the connection between the various scenes of lamentation for Patroclus in the *Iliad* and their relation to Thetis' lament for Achilles see Ford (1997) 413. For a more general discussion of lament in Homer see Alexiou (2002) 11-13, 102-103.

Moreover, when Thetis does join Achilles on land she takes his head in her hands as he lies prostrate, a gesture that elsewhere is always associated with lamentation for the dead.<sup>24</sup> These features of the opening scenes of *Iliad* 18 lead Kakridis, who is interested primarily in what his analysis can reveal about “how Homer works on the older epic material,”<sup>25</sup> to conclude that these scenes are modeled on a passage from an older epic in which the death of Achilles was related.<sup>26</sup> Later critics, however, have sought to emphasize the thematic importance of these scenes; by characterizing Achilles as already dead, it is argued, the poet aims to foreshadow the death of Achilles, a death that, as

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<sup>24</sup> Kakridis (1949) 67-68. Kakridis mentions three scenes of lamentation from elsewhere in the *Iliad* that feature this gesture: in *Iliad* 23 Achilles holds Patroclus’ head as he lies on the bier (*Il.* 23.136-137); in *Iliad* 24 Andromache and Hecabe rush to greet Priam as he brings the body of Hector back to Troy, leap on the wagon where he lies, and take hold of his head (*Il.* 24.710-712); later in the same book, when Hector’s body lies on a bier in Troy, Andromache takes hold of his head as she leads the lament (*Il.* 24.722-724). Kakridis also mentions one scene in art that features the same gesture (Athens, Nat. Mus. 1170); for further discussion of the artistic evidence see Burgess (2001) 92-93. Elsewhere Kakridis (1949: 84-85) discusses a detail that possibly provides further support for the theory that Thetis’ lamentation is better suited to a description of the death of Achilles than that of Patroclus: the use of the phrase μέγας μεγαλωστί (‘mighty in his mightiness,’ *Il.* 18.26) in the description of Achilles’ reaction to the news of Patroclus’ death. This phrase is elsewhere in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* used only of dead men, including Achilles himself (*Il.* 16.776, of Kebriones; *Od.* 24.40, of Achilles). Neo-analyst scholars have gone so far as to argue that the phrase is a direct quotation from an earlier epic dealing with the death of Achilles (whether the *Aethiopsis*, an \*Achilleis, or a \*Memnonis), though Kakridis (1949: 85) is a little more cautious; see especially Pestalozzi (1945) 18; Kullmann (1960) 330; and Schadewaldt (1965) 168; Hölsher (1955: 395) offers a counterargument to Schadewaldt (whose work was originally published in 1944), which is responded to in turn by Kullmann (1960) 38.

<sup>25</sup> Kakridis (1949) 72.

<sup>26</sup> Kakridis (1949) 65-75; a description of Achilles’ death was included in the Cyclic *Aethiopsis*, but Kakridis prefers “to speak generally of an \*Achilleis as the model for the scenes of Σ and not of the *Aethiopsis* specifically” (1949: 72; see also 89-95). This theory is modified by Burgess (2009: 27-42), who argues that the poet makes use of a traditional “*fabula* of the death of Achilles” (27) rather than any specific poem. Kakridis’ neoanalytical interpretation of these scenes has been extremely influential; for a full list of references see Burgess (2001) 225-226 n. 160.

already noted, will not be narrated in the *Iliad* but that has been revealed to be both inevitable and imminent.<sup>27</sup> Well before Patroclus' speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 23, then, Achilles' existence has been split in two; he is literally alive, if not well, when Thetis visits him from the sea, but he is figuratively and symbolically dead.

The other scene in which the characterization of Achilles as in one sense alive but in another sense dead is most striking comes in *Iliad* 24. In this book, Priam undertakes to bring the body of Hector back to Troy (*Il.* 24.189-227), and we have already noted the links between certain aspects of Achilles' reception of Priam and Patroclus' exile narrative in *Iliad* 23. Now we can turn to the presentation of Priam's journey to and reception in Achilles' hut as a *katabasis*. For as Whitman observes, in the course of the description of Priam's journey a "double image evolves."<sup>28</sup> On a literal level Priam is traveling to the hut of Achilles in the Achaean camp, but on a figurative level he is undertaking a "journey to the dead." After noting that the Trojans bewail Priam when he departs ὡς εἰ θάνατόνδε κίοντα ('like a man going towards death,' *Il.* 24.328), Whitman maps out the two levels of Priam's journey as follows: Priam meets Hermes at the tomb of Ilus (*Il.* 24.349-357), "a sort of terminus between the two worlds"; Hermes acts as Priam's guide to Achilles' hut (*Il.* 24.437-439), but also as "the Guide of the Dead, Necropompus"; Priam and Hermes cross the Scamander, which stands in for "the river of folk tale between the living and the dead"<sup>29</sup>; the "the heavily barred doors of Achilles' courtyard [*Il.* 24.453-456], of which no mention has ever previously been made,

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<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Nagy (1979) 113; Griffin (1980) 27-28; and Schein (1984) 129-132. Kakridis does not ignore this thematic aspect completely; see Kakridis (1949) 69 n. 7.

<sup>28</sup> This and the following quotations are from Whitman (1958) 217.

<sup>29</sup> The actual crossing is not mentioned, but just before they notice Hermes (at *Il.* 24.352-353), Priam and Idaeus are described allowing the mules and the horses to drink in the river (*Il.* 24.350-351).

doubtless arise from the forbidding triple walls of the city of the dead”; Achilles, as the host of Priam’s visit, “fills the role of the king of the dead”<sup>30</sup>; and, finally, in agreeing to give up Hector’s body (*Il.* 24.560-561), Achilles acts as “the king of the dead [who] gives back one who has fallen into his realm.”<sup>31</sup>

The most important of Whitman’s observations, for our purposes, are those involving the characterization of Achilles: by sending Priam figuratively to the land of the dead to retrieve his son, the diegetic narrator naturally situates Achilles in the same place.<sup>32</sup> Achilles is characterized not only as dead, however, but as a figure of influence in the land of the dead, a figure who can control who enters and who leaves.<sup>33</sup> This accords perfectly with the role that Patroclus assigns to Achilles in *Iliad* 23, where if Achilles grants Patroclus’ request for burial he will allow him to enter the land of the dead. On one level Achilles will be acting like all those who bury the dead – as a surviving friend of Patroclus he will allow him to enter Hades, and will do so *from the outside*. But by casting himself as an exile and Achilles as his potential host, Patroclus suggests that Achilles can, on another level, allow him to enter Hades, and do so *from within*. This neatly prefigures (and complements) Achilles’ role in *Iliad* 24 – just as he can let Patroclus in, he can let Hector out.

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<sup>30</sup> Whitman (1958) 217-218; Whitman cites Achilles’ famous statement that he would rather be a hireling serving a landless man, but alive, than πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν (‘rule over all of the perished dead,’ *Od.* 11.491) as another instance where Achilles is described as the king of the dead, though it is not clear from what Achilles says that he is actually claiming the title for himself.

<sup>31</sup> Whitman (1958) 218. For Priam’s journey as a *katabasis* see further Stanley (1993) 237-240 (with references, to which may be added Rabel (1997) 199-200).

<sup>32</sup> “Hector lies in the camp in one sense, but he also lies in the land of the dead, *and so does Achilles*,” Whitman (1958) 217 (my emphasis).

<sup>33</sup> As Stanley (1993: 240) notes, however, Achilles has no power over death itself – Hector will not be returned to life.

In the last third or so of the *Iliad* there is a sustained effort on the part of the poet to characterize Achilles as, in a figurative sense, already dead. The series of scenes in which Achilles is so characterized – stretching from the death of Achilles’ surrogate Patroclus in *Iliad* 16, to Thetis’ lamentation over the prostrate Achilles in *Iliad* 18, to Achilles’ reception of Priam in deathlike surroundings in *Iliad* 24 – pick up from (and coexist with) references in the poem to Achilles’ fated death at Troy, and prefigure this death, which will not be narrated in the *Iliad*. Patroclus’ characterization of Achilles in his speech in *Iliad* 23 as a figure who can open the gates of Hades from within is, I believe, an important addition to this series.

### ***Levels of Narrative***

My analysis of Patroclus’ speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 23 raises questions similar to those raised by my analysis of Phoenix’ speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9. First, to what extent is Patroclus conscious of and in control of the deployment of exile in his speech? In other words, at what point do we move from communication between Patroclus and Achilles to communication (through Patroclus) between the diegetic narrator and the diegetic audience? Or alternatively, is Patroclus – or even the poet – unaware of the pervasive presence of exile in the speech? Second, is Patroclus’ speech successful?<sup>34</sup>

To answer the first question it is necessary to consider the levels of narrative operating in Patroclus’ speech. It is perhaps worth pointing out to begin with, however,

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<sup>34</sup> The third question that arose from the analysis of Phoenix’ speech to Achilles, regarding whether Phoenix’ message is meant to be taken literally or figuratively, is unnecessary here, since it is already clear that Patroclus’ exile-in-death is a figurative counterpart to his literal exile in life.

that comparison with other cases in Homeric epic where individuals are left unburied shows that the use of the exile narrative structure is not a necessary feature of descriptions of liminal status after death. The most obviously comparable case is Elpenor, who approaches Odysseus at the beginning of the latter's visit to the underworld in *Odyssey* 11, explains the circumstances of his death, and asks for burial (*Od.* 11.51-83). Elpenor's situation is very similar to Patroclus' in *Iliad* 23 – he is dead but not buried and seems to occupy some sort of liminal position in the underworld, as suggested by the fact that he approaches Odysseus before even Tiresias does and that, unlike the other ghosts except Tiresias, he can recognise and converse with Odysseus without drinking the blood from Odysseus' sacrifices to the gods of the underworld.<sup>35</sup> Nowhere, however, does he describe himself, or is he described by Odysseus, in terms that suggest exile – there is, for example, no reference to wandering, and much less stress on the permanence of death than is found in the speech of Patroclus.

Nevertheless, the fact that exile is not a necessary feature of descriptions of the circumstances of the unburied dead does not automatically make its presence significant. The fact that Patroclus' description of his fate after death stands in such close proximity to his account of his exile in life means that an argument could be made that the poet – and, *a fortiori*, the diegetic narrator and Patroclus – is unconscious of the structuring of Patroclus' description of his circumstances in death as an exile narrative, and that this structuring is simply the result of contamination. Two factors count against such an argument, however.

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<sup>35</sup> For full discussion of Elpenor's liminal status, and Clarke's (1999: 187-189) rejection of it, see Appendix B.



First, the very order of the speech, with Patroclus' exile narrative following his description of his circumstances after death, makes accidental contamination of this sort less likely. The second, and more important, factor suggests that not only is the diegetic narrator (and, therefore, the poet) aware of the structuring of Patroclus' description of his circumstances after death as an exile narrative, but also that we are meant to take Patroclus himself to be aware of it too, and indeed responsible for it. As we have seen, in the events leading up to his death Patroclus is charged with foolishness on no fewer than four occasions. In addition, we have seen that Patroclus charges himself with foolishness when he recounts how he killed the son of Amphidamas (*Il.* 23.88), the event that led to his exile. There is a parallel, then, between the foolishness that leads to Patroclus' death and the foolishness that leads to his exile, and I have argued that this parallel contributes to the presentation of Patroclus' *post mortem* circumstances as a sort of exile-in-death. Most of the parallels between Patroclus' figurative and literal exile narratives – such as wandering in death/integration in exile, ritual burial/ritual purification, permanence of death/permanence of exile – occur within Patroclus' speech. The parallel between the foolishness that leads to Patroclus' exile-in-death and the foolishness that leads to his exile-in-life goes beyond the immediate context, however, in that it looks back to *Iliad* 16. The fact that this one parallel at least lies outside the immediate context of Patroclus' speech makes accidental contamination, of which even the poet is unaware, unlikely as an explanation for the structuring of Patroclus' description of his circumstances as an exile narrative. For if this structuring results from contamination owing to the close proximity of Patroclus' (literal) exile narrative, how are we to explain the apparent reference to Patroclus' foolishness in *Iliad* 16?

This in itself would not necessarily mean that we should take the character Patroclus (as opposed to the diegetic narrator) to be consciously structuring his description of his circumstances after death as an exile narrative, were it not for the fact that Patroclus can be expected to be aware of the parallel. For although two of the four charges of foolishness are leveled at Patroclus by the narrator on the diegetic level of narrative – a level to which Patroclus, like any character, has no access – the other two are leveled directly at Patroclus by another character: Achilles compares Patroclus to a foolish girl for feeling sorry for the Achaeans (*Il.* 16.7-8) and Hector calls him a fool for thinking he could sack Troy (*Il.* 16.833). The fact that Patroclus is so explicitly made aware of the foolishness that leads to his death makes it probable that the diegetic narrator, in having Patroclus charge himself with an act of foolishness that leads to his exile, means for the diegetic audience, not to mention Achilles, to take Patroclus to be deliberately using exile to structure his description of his circumstances after death.

This is not to argue, of course, that Patroclus – who only exists, after all, on the level of the characters – is aware of every aspect of his speech's significance. As a character, he obviously cannot know that his casting of Achilles as a host looks forward to Achilles' reception of Priam in *Iliad* 24, and there is not even any indication that he is consciously using his speech to complement Phoenix' exile narrative in *Iliad* 9. Likewise, Patroclus cannot know that his speech is one in a series of scenes in which Achilles is characterized as symbolically dead. These aspects of Patroclus' speech operate on the diegetic level of the narrative. It is harder to say, however, whether Patroclus is meant to be aware in a more restricted sense of the ominous implications of his characterization of Achilles as a potential 'host' who can grant him access to Hades, though even if he is not

aware that this characterization implies that Achilles is symbolically already dead, he certainly makes no bones about the fact that Achilles will soon be literally dead (*Il.* 23.80-81). Either way, there is a delicate tension in the speech between the themes of the separation of Patroclus and Achilles and their (impending) reunion.

### ***Achilles' Response to Patroclus***

Finally, then, there remains the question of whether Patroclus' speech is successful. The most obvious means of gauging the success of Patroclus' speech is to look to Achilles' response, the procedure followed in Chapter One with regard to Phoenix' speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9. The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that Patroclus' speech to Achilles is prompted by the mistaken impression that Achilles has forgotten him and made no preparations for his burial. Moreover, as is natural in the circumstances, Achilles is overcome by emotion and initially pays little attention to the details of Patroclus' speech. All this is reflected in Achilles' short speech in response to Patroclus. After expressing his surprise that Patroclus has felt the need to come and instruct him on matters that are already well in hand (*Il.* 23.94-95), Achilles cursorily assents to Patroclus' commands (*Il.* 23.95-96). He then expresses his desire to embrace the ghost of Patroclus (*Il.* 23.97-98), an emotionally-charged and pathetic gesture that responds to Patroclus' request that Achilles give him his hand (*Il.* 23.75). The failure of this embrace (*Il.* 23.99-101) leads to Achilles' further brief remarks on the nature of existence in the afterlife (*Il.* 23.103-107).

Achilles' initial response reveals little, then, about the impact on Achilles of Patroclus' speech, and (more specifically) of Patroclus' use of exile in it. In particular, it is impossible to tell from Achilles' speech whether Patroclus' self-presentation as an exile in death has made Achilles more amenable to Patroclus' demand for burial – or even whether Achilles noticed this self-presentation – since Achilles was already planning to bury Patroclus. Nor does Achilles react at this point to Patroclus' additional request that they be buried *together*, an arrangement that Achilles had apparently not envisaged before Patroclus' visit.

A reaction to this additional request for burial together is forthcoming eventually, however, and it suggests that Achilles may have picked up on the significance of Patroclus' literal exile narrative at least. After the cremation, Achilles instructs the Achaean leaders regarding the interment of Patroclus. In accordance with Patroclus' request, Achilles calls upon the Achaean leaders to place Patroclus' bones in the golden urn, where his own will join them when he dies (*Il.* 23.243-244). He then tells the Achaean leaders to heap up a burial mound for Patroclus (*Il.* 23.245-246), specifying that it should be οὐ μάλα πολλὸν ('not very big,' *Il.* 23.245), but rather ἐπιεικέα τοῖον ('such as is fitting,' *Il.* 23.246). Finally he tells the Achaean leaders that afterwards – that is, after his own death – they should make it εὐρὺν θ' ὑψηλὸν τε ('broad and high,' *Il.* 23.247). The difference in the size of the mound when it accommodates only Patroclus and when it accommodates Achilles as well is perhaps significant. It may simply reflect the fact that Achilles is a greater hero than Patroclus and so worthy of a greater memorial. But it may also indicate that Achilles has understood the significance of Patroclus' exile narrative. Achilles will do as Patroclus desires and take steps to ensure that the

relationship between them in life – a relationship that, for all its closeness, is unequal in that Patroclus is an exile and Achilles’ attendant – is replicated after death. The smaller size of Patroclus’ burial mound would then reflect the secondary, dependent status that Patroclus, like all exiles, must endure.<sup>36</sup>

### ***Conclusion***

Patroclus’ speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 23 is striking in a number of ways, and not least because it is delivered by a ghost to a man who is asleep. Homeric conceptions of death and dreams are not the only points of interest in this speech, however, and my analysis has sought to show that exile also has an important role to play. Many critics have noted the presence of the exile motif in the speech in the form of Patroclus’ narrative explaining how he came to grow up in the house of Peleus. I have tried to demonstrate that the presence of exile in the speech is more pervasive. Patroclus uses his exile in the house of Peleus to justify his burial with Achilles and to suggest that the relationship that they enjoyed in life can be replicated in death. But he also extends his use of exile on to a more figurative level by using the structure of an exile narrative to describe his circumstances in death. Patroclus’ use of exile in this way is designed, I believe, to add weight to his demands for proper treatment from an Achilles he views as forgetful and uncaring. He need not have worried, for Achilles has the matter well in hand. And in fact, Patroclus’ words suggest that Achilles is closer to him than Patroclus might think, for

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<sup>36</sup> Of course, these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive; Patroclus is a lesser hero at least in part *because* he is an exile.

they reveal that, in a sense, Achilles is already waiting for Patroclus in the land of the dead.

## CHAPTER THREE – ODYSSEUS

### *Introduction*

The two extended exile narratives of the *Iliad*, those of Phoenix and Patroclus, are delivered by exiles who have managed to integrate themselves into another community, though Patroclus, I argued in the last chapter, faces the challenge of (figuratively) doing so again. The successful integration of exiles in the *Iliad* is not restricted to these two cases, however, but is rather the norm; of all the exiles named in the poem only Tlepolemus does not gain integration into an existing community, and instead founds a new community of his own. The exile narrative that is the subject of this chapter, that delivered by Odysseus (masquerading as a Cretan) in *Odyssey* 13, is rather different. The *Odyssey* is a poem deeply interested in all forms of human movement, and this is reflected in its treatment of exile; far from sharing the settled life enjoyed by his counterparts in the *Iliad*, Odysseus in his Cretan persona is still very much on the move.

### *All 'Cretans' are Liars*

At the beginning of *Odyssey* 13, Odysseus finally arrives back in Ithaca. Owing to the intervention of the goddess Athena, however, the hero is unable to recognise his own land. Finding himself (yet again) on an apparently foreign shore, he wonders about the nature of the inhabitants of this land and the sort of welcome he will receive (*Od.* 13.200-

202).<sup>1</sup> It is not long before Odysseus meets one of these inhabitants (or so he thinks): an armed shepherd, who is actually Athena in disguise. While playing the role of shepherd, Athena informs Odysseus that he is in fact in Ithaca, though she still prevents him from recognising the island. The most immediately striking aspect of Odysseus' reaction to this piece of information is that he lies. More specifically, Odysseus pretends to be an exile from Crete (*Od.* 13.256-286). The fact that Odysseus' exile narrative is a lie and that he pretends to be from Crete has naturally led scholars to group it with the other so-called 'lying tales,' a series of narratives – Odysseus' exile narrative being the first – in which Odysseus lies about his identity and, more specifically, claims a Cretan origin.<sup>2</sup>

This approach is, of course, entirely valid in its own right and it is not my intention to deny the importance either of untruthfulness in Odysseus' exile narrative or of the connections between this narrative and the other lying tales. In fact, both of these aspects of Odysseus' exile narrative will have a role to play in my own analysis. Nevertheless, the treatment of Odysseus' exile narrative as simply the first in a series of lying tales has served to limit discussion of other themes found in the narrative, such as

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<sup>1</sup> The questions that Odysseus poses to himself in these lines are his standard response to arrival in a new and strange land: *Od.* 13.200-202 are repeated from Odysseus' arrival in Scheria (*Od.* 6.119-121), and *Od.* 13.201-202 also occur (though not as part of a question) during Odysseus' description of his arrival in the land of the Cyclopes (*Od.* 9.175-176). In the case of the land of the Cyclopes, however, Odysseus' natural curiosity has yet to be tempered by harsh experience and so his words have a more positive ring.

<sup>2</sup> Odysseus delivers these narratives to Eumaeus (*Od.* 14.199-359), to Antinous (*Od.* 17.419-444), and to Penelope (*Od.* 19.165-307). (Cf. also his lie to Laertes at *Od.* 24.265-279, 303-314.) These narratives differ significantly from each other in their details, though the Egyptian episode from the narrative to Eumaeus is repeated in the narrative to Antinous. The secondary literature on lying and the lying tales in the *Odyssey* is extensive: Haft (1984) 290 n. 4, de Jong (2001) 326 n. 12, and Kelly (2008) 182 n. 19 each provide (only partially overlapping) lists of references, to which may be added West (1981); Pucci (1987) 98-109; Grossardt (1998) 1-217; de Jong (2001) 326-328, 596-597; Maronitis (2004) 147-163 (an English translation of Maronitis (1981) in de Jong's list); and Kelly (2008) 182-191.



exile – nearly all scholarly discussion of Odysseus’ exile narrative has focused on how the narrative contributes to our general understanding of Odysseus’ use of lies.<sup>3</sup> I intend to shift the focus of interpretation away from lying and to consider instead the significance of Odysseus’ claim, at this precise moment, to be a non-integrated exile, especially given the fact that exile plays no part in any of the other lying tales. I intend, that is, to continue the project begun in the chapters on Phoenix and Patroclus and to consider how Odysseus’ claim to be an exile relates to the immediate context in which this claim is made. More specifically, I will argue in this chapter that Odysseus’ narrative, in addition to being directed externally at the shepherd as part of a dialogue, is also directed internally at Odysseus himself, and in this sense functions as a soliloquy. Viewed in this way, Odysseus’ exile narrative is a lie in terms of what it communicates to the shepherd, but as a soliloquy it constitutes both a reaction to and subjective assessment of the situation in which Odysseus finds himself, a situation that (I will argue) involves great uncertainty as to his location. Finally, I will argue that Odysseus’ use of an exile narrative to structure this assessment of his situation is meant to suggest a) that Odysseus suspects not only that he is not in Ithaca but also that he will never reach his homeland, and b) that he holds himself responsible for his predicament.

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<sup>3</sup> Even when critics have pointed out some of the ways in which Odysseus’ exile narrative differs significantly from the other lying tales – especially the fact that this is the only time that one of Odysseus’ tales fails to deceive – it is the narrative’s untruthfulness that frames the discussion; see, for example, Kearns (1982) 2 and Segal (1994) 177.

*Odysseus' Uncertain νόστος*

Our first task, then, is to establish the context of Odysseus' exile narrative. This is an issue that has not been entirely ignored, though such attention as has been paid to it has tended to be focused rather narrowly on Odysseus' encounter with Athena while the goddess is disguised as a shepherd. This is not surprising, given that, as we have seen already, Odysseus' exile narrative is delivered in response to the shepherd's claim that the unfamiliar land in which Odysseus finds himself is in fact Ithaca. In considering Odysseus' encounter with the shepherd, most scholars seem to assume uncritically that Odysseus immediately accepts this claim as true. The most explicit expression of this assumption comes in the analysis of Erbse, who remarks that "Über die *Gewißheit*, in Ithaka zu sein, freut sich Odysseus gar sehr."<sup>4</sup> But can Odysseus really be 'certain' that he is in Ithaca? Given the implications of the shepherd's claim – if true, it would mean that Odysseus has at last achieved his νόστος, at least in the sense of simply reaching his homeland – it is worth considering more attentively Odysseus' grounds for believing or disbelieving what the shepherd says. In order to do this it is necessary to extend the scope of the discussion to include Athena's intervention not only while disguised as a shepherd, crucial though that is, but from the moment Odysseus arrives in Ithaca. If this is done it becomes apparent, I believe, that while the shepherd's claim that they are in Ithaca is true, Athena has manipulated events in such a way that Odysseus, even after this claim has been made, cannot be sure of his whereabouts.

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<sup>4</sup> Erbse (1972) 154 (my emphasis); see also Trahman (1952) 35; Gaisser (1969) 26; Walcot (1977) 9; Kearns (1982) 2; Haft (1984) 299; and Maronitis (2004) 153.

Having struggled for ten years to regain his homeland, Odysseus is not in fact conscious for the last stage of his journey. As soon as he boards the Phaeacian ship detailed to take him home, Odysseus falls into a deep, deathlike sleep (*Od.* 13.78-80). Once the ship has reached Ithaca, the crew carries the still-sleeping Odysseus ashore and leaves him, surrounded by the gifts he has received from the Phaeacians, in a safe and secluded spot (*Od.* 13.116-124).<sup>5</sup> Upon waking, however, Odysseus fails to recognise his homeland. Two reasons are provided to account for this failure: the poet initially claims that Odysseus' homeland is unrecognisable to him because of his long absence (*Od.* 13.189),<sup>6</sup> but then adds that Athena has poured a mist over Odysseus (*Od.* 13.189-190). Athena's motivation for doing this is to make Odysseus unrecognisable to the inhabitants of Ithaca and to provide her with an opportunity to explain to him the situation regarding the suitors (*Od.* 13.190-191). The mist has another effect, however; in addition to making Odysseus unrecognisable it makes him unable to recognise a land that should be familiar to him (*Od.* 13.194-196).

Once Odysseus has assured himself that his possessions are safe he begins to creep along the shore of the sea (*Od.* 13.217-221). He soon falls in with a young shepherd, who (as the diegetic audience has been informed) is in fact Athena in disguise (*Od.* 13.221-225). Odysseus supplicates the shepherd, begging for protection both for himself and for his possessions (*Od.* 13.228-231), and then asks for information

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<sup>5</sup> For the significance of sleep in Odysseus' νόστος see Segal (1967) 325-326 and Maronitis (2004) 158-159.

<sup>6</sup> This interpretation assumes that the phrase ἤδη δὴν ἀπεών (*Od.* 13.189) has a causal force ('because he had been away for a long time by now'). For arguments against this view see Hoekstra (Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad* 13.189); Hoekstra admits, however, that if the phrase is not causal it is hard to explain why it is included at all. The acceptance or rejection of Odysseus' long absence as a contributing factor in his inability to recognise his homeland does not affect my argument.

regarding his whereabouts (*Od.* 13.232-235). In response, the shepherd expresses surprise that anyone could be so ignorant or have come from so far away that the land should be unknown to them (*Od.* 13.237-238), since it is known to all who dwell between sunrise and sunset (*Od.* 13.238-241). Then, after a detailed description of the land (*Od.* 13.242-247), the shepherd names it as Ithaca and says that its fame has reached even Troy (*Od.* 13.248-249). This identification of the land to which Odysseus has come as Ithaca results in a serious inconsistency between what Odysseus sees and what he is told, for although the shepherd says that they are in Ithaca, the mist that surrounds Odysseus is not yet removed. So while the shepherd's identification of Ithaca raises for Odysseus the possibility that he has at last achieved his νόστος, in doing so it must also puzzle Odysseus and cause uncertainty. If he really is in Ithaca, why can he not recognise it?<sup>7</sup>

Evidence from elsewhere in the text strongly supports the argument that the diegetic audience is meant to take Odysseus to be in a state of uncertainty regarding his νόστος when he delivers his exile narrative. Before discussing this evidence, however, it is first necessary to consider an obvious counterargument based upon the fact that Odysseus is made to rejoice upon hearing the shepherd's claim that they are in Ithaca: γήθησεν δὲ πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς, | χάρων ἧ γαίη πατρώϊη ('and much-enduring, noble Odysseus rejoiced, delighting in his fatherland,' *Od.* 13.250-251). Does Odysseus' rejoicing not prove that the hero thinks that he has at last reached home? Given that Odysseus has serious grounds upon which to doubt the shepherd's truthfulness, it is unlikely that he is rejoicing simply because he is convinced by the shepherd's claim that they are in Ithaca – as regards his νόστος, Odysseus is rejoicing at most at the *possibility*

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<sup>7</sup> For an explanation of Athena's motivation for making Odysseus uncertain in this way see below, 138-142, ("Athena's Response to Odysseus").

that he is in Ithaca. But there is another reason for Odysseus to rejoice at the shepherd's words. At least one critic has noted that the shepherd's description of Ithaca would greatly please Odysseus because it expresses the glory that Odysseus' conduct at Troy has won for his homeland (*Od.* 13.248-249).<sup>8</sup> Even if Odysseus doubts the shepherd's claim that they are in Ithaca, the hero still has ample reason to rejoice at the shepherd's words, and it is important to note that Odysseus is described as rejoicing in his homeland (χαίρων ἢ γαίῃ πατρώϊη, *Od.* 13.250-251), not in his return. The fact that Odysseus rejoices is not sufficient, therefore, to prove that Odysseus believes the shepherd's claim.

The identification of a possible motivation for Odysseus' rejoicing that does not require the hero to believe that he is in Ithaca removes an objection to the argument that Odysseus is uncertain as to whether or not he has really achieved his νόστος – an argument suggested by the inconsistency between what Odysseus sees and what he hears – but it does not provide positive evidence in favour of this argument. Positive, and indeed compelling, evidence in favour of Odysseus' uncertainty can be found, however, if we jump forward for a moment to Odysseus' response to his discovery that the shepherd with whom he is speaking is in fact Athena. This discovery takes place when, just after Odysseus' exile narrative, Athena discards her disguise and reveals her true identity, though (crucially) she still does not remove the mist that surrounds Odysseus. Reacting to the discovery of Athena's identity, Odysseus remarks that, though the goddess has been absent during most of his recent troubles, she has been kindly to him in the past (*Od.* 13.312-323), and he goes on to say (*Od.* 13.324-328):

νῦν δέ σε πρὸς πατρός γουνάζομαι—οὐ γὰρ οἶω

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<sup>8</sup> See de Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 13.237-249; cf. Erbse (1972) 154.

ἤκειν εἰς Ἰθάκην εὐδείελον, ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην  
 γαῖαν ἀναστρέφομαι· σὲ δὲ κερτομέουσιν ὄϊω  
 ταῦτ' ἀγορευέμεναι, ἵν' ἐμὰς φρένας ἠπεροπεύσης—  
 εἰπέ μοι εἰ ἔτεόν γε φίλην ἐς πατρίδ' ἰκάνω.

*But now I beseech you by your father – for I do not think that I have come to far-seen Ithaca, but am in some other land, and I think that in saying these things you taunt me, in order to deceive my mind – tell me whether I have truly come to my dear fatherland.*

It is clear from Odysseus' words that, at the time he speaks them, he is uncertain as to whether or not he has really achieved his νόστος. They also confirm, however, that he has been uncertain about his νόστος for as long as there has been an inconsistency between what he sees and what he hears – that is, since Athena, in the form of the shepherd, first claimed that they are in Ithaca – for the evidence available to him as to his whereabouts has not changed since then: he is still faced with the claim that they are in Ithaca, but is prevented from recognising the island.

Odysseus' reaction to the discovery that he is talking with Athena provides compelling evidence, then, in support of the argument that Odysseus is meant to be in a state of uncertainty regarding his νόστος when he delivers his exile narrative. Moreover, this uncertainty has serious ramifications, since it raises a problem for the hero regarding his identity. If he is not in Ithaca then he remains a vulnerable wanderer. If, however, he is in Ithaca then his identity changes radically: he is the former king. If this is the case then the shepherd's comments on Ithaca's fame suggest that he at least would respond positively to the return of the hero most responsible for that fame. Odysseus would not, however, be able to assume a generally warm welcome since he has heard from the ghost of Tiresias that if he manages to return home he will find (Od. 11.115-117):

...ἐν πῆματα οἴκῳ,  
 ἄνδρας ὑπερφιάλους, οἳ τοι βίον καταέδουσι  
 μνώμενοι ἀντιθέην ἄλοχον καὶ ἔδνα διδόντες.

*...troubles in your house, overbearing men who consume your livelihood, while wooing your godlike wife and giving her gifts.*

Even if he is in Ithaca, then, and is the former king, Odysseus must proceed with caution.<sup>9</sup> Once again, then, we see the link between heroic identity and social status and, more precisely, the effect on heroic identity of a loss of social status through displacement. If Odysseus is a wanderer in a foreign land, his heroic identity as king of Ithaca is not entirely lost – he still retains his heroic and kingly past – but nevertheless continues to undergo the sort of radical reassessment described by Chambers, especially now that Odysseus wanders alone rather than as the leader of the Ithacan contingent from the Trojan War. If, however, he is in Ithaca, while his heroic and kingly identity may no longer be what it was – time as well as place affects identity, and Odysseus has been absent for twenty years – he at least has the potential to restore it to its former glory.

There is every reason to believe, then, that at the time he delivers his exile narrative, just after the shepherd claims that they are in Ithaca, Odysseus is in a state of uncertainty regarding his νόστος. This uncertainty is a result of the part played by Athena in the events leading up to the exile narrative; in the role of shepherd, Athena raises for Odysseus the possibility that he has at last achieved his νόστος, but she simultaneously prevents him from attaining any certainty in the matter. Odysseus' uncertainty regarding

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<sup>9</sup> In addition to what Tiresias says, Odysseus is also warned by the ghost of Agamemnon to approach Ithaca κρύβδην, μηδ' ἀναφανδὰ ('secretly and not openly,' Od. 11.455), advice motivated by the unexpectedly treacherous, and deadly, welcome that Agamemnon received from Clytemnestra (Od. 11.405-434). Though Agamemnon admits that Odysseus has little to fear from a wife like Penelope (Od. 11.444-446), his experiences nevertheless serve as an additional reminder to Odysseus of the need for caution.

his νόστος, and the problems it raises regarding his identity, constitute, I believe, an important and hitherto overlooked element of the context in which Odysseus delivers his exile narrative.

### *Odysseus' Exile Narrative as a Soliloquy*

Odysseus' uncertainty regarding his νόστος places the hero in a unique position. On the one hand, once the shepherd claims that they are in Ithaca, which would mean that Odysseus is the former king of the land, the hero is no longer in the same position as he was when he arrived in other strange lands during his travels, for while he may doubt the shepherd's claim he cannot simply ignore it. On the other hand, once Odysseus has received confirmation that he is in Ithaca, as eventually happens, his position changes again and he can, with Athena's help, assume a much greater degree of control over the situation. As things stand, however, Odysseus' position is unique, and he responds in a unique way: here and only here does Odysseus claim to be an exile. This does not seem to me to be a coincidence, and I shall argue that Odysseus' claim to be an exile is directly linked to his uncertainty regarding his νόστος. More specifically, I shall argue that Odysseus' exile narrative, in addition to forming part of a dialogue with the shepherd, also acts as a soliloquy and, as such, allows the hero to weigh against each other the competing possibilities that face him: the possibility that he is in Ithaca, and therefore the former king, and the possibility that he is not, and therefore nothing more than a wanderer.



Odysseus' exile narrative follows the same pattern as is found in other exile narratives in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Adopting a fictitious (and nameless) persona, Odysseus begins by claiming that he has fled Crete, leaving his children behind, because he killed Orsilochus, the son of Idomeneus (*Od.* 13.258-261). Expanding upon this bald claim, Odysseus explains that a dispute had arisen between him and Orsilochus – Odysseus claims that he decided to serve at Troy as an independent commander rather than as the attendant of Idomeneus and that, as a result, Orsilochus wished to steal from him the booty he had won at Troy (*Od.* 13.262-266). Odysseus then goes on to describe in some detail the actual act of homicide, which was accomplished under the cover of night with the aid of a companion (*Od.* 13.267-270). There follows an even more detailed description of the flight from Crete in a Phoenician vessel, a journey that was interrupted by unfavourable winds and culminated with the Phoenicians abandoning him in his current location (*Od.* 271-286).

For all that this exile narrative draws upon Odysseus' actual experiences,<sup>10</sup> a point to which we shall return in due course, in terms of the hard 'facts' that it presents to the shepherd the narrative is a lie from start to finish. Existing analyses of the narrative have tended, as we have already noted, to focus on its untruthfulness and to compare it with similar lying tales later in the poem. Even when the exile narrative has been interpreted in its context, critics have approached it from the point of view of the intended significance for the shepherd of the lies that it contains. From such an approach there has resulted the (perceptive) interpretation of the narrative as at once an explanation to the shepherd of

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<sup>10</sup> For Odysseus' use of truth in his lying tales see Trahman (1952) 38 and de Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 13.253-286.

Odysseus' presence and somewhat unexpected appearance (well-dressed and surrounded by wealth) and as a warning to the shepherd against hostile action.<sup>11</sup>

At least one scholar, however, has put forward a different, though complementary, interpretation of Odysseus' speech, and one that concentrates as much on the truth that Odysseus conceals as on the lie that he tells. While agreeing that Odysseus' exile narrative serves as explanation and threat, Haft argues that it also serves as a "verbal disguise" designed to conceal Odysseus' identity from the shepherd and thereby buy the hero some time.<sup>12</sup> Haft applies this interpretation not just to the exile narrative, however, but to Odysseus' lying tales as a group, arguing that the lying tales "are intimately connected with Odysseus' recent return to Ithaca and his desire to regain hearth, wife, and throne" and that Odysseus needs to buy time in order to "gather information and allies, to test the loyalty of others."<sup>13</sup> It is clear from these comments that Haft assumes that when Odysseus delivers his lying tales he believes himself to be in Ithaca and is using them as part of a plan to tackle the problems in his house. This is certainly true for the later lying tales (delivered to Eumaeus, Antinous, and Penelope), but

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<sup>11</sup> Erbse (1972: 154-155) provides a neat summary of how the main details of the narrative fulfill these two aims. Odysseus' fictitious claim in the narrative to have been a victorious general in the Trojan War is designed to explain, Erbse argues, his obvious wealth. Similarly, the bad faith of the Phoenicians (who were meant to take him to Pylos or Elis) explains how he came to be left alone in Ithaca. The description of the killing of Orsilochus, on the other hand, is meant (according to Erbse) to show that he is someone quite capable of defending himself and his wealth, while the mention that he makes of children left in Crete suggests that any foul play on the part of the shepherd would not go unavenged. Erbse follows in many details the earlier analysis of Trahman (1952: 35-36), who is, however, over-subtle in some of his interpretations. Similar conclusions are also drawn by Walcot (1977); Pratt (1993) 90; and Grossardt (1998) 50-54.

<sup>12</sup> Haft (1984) 299-300.

<sup>13</sup> Haft (1984) 299.

when Odysseus delivers his exile narrative – the first of the lying tales – he is still uncertain, I have argued, as to where he is. As regards the exile narrative, then, I agree with Haft that Odysseus needs time to gather information, but I disagree as to the nature of that information; rather than information that will help him in his struggle to regain his former position in Ithaca, he needs information that will help him to ascertain whether he is in Ithaca at all.

By having Odysseus use his exile narrative to buy himself time, the diegetic narrator has Odysseus confront his uncertainty regarding his νόστος in a rather indirect manner. I believe that the diegetic narrator also has Odysseus use his exile narrative as a means to confront his uncertainty more directly and immediately, however, even if he cannot yet resolve it, and does so by having Odysseus deliver the narrative not just as part of a dialogue with the shepherd but also, in a sense, as a soliloquy directed reflexively at Odysseus himself.

Homeric psychology has room for an entirely internalised mental process, but when it comes to presenting the mental process in detail the Homeric narrator often employs direct speech in the form of a soliloquy.<sup>14</sup> This sort of speech-act, which is reserved for occasions of particular tension, is found eleven times in the *Iliad* and ten times in the *Odyssey*.<sup>15</sup> In order to better understand how Odysseus' speech acts as a soliloquy it will be necessary to outline the main features of the Homeric soliloquy.

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<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, there are examples of extended description by the diegetic narrator of the internal mental process; see, for example, the description at *Il.* 24.3-8 of Achilles' continuing distress over the death of Patroclus.

<sup>15</sup> In the *Iliad*: *Il.* 11.404-410 (Odysseus); *Il.* 17.91-105 (Menelaus); *Il.* 17.201-208 (Zeus); *Il.* 17.443-455 (Zeus); *Il.* 18.6-14 (Achilles); *Il.* 20.344-352 (Achilles); *Il.* 20.425-427 (Achilles); *Il.* 21.54-63 (Achilles); *Il.* 21.553-570 (Agenor); *Il.* 22.99-130 (Hector); *Il.* 22.297-305 (Hector). In the *Odyssey*: *Od.* 5.286-290

Two features of the Homeric soliloquy are of particular importance for my analysis of Odysseus' exile narrative. First, Homeric soliloquies share with all soliloquies the simple, and defining, fact that they unite the speaker and addressee in a single individual – a soliloquy is spoken by the speaker to the speaker.<sup>16</sup> Second, all Homeric soliloquies, with the exception of those spoken by gods,<sup>17</sup> present a hero or heroine responding to uncertainty. In some cases, this uncertainty results from the need to make a difficult decision between two possible but directly opposed ways of reacting to a situation. (Pfister terms soliloquies of this sort “soliloquies of action.”<sup>18</sup>) Several soliloquies in the *Iliad*, for example, show a hero weighing at some length the pros and cons of standing firm in battle or retreating (*Il.* 11.404-410; *Il.* 17.91-105; *Il.* 21.553-570; *Il.* 22.99-130). In other cases, the uncertainty results from the surprising or wondrous

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(Poseidon); *Od.* 5.299-312 (Odysseus); *Od.* 5.356-364 (Odysseus); *Od.* 5.377-379 (Poseidon); *Od.* 5.408-423 (Odysseus); *Od.* 5.465-473 (Odysseus); *Od.* 6.119-126 (Odysseus); *Od.* 13.200-216 (Odysseus); *Od.* 18.201-205 (Penelope); *Od.* 20.18-21 (Odysseus); in addition, Polyphemus' speech to his ram at *Od.* 9.447-460 comes close to functioning as a soliloquy.

<sup>16</sup> I use the term soliloquy in accordance with the distinction drawn in the theory of drama between the soliloquy and the monologue and based upon a situational criterion (whether the speaker is alone) and a structural criterion (the length and autonomy of the speech); see generally Pfister (1988) 126-131. According to this distinction, a soliloquy is anything spoken by someone who is alone (or believes that he or she is alone, or acts as if he or she were alone). Consequently, it is usually addressed reflexively to the speaker, although this reflexivity can be lessened somewhat by rhetorical apostrophe to a god, an absent individual, or even an inanimate object. A monologue, on the other hand, is any reasonably long, autonomous speech, even if it is delivered as part of a dialogue. Traditionally, Homeric scholarship has referred only to monologues and has had recourse only to the situational criterion in defining them. Thus, any speech delivered by someone who is alone (or believes that he or she is alone, or acts as if he or she were alone) has been termed a monologue, while all other speech has been treated as dialogue; see, for example, Edwards (1991) *ad Il.* 20.425-427 and de Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 5.299-312 (with references).

<sup>17</sup> See above, 116-117 n. 15.

<sup>18</sup> Pfister (1988) 136-137; Pfister's choice of term refers to the fact that such soliloquies, since they result in a decision on the part of a character as to what to do, actually change the course of the action.

nature of the situation. (Such soliloquies form part of the category of soliloquies that Pfister terms “soliloquies of reflection.”<sup>19</sup>) When Odysseus is offered help by Ino Leucothea, for example, he wonders whether the goddess is setting a trap for him (*Od.* 5.356-364). In such cases, the hero cannot resolve his uncertainty simply by coming to a decision, since the events in question are beyond his control. Whether or not Hector stands firm and faces Achilles is up to Hector, but whether or not Odysseus is being deceived by Ino Leucothea is not up to Odysseus; it is a situation that calls for analysis rather than a decision. Nevertheless, these cases too nearly always involve an implied opposition, this time between two possible scenarios rather than two possible courses of action: Ino Leucothea is either trying to help Odysseus or trying to trick him.

It is important to remember that even if, as I shall argue, what Odysseus’ speech reveals about the hero’s private thought process in the face of uncertainty is as important as what it communicates to the shepherd, it always remains part of a dialogue. For this reason, the speech lacks some of the more formal markers of the Homeric soliloquy.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Pfister (1988) 136-137. More precisely they are what Pfister calls “commentative” soliloquies of reflection; that is, soliloquies that provide the speaker’s subjective analysis of a situation already known to the diegetic audience.

<sup>20</sup> These formal markers are, in any case, more strictly applied in the *Iliad* than in the *Odyssey*. The soliloquies of action in the *Iliad* have a distinct and regular structure (*Il.* 11.404-410; *Il.* 17.91-105; *Il.* 21.553-570; *Il.* 22.99-130; cf. *Il.* 22.378-394). They are all introduced by the same whole-line formula: ὀχθήσας δ’ ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν (‘and vexed, he spoke to his own great-hearted spirit’). They all begin with the words ὦ μοι ἐγὼ (‘Woe is me’). And they all include a whole-line formula to mark the moment of decision: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; (‘But why does my dear heart debate these things?’). The soliloquies of reflection, on the other hand, are somewhat looser in structure (*Il.* 17.201-208; *Il.* 17.443-455; *Il.* 18.6-14; *Il.* 20.344-352; *Il.* 20.425-427; *Il.* 21.54-63; *Il.* 22.297-305). The way in which they are introduced varies, though the same whole-line formula as is used to introduce soliloquies of action is found on a number of occasions (*Il.* 18.5; *Il.* 20.343; *Il.* 21.53). The opening words of soliloquies of reflection are usually exclamatory – the exception is *Il.* 20.425 – but the exclamation

Nevertheless, I believe it can be shown that Odysseus' speech functions as an Homeric soliloquy to the extent that the two key features that we have just identified – the combining of speaker and addressee in one individual and the response to uncertainty resulting from some sort of an opposition – can be seen to be present in it.

There are indications that Odysseus is, in a certain sense at least, addressing his speech to himself, the defining feature of all soliloquies. In order to see how this is so, however, it necessary to look first at the other feature of Odysseus' speech that is typical of an Homeric soliloquy. When Odysseus delivers the speech he is, as we have seen, in a position of great uncertainty regarding his location – exactly the sort of situation that might elicit a soliloquy if Odysseus were alone. In fact, two of Odysseus' soliloquies in the *Odyssey* deal with exactly this issue. Upon arriving in Scheria, Odysseus delivers a soliloquy in which he wonders aloud where he is and what sort of people inhabit the land to which he has come (*Od.* 6.119-126). And upon awaking on the beach where his Phaeacian escort leaves him, Odysseus delivers a very similar soliloquy (*Od.* 13.200-216).<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, Odysseus' uncertainty as to his location when he addresses the shepherd results from the implicit opposition between two possible scenarios – exactly the sort of uncertainty that elicits soliloquies elsewhere in Homeric epic. Before his

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varies from cases to case: ὦ μοι ἐγὼ ('Woe is me') is still found (*Il.* 18.6), but most common is ὦ πόποι ('Alas,' *Il.* 20.344; *Il.* 21.54; *Il.* 22.297), and ἄ δειλ' / ἄ δειλώ ('Ah wretched man/pair,' *Il.* 17.201; *Il.* 17.443) also occurs. And though soliloquies of reflection often result in some sort of decision on the part of the hero, the formula that marks the moment of decision in soliloquies of action is not used in soliloquies of reflection. The structural differences between soliloquies of action and soliloquies of reflection are less rigidly observed in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. For example, all soliloquies in the *Odyssey* begin with the words ὦ μοι ἐγὼ ('Woe is me,' abbreviated to ὦ μοι at *Od.* 5.408, a soliloquy of action) and the formula that marks the moment of decision in soliloquies of action in the *Iliad* is not found in any soliloquy in the *Odyssey*.

<sup>21</sup> *Od.* 13.200-202 = *Od.* 6.119-121.

encounter with the shepherd, Odysseus' uncertainty as to his location is unfocused: he could be anywhere. Once the shepherd mentions Ithaca, however, Odysseus' uncertainty centres around two competing possibilities: either he is in Ithaca as the shepherd says, or he is not.

These two possibilities inhabit Odysseus' speech to the shepherd in the same way that different possibilities inhabit Homeric soliloquies of reflection: 'Is the goddess helping me or tricking me?' (cf. *Od.* 5.356-364). Faced with an as yet irresolvable uncertainty as to the correct answer, however, Odysseus can do no more than weigh the competing possibilities, and he uses his exile narrative to do so in a complex manner.

If, on the one hand, Odysseus is in Ithaca then he is not merely a wanderer in a strange land but the former king returning home. This possibility is present in Odysseus' exile narrative, and especially in the first half of the narrative (up to *Od.* 13.270), in the form of a number of reminiscences of the hero's former status. For although critics have usually argued that such reminiscences of the past are designed to do no more than add verisimilitude,<sup>22</sup> it is possible to see them playing a more decisive role. First, Odysseus' remark near the beginning of his narrative that he left much wealth behind in Crete with his children (*Od.* 13.258-259) reflects the actual circumstances of Odysseus' departure for Troy, when he left Telemachus at home surrounded by much wealth. Second, Odysseus' insistence in the first part of the speech that he fought at Troy as the leader of an independent Cretan contingent and not under the banner of Idomeneus (*Od.* 13.265-266) reflects his real role as the commander of an independent, Ithacan contingent during the war. Third, the circumstances surrounding the slaying of Orsilochus, which are also

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<sup>22</sup> See above, 114 n. 10.

described in the first half of the speech, are reminiscent of a prominent episode from Odysseus' adventures at Troy: the Doloneia. As Haft remarks, "we find reference in both [Odysseus' exile narrative and the Doloneia] to a night raid undertaken by two friends (one of whom is our hero), and to the ambush/murder of an enemy renowned for his speed and the wealth of his father."<sup>23</sup>

If, however, Odysseus is not in Ithaca, then rather than being a king returning home he remains simply a wanderer in a strange land. This possibility too has a strong presence in Odysseus' exile narrative, especially in the second half (from *Od.* 13.271). In this part of the narrative, Odysseus places great emphasis on travel – much more than is the case in other Homeric exile narratives. This partly reflects the *Odyssey's* general interest in human movement – travel does not play a large role in the exile narratives of the *Iliad* because this poem, which lacks the *Odyssey's* interest in movement, depicts exiles integrating themselves into other communities almost immediately. Odysseus' voyage also receives much more attention than Theoclymenus' travels as an exile, however, which are described in the only other exile narrative of comparable length in the *Odyssey* (*Od.* 15.222-278). Whereas only a few lines deal with the as yet non-integrated Theoclymenus' travels (*Od.* 15.223-224, 276), Odysseus spends eleven lines giving a detailed account of his departure from Crete, misadventure at sea, and arrival in a strange land (*Od.* 13.271-281).

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<sup>23</sup> Haft (1984) 303 (see 303 n. 48 for line references). To Haft's list of comparanda I would add the fact that both Dolon and Orsilochus, in addition to having wealthy fathers, seek material gain in their own right (*Il.* 10.318-331; *Od.* 13.262-263) and that both are killed under the cover of night (*Il.* 10.251-253, 468; *Od.* 13.269-270).



Furthermore, Odysseus dwells in the second half of his narrative on his dependence on others – a characteristic of the exile in particular, but also of the wanderer more generally – and his consequent vulnerability to ill-treatment. In addition, as an exile he is able to claim a share in the wanderer’s vulnerability to natural phenomena. These are natural themes in an exile narrative, but are given unusual prominence by Odysseus. Odysseus presents himself as having been unable to arrange transport from Crete using his own resources, despite his considerable wealth.<sup>24</sup> Instead, he says that he was reduced to beseeching the Phoenicians to give him passage (*Od.* 13.272-273). This stands in particularly marked contrast with his claim in the first half of the speech that he fought independently at Troy rather than as Idomeneus’ *θερόπων* (*Od.* 13.265). The Phoenicians, Odysseus claims, accepted him as a passenger, in return for *μενοεικέα λήϊδα* (‘booty suited to their desires,’ *Od.* 13.273), but he ran into trouble anyway in the form of contrary winds, which drove the ship to an unknown shore (*Od.* 13.276-278).<sup>25</sup> At this point the good faith of the Phoenicians appears to have run out since Odysseus claims that they left him asleep on the beach (*Od.* 13.282-286) rather than taking him to Pylos or Elis as requested (*Od.* 13.274-276).<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> As a former commander at Troy one might expect him to be able to man his own ships. In other lying tales Odysseus shows considerably more independence in this regard (*Od.* 14.245-248, *Od.* 17.424-427).

<sup>25</sup> The link between wandering and vulnerability to storms is brought out by the description of the Phoenicians as *πλαγχθέντες* (*Od.* 13.278). The verb *πλάζω*, which is found elsewhere in the *Odyssey* in the context of a storm (*Od.* 5.389), literally means to “turn aside or away from” (LSJ q.v. 1), but in the passive it comes to mean to “wander” or “rove” (LSJ q.v. 4). It is used of Odysseus himself as early in the poem as *Od.* 1.2.

<sup>26</sup> The curious and inexplicable dissonance between Odysseus’ insistence that the Phoenicians did not willingly deceive him (*Od.* 13.276-277) and his claim that they abandoned him (*Od.* 13.282-286) is noted by Walcot (1977:10), who argues that Odysseus’ story “begins to collapse towards its end” and comments: “Unscrupulous enough not to convey the hero to his stipulated destination of Pylos or Elis, they [the

Finally, as in the first half of Odysseus' exile narrative there is much in the second half that is derived from his actual experiences. Now, however, he makes use not of experiences he had as king of Ithaca or as a commander at Troy, but of experiences he has had more recently during the wanderings that he has already endured. The mention of contrary winds at sea (*Od.* 13.276) recalls the many storms that have driven Odysseus off course since he left Troy.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, Odysseus' claim that he was left asleep on the shore is an accurate account of his arrival in the land in which he currently finds himself (cf. *Od.* 13.113-125), but it also looks back to the important role that sleep has played throughout his wanderings.<sup>28</sup>

Odysseus' inclusion in the first half of his exile narrative of details drawn from experiences that he had as king of Ithaca, details that reflect the possibility that he is in Ithaca now, is balanced, then, by the inclusion in the second half of the narrative of details drawn from experiences that he has had as a wanderer, details that reflect the possibility that that is still what he is. This brings us to the second soliloquial feature present in Odysseus' speech. Odysseus presents opposing possibilities, but presents them to whom? Even if the shepherd is an Ithacan, he clearly does not recognise Odysseus, so any references in the first half of the exile narrative to Odysseus' past as the king of Ithaca are unlikely to register with him. The shepherd would obviously also be oblivious

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Phoenicians] did not attempt to trick Odysseus initially...and went to the bother of leaving treasures as well as passenger in Ithaca. Remarkable Phoenicians these."

<sup>27</sup> Odysseus encounters storms at *Od.* 5.291-453 (between Ogygia and Scheria); *Od.* 9.67-75 (between the land of the Cicones and Malea); *Od.* 9.82-83 (between Malea and the land of the Lotus-eaters); *Od.* 10.47-55 (between Ithaca and Aeolia); and *Od.* 12.403-425 (after leaving Thrinacia).

<sup>28</sup> Sleep plays a central role in Odysseus' failure to reach Ithaca after leaving the island of Aeolia (*Od.* 10.28-55), in his failure to prevent his companions from eating the cattle of the sun (*Od.* 12.327-373), and in his arrival in Scheria (*Od.* 5.474-493, *Od.* 6.1-2, 110-126). See also above, 108 n.5.

to Odysseus' references in the second part of his narrative to his past wanderings. It follows, therefore, that if Odysseus includes these references not merely to add verisimilitude to his narrative, but rather, as I have argued, to balance the possible scenarios that face him, then they must be addressed to Odysseus himself. In addition to including reminiscences of the past, Odysseus concentrates in the second half of his exile narrative on travel, dependence, and vulnerability. As noted already, these are natural themes in an exile narrative, but they also reflect Odysseus' actual situation if he is not in Ithaca. It is not possible, however, for the shepherd to interpret the presence of these themes in this way. Rather, he would accept the travel, dependence, and vulnerability to which Odysseus refers as no more than a natural part of the exile's lot. As with the reminiscences in the narrative, then, it follows that if Odysseus is using these themes to present the possibility that he is not in Ithaca, as I have argued he does, then he is again making himself the audience of his own narrative. This combining of speaker and addressee in the same individual is, as we have seen, the defining feature of all soliloquies, including Homeric soliloquies.

Finally, it is worth noting that the soliloquial nature of Odysseus' exile narrative may suggest which of the two possibilities that face him Odysseus deems to be more likely, even if he is not yet in a position to be certain. If in an Homeric soliloquy the speaker comes to any sort of decision or expresses an opinion concerning the circumstances that gave rise to the soliloquy, this usually takes place in the second half of the soliloquy. This is most obvious in the case of soliloquies of action, since these soliloquies, by their very nature, nearly always result in a decision of some kind. Many soliloquies of reflection too, however, conclude with the hero giving what he believes to

be the correct interpretation of the circumstances. In Achilles' soliloquy of reflection at *Il.* 18.6-14, for example, the hero begins by wondering why the Achaeans flee and concludes that Patroclus must be dead. Circumstances preclude Odysseus from coming down decisively on the side of either of the possibilities that face him – he cannot completely accept or reject either the possibility that he is in Ithaca or the possibility that he is not. Nevertheless, the fact that the second half of Odysseus' speech is dominated by the possibility that he is still a wanderer may suggest that Odysseus believes that this is the more likely of the two possibilities.<sup>29</sup>

To sum up, since Odysseus' speech strictly remains part of a dialogue its soliloquial nature is restricted and it lacks some of the structural features typically found in the soliloquies of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Nevertheless, two crucial features that are typical of the Homeric soliloquy are present in Odysseus' speech – it a) combines, in a certain sense, the speaker and addressee in a single individual, and b) is delivered in the face of an uncertainty that results from some sort of opposition. More precisely, Odysseus' speech resembles a soliloquy of reflection because the hero is faced with a

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<sup>29</sup> This interpretation of Odysseus' speech as operating as a soliloquy, even as it forms part of a dialogue, differs from the acknowledgement in drama theory that dialogues may have monological tendencies (and soliloquies dialogical tendencies); see Pfister (1988) 127-131. According to such an approach, dialogues are monological when both or all parties are in complete agreement and are effectively saying the same thing or making the same point. This is not the case with Odysseus and the shepherd. Soliloquies are dialogical when the reflexive quality of the speech is suspended through apostrophe or through the construction of a dialogue between parts or versions of the self (a dialogue, for example, between the heart and the mind, or one's former and present self). Such a dialogical tendency may in fact be present in Odysseus' speech (conceived as a soliloquy) in the debate between his identity as king of Ithaca and as a wanderer. My main point, however, is not that Odysseus constructs a soliloquy with dialogical tendencies but that his speech functions simultaneously both as part of a dialogue with another character (the shepherd) and as a soliloquy aimed at Odysseus himself. For dialogical soliloquies in Homeric epic, see Pelliccia (1995) 213-216 (who terms them 'dialogic monologues').

situation over which he has no control – he cannot simply decide to be in Ithaca. What is more, the soliloquial nature of Odysseus’ speech may provide a clue as to which of the possibilities that faces him Odysseus deems more likely; the fact that he dwells on wandering in the second half of the speech may suggest that he is inclined to believe that he is not in Ithaca.

### *Odysseus’ Claim to Exilic Status*

In the face of great uncertainty as to his location Odysseus balances the possibilities. Out of such an interpretation of Odysseus’ exile narrative there arises a very important question, at least within the context of a study of exile. Why does Odysseus choose an exile narrative in particular for his balancing act? Part of the reason may be that exile is simply the most plausible explanation of Odysseus’ circumstances. But Odysseus’ decision to use an exile narrative naturally suggests, I shall argue, that he feels a sense of responsibility for his wandering and that he is becoming resigned to being a wanderer forever. By having Odysseus deliver an exile narrative, in other words, the diegetic narrator may be making Odysseus lay claim to a more literal share of the exilic experience.

Odysseus’ exile narrative, for all that it operates in one of its ‘modes’ as a soliloquy, remains part of a dialogue and must make sense to the shepherd.<sup>30</sup> Odysseus

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<sup>30</sup> I refer to the dialogic and soliloquial senses of Odysseus’ speech to the shepherd as modes rather than levels in order to avoid confusion with the different narrative levels (communication among characters, communication between the diegetic narrator and audience etc.) at work in the text. Nevertheless, these dialogic and soliloquial modes do work as levels insofar as the soliloquial mode lies hidden beneath the

claims that he is an exile partly, no doubt, because this provides the most plausible explanation of his circumstances as they appear to the shepherd; the exile is perhaps the only figure in Homeric society who could plausibly be both surrounded by wealth but also a vulnerable wanderer.<sup>31</sup> But it is also worth considering a further possibility. Thus far I have argued that, in the mode in which the speech is directed not at the shepherd but at Odysseus himself, Odysseus presents the possibility that he is still a wanderer in part by emphasizing certain aspects of (non-integrated) exile, a specific form of wandering, that are common to wandering more generally: travel, dependence, and vulnerability. In other words, with respect to the significance of Odysseus' speech for Odysseus himself, I have considered his use of exile only as a vehicle for the presentation of the possibility that he is a wanderer. Given the close ties in the *Odyssey* between the figure of the exile and the more general figure of the wanderer, however, as well as the dense interaction between the two modes of the speech, it seems not unlikely that the distinction between the two modes is unstable – that, in other words, Odysseus' use of exile is directly significant, more than just a vehicle, in the mode in which the speech is directed at Odysseus himself. The possibility that the distinction between the two modes of

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dialogic mode. I would not conclude from this, however, that the soliloquial mode is any less thematically significant.

<sup>31</sup> Even for an exile, however, the situation is unusual. An exile who manages to integrate himself into a new community may be wealthy and at the same time dependent, if not vulnerable, but in such cases the exile appears to acquire this wealth once in exile (see, for example, *Il.* 9.483). There is no suggestion outside of Odysseus' exile narrative that the exile can take his possessions with him (though equally, there is no suggestion that he cannot). Nevertheless, the figure of the exile needs less adapting in order to fit Odysseus' situation than would be the case for other sorts of wanderers, such as itinerant craftsmen or those who have suffered misfortune in war or at sea.

Odysseus' narrative is unstable has important implications for two aspects of Odysseus' self-presentation as a wanderer: the cause of his wandering and his ultimate fate.

Before considering the implications for Odysseus' self-presentation as a wanderer of any instability between the two modes of Odysseus' speech, it is important to make it clear that even if it is accepted that exile is directly significant in the mode in which the speech is directed at Odysseus himself, there remain, as we shall see more fully in due course, several important differences between exile, as I have defined it, and the situation in which Odysseus finds himself. First, the events that lead to Odysseus' wandering involve neither an act of homicide nor a dispute, the acts that typically lead to exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Second, the events that lead to Odysseus' wandering do not result in Odysseus' departure from his original community, but rather take place when he is already far from home. Third, unlike an exile, Odysseus always resists integration into other communities because he keeps alive the hope of a return to his original community. This hope can be seen in Odysseus' presentation in the first half of his speech of the possibility that he may now be in Ithaca. Even if the distinction between the two modes of the speech – the dialogic and the soliloquial – is found to be unstable, then, it can never be entirely erased.

In the great majority of cases of exile in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, those where exile results from homicide, the exile is responsible for his displacement from his original community, at least in the sense that there is a causal, if not moral, relationship between his actions and their outcome. Whether he manages to integrate himself into another community or becomes a wanderer, therefore, such an exile is causally responsible for the situation in which he finds himself. If Odysseus' claim to be an exile is directly

significant in the mode in which the speech is addressed to Odysseus himself, then the possibility arises that by claiming to be an exile Odysseus is being made to take some responsibility for his wandering. But is there an act or event that bestows upon Odysseus a degree of responsibility for his wandering and does Odysseus accept this responsibility? Just such an act, and just such an acceptance of responsibility, can be found in Odysseus' encounter with Polyphemus. It must be stressed that the existence of an episode that leads to Odysseus' wandering and for which he has accepted responsibility in the past does not constitute proof that when Odysseus claims that he is an exile he is repeating his acceptance of responsibility – just because Odysseus could be referring to the Polyphemus episode does not mean that he must be. Nevertheless, the existence of such an episode does at least increase the likelihood that, in using an exile narrative in particular to express the possibility that he is still a wanderer, Odysseus is admitting to himself that he is responsible for his situation.

It is apparent even before his arrival in the land of the Cyclopes that Odysseus is not destined to have an easy νόστος,<sup>32</sup> but it is events in this land that seal Odysseus' fate as a wanderer. Moreover, in describing this encounter to the Phaeacians, Odysseus does not shrink from taking responsibility for what happened – he admits that both at the beginning and at the end of the episode he failed to heed the advice of his companions, with disastrous results.

When Odysseus and his men first enter Polyphemus' cave, his men suggest that they should take some cheese, kids, and lambs and depart (*Od.* 9.224-227). Odysseus

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<sup>32</sup> The raid on the Cicones ends badly (*Od.* 9.39-66), the fleet runs into storms and is driven off course rounding Malea (*Od.* 9.67-83), and the land of the Lotus-eaters provides a first taste of the dangers and temptations to come (*Od.* 9.83-104).



decides that they will wait, however, and admits to the Phaeacians that ἤ τ' ἄν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν ('indeed, it would have been much better,' *Od.* 9.228) if he had listened to his men. It is hard to judge exactly what Odysseus means by this remark. It may mean simply that by heeding his men's advice Odysseus could have spared both them and himself much suffering in the Cyclops' cave. But Odysseus may, with the benefit of hindsight, be saying that by leaving before Polyphemus arrived he could have avoided his subsequent fate as a wanderer. The impression that the latter interpretation is at least partly correct is strengthened by Odysseus' account of the second occasion on which he ignores the advice of his companions (*Od.* 9.473-536). As Odysseus and his men are escaping on their ship, Odysseus twice directs taunts at the Cyclops. The first speech nearly results in immediate disaster as Polyphemus hurls a rock that narrowly misses the ship. When Odysseus is about to begin taunting Polyphemus again his men intervene and plead with Odysseus to restrain himself, but are unable to persuade him. What is worse, Odysseus now foolishly reveals his true name to Polyphemus, allowing the Cyclops to call upon his father Poseidon to curse Odysseus' νόστος. Here, then, there is a clear connection between Odysseus' failure to heed his men's advice and his subsequent wandering, a connection that Odysseus recognises when he remarks laconically that τοῦ...ἔκλυε κυανοχάτης ('the dark-haired god heard him [i.e. Polyphemus],' *Od.* 9.536). Finally, this admission of responsibility, at least in a causal sense, is not the only possible connection with exile in the Polyphemus episode, and it is worth noting that the episode results not just in wandering but, more specifically, *flight* into wandering – it is in terms of flight, a common feature of Homeric exile, that Odysseus describes his escape from

death at the Cyclops' hands (οἱ φύγομεν θάνατον ('we who had fled death') *Od.* 9.467), a detail that enhances the connection between this scene and scenes of genuine exile.

Odysseus could have prevented the eventual outcome of the Polyphemus episode at a number of points, then – he could have listened to his men and left the cave before Polyphemus returned, he could have listened to them when they urged him not to taunt the Cyclops, and even when he decided to continue his taunting he could have kept his true name concealed. The fact that Odysseus has so many opportunities to prevent an outcome that is causally linked to his wandering but squanders each of them, as he himself admits, only compounds his responsibility. Of course, at the time Odysseus' companions give their advice to Odysseus neither they nor Odysseus can know that by heeding it Odysseus can avoid becoming a wanderer. And while it is certainly foolish of Odysseus to reveal his true name, he again cannot know at the time that this revelation will have such a devastating effect on his future. It is only in hindsight, when he is describing these events to the Phaeacians, that Odysseus can correctly identify this episode as the cause of his subsequent wandering. More importantly, for our purposes, Odysseus not only recognises the Polyphemus episode as the cause of his wandering but he accepts that he himself, through his actions, is responsible for what happened.

Odysseus' claim to be an exile may look back to the cause of his wandering, then, and suggest that Odysseus takes some responsibility for it. It may also look forward, however, and suggest that Odysseus believes that wandering is his ultimate fate. Exile is always a permanent state in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. If exile is directly significant in Odysseus' presentation of the possibility that he is a wanderer, therefore, then his choice of this sort of narrative in particular may indicate that he has given up hope of ever

reaching home. Evidence in support of this interpretation can be found in Odysseus' reaction once Athena finally removes the mist that surrounds him and confirms that he really is in Ithaca, pointing out (among other things) the cave of the Naiads in which Odysseus used to offer hecatombs (*Od.* 13.344-352). Odysseus' first words are as follows: νύμφαι νηϊάδες, κοῦραι Διός, οὐ ποτ' ἐγὼ γε | ὄψεσθ' ὑμῶν ἐφάμην ('Naiad nymphs, daughters of Zeus, I thought that I would never see you again,' *Od.* 13.356-357). It is clear that Odysseus is referring to more than just the (cave of the) Naiads – he means that he thought he would never see Ithaca again – but his words are nevertheless vague. The diegetic narrator may be allowing Odysseus to indulge in hyperbole, and even if Odysseus is entirely sincere he (crucially) does not say when he thought this – was never seeing Ithaca again something to which he had resigned himself, or did such thoughts only come to him in his darker moments? Odysseus' words at this point do not prove conclusively, therefore, that while he was delivering his exile narrative he was under the impression that he would never see Ithaca again. Nevertheless, if sincere they do show that the thought had occurred to Odysseus that perpetual wandering might be his ultimate fate, and it is possible that this thought influences Odysseus' decision to employ an exile narrative. Moreover, if Odysseus' exile narrative is indeed taken as an admission on the part of Odysseus, and directed at Odysseus himself, of the belief that his wandering will be permanent, then the narrative becomes particularly pointed in the context since it constitutes a rejection by Odysseus, in *propria persona*, of the possibility of νόστος. Such a rejection would be, like much else in this scene, richly ironic of course, because it takes place during Odysseus' first moments back in Ithaca after a twenty-year absence.

If, then, exile is significant not only in the mode in which Odysseus' speech is directed at the shepherd, but also in the mode in which it is directed at Odysseus himself, then Odysseus can be seen to be presenting his whole ten years of wandering as a sort of exile. He may not have committed an act of homicide or been involved in a dispute (the events that usually lead to exile) – on the contrary, the events that lead to his wandering take place when he is already far from home – but in other respects his experience has been, and still is, quite exilic. First, Odysseus recognises that he is responsible for his wandering, at least to the extent of acknowledging the causal relation between his actions and their outcome. Second, Odysseus may be under the impression not only that he is not in Ithaca, but also that his wandering, like the wandering of an exile (and a non-integrated exile in particular), will last forever.

### *Levels of Narrative*

My analysis of Odysseus' speech to the shepherd as operating in two modes – a dialogic mode and a soliloquial mode – and my exploration of the possibility that the influence of exile is felt directly in the latter as well as the former, has more or less assumed thus far that Odysseus is conscious of, and in control of, the different modes of the speech and the significance of exile in each mode. It is worth pausing to consider, however, whether this assumption is justified, just as we paused to consider whether Phoenix and Patroclus are conscious of the full force of their exile narratives. Is it possible, we must ask, that the diegetic narrator introduces into the speech the balancing of possibilities that I have been arguing occurs in the speech's soliloquial mode, but introduces it without presenting

Odysseus as being conscious of it? And even if Odysseus is consciously structuring his speech and deploying exile as I have described, what are the limits of this process? At what point do we move from communication between Odysseus and the shepherd and Odysseus and himself, on the one hand, and the diegetic narrator and external audience, on the other? In short, on what narrative level does the balancing of the possibilities that face Odysseus occur?

In tackling these questions, I shall begin by considering the dialogic mode of Odysseus' speech – the mode in which the speech is directed at the shepherd – since the role of exile in this mode is relatively uncontroversial. Odysseus deploys exile openly in this mode, as we have seen, as an explanation to the shepherd of his appearance and as a warning against hostile action. In addition, the exile narrative buys Odysseus the time he needs to gather information as to his whereabouts. In manipulating exile in this way, Odysseus is drawing upon his knowledge, as a character, of exile as an actual social practice within the world of the poem, and applying this social practice to the needs of the situation in which he finds himself.

I have proposed that, in addition to this dialogic mode, there is a soliloquial mode operating in Odysseus' speech – a mode in which the speech is directed at Odysseus himself. This mode of the speech, I have argued, operates as an Homeric soliloquy of reflection in that it responds to an uncertainty that results from an opposition between two possible scenarios. But should we take Odysseus to be consciously using his speech in this way? More precisely, should we take Odysseus to be aware of and responsible for the fact that the speech balances the two possible scenarios that are implicit in Odysseus' uncertainty as to whether or not he is in Ithaca? Or is the diegetic audience meant to note

the presence of these issues in the speech without necessarily attributing their presence to Odysseus?

There is, in fact, good evidence in favour of taking Odysseus to be aware of and responsible for these features of his speech. As we have already had occasion to mention, Odysseus delivers two soliloquies in the *Odyssey* that respond to uncertainty as to his location: the first when he arrives in Scheria (*Od.* 6.119-126), and the second when he arrives in Ithaca and does not recognise where he is (*Od.* 13.200-216). This second soliloquy comes just fifty or so lines before Odysseus' speech to the shepherd and is of particular interest. Odysseus opens it, as he does the soliloquy in Scheria, with a question that sums up his ignorance as to his location: ὦ μοι ἐγώ, τέων αὖτε βροτῶν ἐς γαῖαν ἰκάνω; ('Woe is me, to the land of which mortals have I come this time?' *Od.* 13.200). But unlike the soliloquy in Scheria, Odysseus' soliloquy at *Od.* 13.200-216 is also filled with thoughts of thwarted νόστος, since Odysseus is aggrieved that the Phaeacians have (apparently) brought him εἰς ἄλλην γαῖαν ('to another land,' *Od.* 13.211) rather than εἰς Ἰθάκην εὐδείελον ('to far-seen Ithaca,' *Od.* 13.212). Odysseus' soliloquy at *Od.* 13.200-216 raises exactly the same issues, then – uncertainty as to location and an opposition between an unknown land and Ithaca – as we have found in Odysseus' speech to the shepherd. Though Odysseus' situation has changed in two important ways by the time he delivers the speech to the shepherd – he is no longer alone and the possibility that he *is* in fact in Ithaca has been raised – this speech can be seen to constitute a continuation of the soliloquy at *Od.* 13.200-216, with the general question "Where am I?" having been replaced with the more specific "Am I in Ithaca?" Odysseus tackles these issues explicitly in the soliloquy at *Od.* 13.200-216, and it is unlikely that he should deliver a

speech only fifty lines later that contains these same issues but that this time the diegetic narrator should intend the diegetic audience to take him to be unaware of them.<sup>33</sup>

Granted, then, that Odysseus is aware of and responsible for the fact that his speech to the shepherd operates both as part of a dialogue and as a soliloquy, can we go one step further and argue that Odysseus should be taken to be consciously destabilising the distinction between the two modes in order to claim a more literal share in the exilic experience? In other words, if this destabilisation of the distinction between the dialogic and soliloquial modes of Odysseus' speech is accepted – a destabilisation that would make exile directly significant in the mode in which the speech is directed at Odysseus himself – on what narrative level should it be interpreted as taking place? On the level of the characters, as I have been assuming? Or only on the level of communication between the diegetic narrator and audience? The answer to these questions lies, I believe, in the different states of knowledge found at this point on the different narrative levels of the text. As we have seen, a consequence of a destabilization of the distinction between the modes of the speech would be that by implying that Odysseus' wanderings are more literally exilic such a destabilisation would imply both that Odysseus is responsible for his wandering and that he will never achieve his νόστος. The second of these implications – that Odysseus will never achieve his νόστος – would be unconvincing if

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<sup>33</sup> This continuity between Odysseus' soliloquy at *Od.* 13.200-216 and his speech to the shepherd at *Od.* 13.256-286 is strengthened by other points of contact between the two speeches. First, Odysseus' obsession in the soliloquy with how to protect his wealth (*Od.* 13.203, 207-208, 215-216) is picked up by the suggestion that he makes in his speech to the shepherd that he is perfectly capable of defending his possessions (*Od.* 13.267-270). An even more obvious point of contact can be found in the way that the blame that Odysseus lays in his soliloquy on the Phaeacians for leaving him on an unknown shore (*Od.* 13.209-212) is picked up by his description in the speech to the shepherd of his treatment at the hands of the Phoenicians (*Od.* 13.274-284).

made directly on the level of communication between the diegetic narrator and diegetic audience, since the diegetic audience already knows that Odysseus is in Ithaca. On the level of the characters, however, Odysseus is still unsure whether he has reached Ithaca, or ever will, so it would not be unconvincing for him to include in his self-presentation as a wanderer a claim that his situation is more literally exilic in that it appears to be endless. To be sure, certain discrepancies remain between Odysseus' situation and other cases of Homeric exile, and we have seen that any attempt on the part of Odysseus to assimilate himself to an exile must remain incomplete. Nevertheless, Odysseus' situation, as he is allowed to see it, closely parallels exile. As the result of his encounter with Polyphemus – an episode that, though it takes place when Odysseus is already far from home and does not involve murder or a dispute, makes Odysseus responsible for his own plight – Odysseus is compelled to flee into apparently endless wandering. Three of the four stock elements of exile are present, and the fourth receives a partial replacement. Moreover, if Odysseus is allowed to make a conscious claim to a more literal share in the exilic experience, the irony of the scene would, as we have noted, be further intensified.

Though I have argued that Odysseus employs his exile narrative very subtly, I do not wish to suggest, of course, that he is aware of its significance on every level. As I have already noted, Odysseus' use of exile draws upon his knowledge, as a character, of the social practices of the world of the poem – he does not, indeed cannot, view his narrative as a poetic motif. Likewise, I have identified a number of aspects of Odysseus' speech as typical of the Homeric soliloquy, but Odysseus himself obviously does not, and again cannot, view them in such terms. These levels of meaning may guide the diegetic



audience's interpretation of the narrative, but are inaccessible to Odysseus or any other character in the poem.

### *Athena's Response to Odysseus*

I have concluded the preceding chapters on the exile narratives of Phoenix and Patroclus with an assessment of the successfulness of their narratives based on the response of their audiences within the text, which in both cases is Achilles. In this chapter my primary focus has been on a mode in which Odysseus' exile narrative is, I have argued, directed at Odysseus himself. This mode of Odysseus' narrative cannot be assessed in terms of successfulness since it is not intended to have any external effect; unlike the mode in which the narrative is directed at the shepherd it is not intended to be deceptive and unlike the narratives of Phoenix and Patroclus it is not intended to be persuasive. Instead, it expresses a private thought process, and it makes no sense to talk about whether Odysseus' thoughts are successful or not. Nor, in fact, is it even possible to gauge the success of the mode in which Odysseus' exile narrative is directed at the shepherd – that is, the success of the narrative as a lie – since the shepherd is in fact the goddess Athena, who is not fooled for a minute. Nevertheless, it will be worth examining briefly Athena's response to Odysseus' exile narrative, because even though Athena can see through Odysseus' lie, she misinterprets, I believe, the motivation behind the lie.

Athena responds to Odysseus' exile narrative by immediately dropping her disguise (*Od.* 13.288-289) and expressing her delight in the hero's deceptiveness (*Od.*

13.291-300).<sup>34</sup> In the course of expressing her delight, however, Athena also reveals how she has interpreted Odysseus' motivation for lying. Indulging in some "playful chiding,"<sup>35</sup> Athena says (*Od.* 13.291-295):

κερδαλέος κ' εἴη καὶ ἐπὶ κλοπῆος ὅς σε παρέλθοι  
 ἐν πάντεσσι δόλοισι, καὶ εἰ θεὸς ἀντιάσειε.  
 σχέτλιε, ποικιλομήτα, δόλων ἄτ', οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμελλες,  
 οὐδ' ἐν σῆ περ ἐὼν γαίη, λήξειν ἀπατάων  
 μύθων τε κλοπίων, οἳ τοι πεδόθεν φίλοι εἰσίν.

*Crafty he would be and wily who would surpass you in every kind of trick, even if a god were to meet you. Unwearying, wily-minded man, insatiate of tricks, not even once you were in your own land were you to cease from deceptions and wily tales, which are dear to you from the bottom of your heart.*

It appears from these words that, although Athena is responsible for Odysseus' uncertainty regarding his νόστος, she does not take Odysseus' attempt at deception to be a response to this uncertainty. Rather, she believes that he makes this attempt because guile and deceit are 'dear' to him – put simply, he enjoys telling lies.

Athena's reason for holding this belief becomes clear when we consider more closely her own deception of Odysseus earlier in the episode. As we have seen, when Odysseus first arrives in Ithaca, Athena surrounds him with a mist ὄφρα μιν αὐτὸν | ἄγνωστον τεύξειεν ἕκαστά τε μυθήσαιοτο ('in order that she might make him unrecognisable and tell him everything,' *Od.* 13.190-191). In addition to making Odysseus unrecognisable, however, this mist also has the effect of rendering him unable

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<sup>34</sup> For analysis of these lines as an expression of Athena's delight in Odysseus' attempt at deception see especially de Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 13.287-310.

<sup>35</sup> de Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 13.287-310.

to recognise where he is (*Od.* 13.187-190).<sup>36</sup> As a further precaution, Athena makes sure that she is the first ‘person’ to meet Odysseus on Ithaca (*Od.* 13.221-225). Athena’s use of deception to ensure that she will have an opportunity to advise Odysseus on how to act against the suitors is justified by the potential dangers that await the hero in his homeland, though already it may be wondered whether quite such an elaborate scheme is really necessary.<sup>37</sup> In what follows, however, her use of deception goes beyond what is justified and becomes gratuitous. In her disguise as a shepherd, Athena tells Odysseus that he is in Ithaca, but she does not yet remove the mist that prevents him from recognising his homeland, and this discrepancy between what Odysseus sees and what he is told causes, I have argued, uncertainty regarding his νόστος. One might speculate that Athena is meant to suspect that, if she were to remove the mist and suddenly reveal Ithaca, Odysseus would realise that he is dealing with no ordinary shepherd, but it is unclear why this should concern Athena – she will reveal herself soon enough anyway. And in any case, no such concern on the part of Athena is evident in the text. What *is* evident is the pleasure that Athena derives from her gratuitous deception of Odysseus. This pleasure is most obvious in the very speech in which Athena identifies Ithaca, a speech that reveals Athena’s willingness to employ mockery and irony at Odysseus’

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<sup>36</sup> There is nothing in the text to suggest that Athena is unaware that the mist prevents Odysseus from recognising his surroundings, and such an effect would seem natural enough – if the mist prevents other mortals from recognizing what is inside the mist then there is no reason why Odysseus should be able to recognise what is outside it. For the overdetermination of Odysseus’ inability to recognise Ithaca – in addition to the effect of the mist, it also suggested that his inability arises from the length of his absence (*Od.* 13.189) – see above, 108 n. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Hoekstra’s (Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 13.190-191) remarks about the unconventional and “roundabout” way in which Athena proceeds in her use of the mist.

expense and that, as de Jong notes, is delivered “with obvious relish.”<sup>38</sup> What was already an over-elaborate scheme has now become a means to poke fun at Odysseus, and the diegetic audience may wonder whether, whatever Athena’s legitimate fears for Odysseus, such mockery was always part of her intention in deceiving the hero.

So how does this explain Athena’s belief that Odysseus’ attempt at deception is motivated by enjoyment? The answer lies in Athena’s identification of herself and Odysseus as two of a kind (*Od.* 13.296-299):

εἰδότες ἄμφω  
κέρδε', ἐπεὶ σὺ μὲν ἔσσι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἀπάντων  
βουλή καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι  
μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν.

*We both know wiles, since you are much the best of all mortals in counsel, and I am famous among all the gods for cunning and for wiles.*

From this similarity in abilities Athena seems to take for granted a similarity in motivation; Odysseus, like her, deceives for pleasure. In this way, however, Athena

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<sup>38</sup> De Jong (2001) *ad Od.* 13.237-249; cf. Erbse’s (1972: 154) remark that Athena speaks “nicht ohne feinen Spott.” Athena’s opening remark that Odysseus is either ignorant (νήπιος, *Od.* 13.237) or has come from far away (τηλόθεν, *Od.* 13.237) is particularly pointed and contrasts two aspects of Odysseus life, knowledge and travel, that are usually connected (cf. *Od.* 1.3-4). The first alternative, that Odysseus is ignorant, is calculated to sting a man whose years of wandering have brought much suffering but also incomparable knowledge and experience. The other alternative, that Odysseus has come from far away, stings all the more for being true; Odysseus has traveled further than he would care to remember. Athena’s description of Ithaca (*Od.* 13.242-247) is also rich in mocking irony since she describes to Odysseus his own land even as she prevents him from recognizing it. Moreover, this description echoes Odysseus’ own description of the island to the Phaeacians (*Od.* 9.21-28). Since, however, there is no evidence in the text that Athena heard Odysseus’ description of Ithaca it would be rash to take her to be alluding to it in her own description. We should instead see any such allusion as operating on the level of the diegetic narrator and audience. Particularly striking, if an allusion at this narrative level is accepted, is the fact that Odysseus concludes his description of Ithaca by opining that nothing is sweeter to look upon than one’s own land (*Od.* 9.27-28), the very thing he is currently being prevented from doing.

underestimates the serious nature of Odysseus' lie when he claims to be a Cretan exile. Athena is not entirely ignorant, of course, of the serious aspects of deception – after all, her deception of Odysseus is motivated at least in part by legitimate concern for the hero's safety and she takes very seriously Odysseus' need for deception in his dealings with the suitors (*Od.* 13.397-403). Even so, deception does not involve the same stakes for her, as a goddess, as it does for Odysseus, as a mortal. Athena risks nothing by practicing deception and so can afford to treat it, at least in part, as a pleasant pass-time.<sup>39</sup> For Odysseus, on the other hand, deception is potentially a matter of life and death. During the Polyphemus episode he uses deception to save his life and the lives of (most of) his men. Conversely, he learns the potential dangers of revealing the truth – his revelation of his true name to Polyphemus leads directly to his wandering. By lying to the shepherd, therefore, Odysseus is not in any way indulging in a pleasant pass-time. Rather, he is taking serious measures to ensure his safety, whether he is in Ithaca or in some foreign land. In suggesting that Odysseus deceives for pleasure, then, Athena seems to forget temporarily the more serious aspects of lying and, perhaps because of her eagerness to compare Odysseus to herself, attributes to him a motivation for deception that would be more suitable for a god.<sup>40</sup> Ironically, it is at this point that Odysseus, alone, vulnerable, and uncertain of his location, is at his most ungodlike.

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<sup>39</sup> Cf. Achilles' reaction to Apollo when the hero learns that the god has deceived him and prevented him from killing many Trojans (*Il.* 22.14-20). Achilles declares that Apollo carried out his deception "lightly" (ῥηϊδίως), since he had no vengeance to fear (*Il.* 22.19). Although Apollo's deception is serious in intent – he is certainly not deceiving for pleasure – his invulnerability to the consequences of deception is similar to Athena's.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. *Od.* 13.312-313, where Odysseus implicitly recognises the difference between deception on the part of mortals and deception on the part of the gods. He does not mention motivation, however, emphasizing instead the quality of divine deception: ἀργαλέον σε, θεά, γνῶναι βροτῶ ἄν τιάσαντι, | καὶ μάλλ'

### *Conclusion*

In Chapter One, I argued that Phoenix develops in his speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 a complex, and paradoxical, relationship between exile and νόστος. An equally complex relationship between the two themes can be found, I have argued in this chapter, in Odysseus' speech to the shepherd in *Odyssey* 13. In one sense, Odysseus' exile narrative is a lie from beginning to end – a fact that has attracted the attention of many scholars – but in another sense, one that is directed at Odysseus himself, it allows the hero to ponder his situation. The exile narrative becomes more than a lie, it becomes a means for Odysseus to balance the opposing possibilities that face him: the possibility that he is still just a wanderer in a strange land, and the possibility that he has at last achieved his νόστος, at least in the sense of reaching Ithaca. Odysseus may even be tempted to believe his own lie and to claim a more literal share in the exilic experience by suggesting that he is responsible for his wandering and doomed to wander forever. The result is irony – Odysseus rejects the possibility of νόστος even as, unbeknown to him, he stands on the shore of Ithaca. But why the need for Odysseus to ponder his situation so deeply and balance the possibilities that it contains? Because Odysseus himself is being deceived. The goddess Athena – who, while she shows genuine concern for Odysseus, approaches the situation with a levity that the hero cannot afford – has orchestrated events in such a way that Odysseus cannot help but be uncertain as to his location. Certainty will soon be attained, but Odysseus will quickly learn that while he is no longer a wanderer, there is much still to be done before his νόστος is complete.

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ἐπισταμένω· σὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν παντὶ ἔϊσκείς ('It is hard for a mortal man to know you, goddess, when he meets you, even one who knows much; for you take on any shape').

## CONCLUSION

My focus in this study of exile in Homeric epic has, for the most part, been narrow; I have tried to show how the exile narratives of Phoenix, Patroclus, and Odysseus function in their specific contexts. I wish to conclude by commenting briefly on the place of these narratives, and exile more generally, in the broader narrative and thematic structures of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

In analyzing Phoenix' speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 and Patroclus' speech to Achilles in *Iliad* 23, I have made use of some of the close narrative and thematic links, many already identified by other scholars, between the exile narratives contained in these speeches and the situation of Achilles more generally in the *Iliad*. On the one hand, Phoenix' exile narrative, like the Meleager narrative related in the same speech, looks back to the argument between Achilles and Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1. On the other hand, the exile narratives of both Phoenix and Patroclus look forward to Achilles' reception and treatment of Priam in *Iliad* 24, especially given the presence at *Il.* 24.480-484 of a simile featuring exile.

In spite of these connections, the major exile scenes in the *Iliad* have only rarely been read together as a sequence. I believe, however, that such a reading of these scenes has the potential to offer a fuller understanding of the narrative and thematic significance of exile in the *Iliad* as a whole. The only scholar to have proposed reading the major exile scenes of the *Iliad* as a sequence is Schlunk, who argues that the exile simile at *Il.* 24.480-484 is "the culmination of a closely knit series of images which run like a

subcurrent through the whole of the epic.”<sup>1</sup> Even Schlunk, however, for all his championing of the idea of reading the major exile scenes of the *Iliad* as a sequence, concentrates his analysis on just one part of the sequence: the exile simile in *Iliad* 24. His analysis does not really explain, therefore, how the sequence functions *as a sequence*. I believe that my reading of the exile narratives of Patroclus and Phoenix in their immediate contexts can help to do just that, however; more specifically, I believe that these readings can be used to show that the major exile narratives of the *Iliad*, together with the exile simile of *Iliad* 24, closely adhere to the story of Achilles as it is told in the *Iliad* and interact with it in various ways, sometimes commenting upon it, sometimes actually shaping it, and sometimes sharpening the hero’s characterization. The most important exile scenes in the *Iliad* all intimately involve Achilles – the exile narratives of Phoenix and Patroclus are each addressed to Achilles and the exile simile in *Iliad* 24 expresses the hero’s surprise at the appearance of Priam in his hut – and each of these exile scenes marks a critical moment in Achilles’ story.

There is, of course, no exile scene in *Iliad* 1, but, as has often been noted, Phoenix’ exile narrative in *Iliad* 9 contains several parallels with the all-important quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon that opens the *Iliad* and sets in motion the events of the rest of the poem. Moreover, it is precisely in *Iliad* 9 that this quarrel with Agamemnon brings Achilles to a potential turning point – during the first part of the embassy scene Achilles seems to be on the point of abandoning the expedition against Troy and returning to Phthia. Phoenix’ exile narrative is crucial, I have argued, in dissuading Achilles from following such a course of action by revealing the fragility of

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<sup>1</sup> Schlunk (1976) 200.



his heroic identity. Phoenix' exile narrative not only comments on Achilles' situation at a critical moment, then, but can, in addition, be seen actually to change the course of Achilles' story.

Patroclus' exile narrative to Achilles in *Iliad* 23 also marks something of a turning point, albeit one of a rather different sort. Patroclus' visit to Achilles has little impact on the course of events – Achilles intended to bury Patroclus before the visit and he still intends to, and does so, after it – but it marks an important change in what motivates Achilles to act. Before the visit, Achilles was motivated by his emotional attachment to his dead friend. Patroclus' self-presentation as an exile, however, allows Achilles to act as more than just a friend, though he is certainly still expected to continue to fill this role; more precisely, it allows him to fill the traditionally heroic role of host, thereby providing him with an opportunity to take his first real step towards reintegration into the community of heroes. Here, then, an exile narrative marks a change in the characterization of Achilles – a change, that is, in what motivates him as a character – rather than in the course of the action.

Finally, the exile simile in *Iliad* 24 introduces the scene in which Achilles' characterization comes, in a sense, full circle. More specifically, the simile prepares for the kindness and respect with which Achilles treats Priam. By treating Priam in this way Achilles takes up the mantle of his father Peleus, a hero alive to the needs of those less fortunate and therefore prepared to act as a host to exiles. Achilles also, however, and perhaps more importantly, returns to his former self, though with a suitably enhanced perspective on his own heroism. For as Zanker has noted, the *Iliad* repeatedly presents Achilles' behaviour at Troy in the period preceding the action of the poem as notable not

only for devotion to the Achaean cause but also for the kind and respectful treatment of his enemies.<sup>2</sup>

The exile narratives of Phoenix and Patroclus in *Iliad* 9 and 23 and the exile simile in *Iliad* 24 coincide with the presentation of key moments in Achilles' story as it is told in the poem. More precisely, the major exile scenes of the *Iliad* can be read as constituting a sequence that both comments on and helps to shape the trajectory of Achilles' story, and that marks important changes in the hero's characterization.

Unlike the exile scenes of the *Iliad*, Odysseus' exile narrative in *Odyssey* 13 has frequently been viewed as part of a sequence, though a sequence of lying tales rather than a sequence of scenes involving exile. As was noted in Chapter Three, this approach to Odysseus' exile narrative is entirely valid in its own terms. I have chosen not to take such an approach, however, and have concentrated for the most part on the close context in which Odysseus' exile narrative occurs. Nevertheless, it will be useful, I believe, to conclude by revisiting the relationship between Odysseus' exile narrative and the other lying tales, as well as a few other passages from the second half of the *Odyssey*. I still do not intend to focus on lying *per se*, however; instead, I shall consider briefly how the lying tales and a couple of other passages express, like Odysseus' exile narrative, resistance to νόστος or show νόστος under threat.

Odysseus delivers the narrative in which he claims to be an exile – a figure who, in Homeric epic, can never return to his original community – precisely at the moment of his νόστος. The reason Odysseus makes this claim, I have argued, is that he is uncertain as to whether he really has achieved his νόστος, and may well be inclined to believe that

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<sup>2</sup> Zanker (1994) 8-9, 73-75.

he has not. Odysseus' claim to be an exile, then, expresses a certain resistance to νόστος. By the time Odysseus delivers the later lying tales he knows that he really is in Ithaca and so any resistance to νόστος that these tales contain is no longer expressed in terms of exile – the absolute impossibility of νόστος that is a feature of Homeric exile is no longer relevant. Nevertheless, there are indications in the later lying tales that Odysseus is not entirely comfortable with or convinced by the idea of an uncomplicated νόστος.

On a number of occasions in the lying tales to Eumaeus, Antinous, and Penelope, Odysseus presents himself as someone who rejects a life spent at home in favour of a life on the move, and more specifically as someone who resists νόστος. In his lying tale to Eumaeus, for example, Odysseus describes himself as a warrior, and adds, ἔργον δέ μοι οὐ φίλον ἔσκεν | οὐδ' οἰκωφελίη, ἢ τε τρέφει ἀγλαὰ τέκνα ('labour was not dear to me, nor the care of a household, which rears glorious children,' *Od.* 14.222-223). He goes on to describe how once he had returned home after leading the Cretan contingent at Troy with Idomeneus, he only stayed for a month and then left to go raiding in Egypt (*Od.* 14.243-248; cf. *Od.* 17.424-426). As we have seen, critics have argued that Odysseus puts much of his true self into the lying tales, and this may well be the case here, for the attractions of a life of raiding are also found in Odysseus' actions in real life. Even after ten years at Troy, Odysseus is willing to delay his νόστος in order to take the opportunity to raid the Cicones (*Od.* 9.39-61), an episode closely related to Odysseus' false account of his raid on Egypt. His experiences have also taught him, of course, that such a life can bring much suffering and this too is acknowledged in his lying tales; in describing his decision to leave home after only a month Odysseus says, ἐμοὶ δειλῶ κακὰ μήδετο

μητίετα Ζεύς ('Zeus the counselor devised evils for me, wretch that I am,' *Od.* 14.243; cf. *Od.* 17.424-426), and the rest of his tale bears this out (*Od.* 14.257-359).

Perhaps the best evidence, however, for Odysseus' resistance to νόστος comes in the repeated claim in the lying tales that 'Odysseus' – whom, in his lying tales to Eumaeus and Penelope, Odysseus claims to have learned of in the course of his travels – could be home by now but has preferred to lengthen his absence. Odysseus tells both Eumaeus and Penelope that 'Odysseus' has much wealth stored up in Thesprotia but has not taken up the offer of passage home made by Pheidon, king of the Thesprotians, who has even launched a ship for the purpose (*Od.* 14.323-326, 331-333; 19.288-295). Part of the reason for the delay, Odysseus says, is caution – 'Odysseus' has gone to Dodona to ask how best to accomplish his νόστος (*Od.* 14.327-330; 19.296-299) – but there is also a resistance to νόστος based on the potential profitability of travel (*Od.* 19.282-284):

καί κεν πάλαι ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεὺς  
ἦην· ἀλλ' ἄρα οἱ τό γε κέρδιον εἶσατο θυμῷ,  
χρήματ' ἀγυρτάζειν πολλὴν ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἰόντι·

*And long ago would Odysseus have been here; but it seemed more profitable to his mind  
to gather possessions, travelling far over the earth.*

Again, this interest in accumulating wealth through travel looks to Odysseus' experiences in real life; Odysseus sometimes directs his travels specifically for the sake of profit – the search for wealth is behind the raid on the Cicones (*Od.* 9.41-42), for example – and he has a keen eye for material gain even when he becomes a wanderer – he gains much wealth in the form of gifts from the Phaeacians, and it is the possibility of material gain that leads him to linger in the Cyclops' cave (*Od.* 9.228-229).

The lying tales are not the only passages, however, in which Odysseus' νόστος is called into question, whether by himself or by others. Odysseus is certainly aware, for example, of the threat to his νόστος posed by the killing of the suitors. Here we return to the contrast found in *Odyssey* 13 between νόστος and exile, for Odysseus warns Telemachus that the killing even of one man with no family, let alone many men from powerful families, leads to exile in a foreign land (*Od.* 23.118-122). The killing of the suitors, in other words, may well lead to the curtailment of Odysseus' νόστος almost as soon as it has been achieved. And Telemachus' recent encounter with the exile Theoclymenus (*Od.* 15.222-281) should make the reality of such an outcome even easier for the young hero to appreciate. Moreover, Odysseus' opponents also assume the curtailment of Odysseus' νόστος through exile as a natural outcome of the slaying of the suitors; Eupheithes, the father of Antinous, urges the relatives of the other suitors to join him in taking action before Odysseus has a chance to flee to Pylos or Elis (*Od.* 24.430-432).

These two passages ultimately connect back to Tiresias' words in *Odyssey* 11, where the ghost of the dead prophet reveals to Odysseus that upon returning to Ithaca he will find other men destroying his house and wooing his wife and will have to take vengeance upon them by slaying them (*Od.* 11.113-120). Tiresias' words reveal a further threat to Odysseus' νόστος, however; Tiresias says that after the killing of the suitors Odysseus will have to leave Ithaca, though not as an exile. Rather, he will have to make a trip far inland to make an offering that will finally appease the wrath of Poseidon (*Od.* 121-131). Only then, says Tiresias, will Odysseus be able to οἶκαδ' ἀποστείχειν ('go off homewards,' *Od.* 11.132).

Odysseus' exile narrative in *Odyssey* 13 is, then, part of a whole series of scenes in which Odysseus' νόστος can be seen to be presented, in one way or another, as problematic. I have only sketched this series. There are certainly important differences between, for example, the resistance to νόστος in Odysseus' exile narrative, in which (I have argued) Odysseus expresses disbelief in his νόστος, and the resistance to νόστος in the other lying tales, which at certain points idealize travel, but the detailed analysis of how the series fits together is beyond the scope of this study since many parts of the series do not involve exile. It is clear enough, however, that the first hints as to the problematic nature of Odysseus' νόστος come in Tiresias' words in *Odyssey* 11, though in the first half of the *Odyssey*, and especially in *Odyssey* 9-12, it is the will to overcome wandering by achieving νόστος that dominates. It is only once Odysseus is in Ithaca that the problematic nature of his νόστος, and in particular the opposition between νόστος and further wandering, becomes a central concern. The exile narrative in *Odyssey* 13 can be read, I believe, as setting up this thematic dissonance between νόστος and wandering, a dissonance that will never be fully resolved.

The exile narratives of both Phoenix and Patroclus in the *Iliad* and of Odysseus in the *Odyssey* can be seen, therefore, to fit into the larger-scale thematic and narrative frameworks of the poems in which they are found. How they do so becomes much clearer, however, when we pay attention to how these narratives work on a smaller scale. In fact, it has been the aim of this study to show that Homeric exile need not be approached only in terms of the larger scale structures of the poems, and that there is plenty to be learned from examining how exile narratives operate in the immediate contexts in which they are found.

**APPENDIX A – CASES OF EXILE IN THE *ILIAD* AND THE *ODYSSEY***

<b>Name of Exile</b>	<b>Line Reference</b>	<b>Cause of Exile</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Original Community / Place of Exile</b>
<i><u>Iliad</u></i>				
<b>Phyleus</b>	<i>Il.</i> 2.627-629	Dispute (with father)	Integration	- / Dulichium
<b>Tlepolemus</b>	<i>Il.</i> 2.661-670	Homicide (of great-uncle, Licymnius)	Foundation of new community	- / Rhodes
<b>Phoenix</b>	<i>Il.</i> 9.444-495	Dispute (with father, Amyntor)	Integration	Hellas / Phthia (in the house of Peleus)
<b>Medon</b>	<i>Il.</i> 13.694-697 (= <i>Il.</i> 15.333-336)	Homicide (of a kinsman of his stepmother, Eriopis)	Integration	Locris / Phylace
<b>Lycophron</b>	<i>Il.</i> 15.430-439	Homicide	Integration	Cythera / Salamis (in the house of Aias and Teucer)
<b>Epeigeus</b>	<i>Il.</i> 16.570-576	Homicide (of a kinsman)	Integration	Budeum (where he was king) / Phthia (in the house of Peleus)
<b>Patroclus</b>	<i>Il.</i> 23.83-90	Homicide (of the son of Amphidamas)	Integration	Opoeis / Phthia (in the house of Peleus)
<b>(Simile)</b>	<i>Il.</i> 24.480-482	Homicide	(Attempt at) integration	- / the house of a rich man

<b>Name of Exile</b>	<b>Line Reference</b>	<b>Cause of Exile</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Original Community / Place of Exile</b>
<b><u>Odyssey</u></b>				
<b>Odysseus pretending to be a Cretan)</b>	<i>Od.</i> 13.256-286	Homicide (of Orsilochus, the son of Idomeneus)	(Currently) wandering	Crete / (currently in) Ithaca
<b>Aetolian</b>	<i>Od.</i> 14.379-385	Homicide	Wandering	Aetolia / Ithaca (at least temporarily)
<b>Theoclymenus</b>	<i>Od.</i> 15.223-225, 272-278	Homicide (of a kinsman)	(Currently) wandering	Argos / (currently) near Pylos (and will travel with Telemachus to Ithaca)
<b>Polyphoides</b>	<i>Od.</i> 15.252-255	Dispute (with father, Mantius)	Integration	Argos / Hyperesia
<b>(Generalisation)</b>	<i>Od.</i> 23.118-120	Homicide	Flight	- / -
<b>(Expectation, ultimately unfulfilled, that Odysseus will try to go into exile)</b>	<i>Od.</i> 24.429-432	Homicide (of the suitors)	(Flight)	Ithaca / (Pylos or Elis)



## APPENDIX B – THE LIMINAL STATUS OF THE UNBURIED DEAD

This appendix is intended to supplement the discussion in Chapter Two of Patroclus' liminal status at the time of his visit to Achilles in *Iliad* 23, a liminal status caused (I have argued) by the fact that Patroclus is at this point unburied. In particular, it is intended to respond to the arguments of Clarke, who rejects the idea of a liminal status for those who have died but not yet received the proper funeral rites.<sup>1</sup>

Clarke bases his rejection of the possibility of liminal status for those who are dead but unburied on the case of Elpenor. Odysseus encounters Elpenor, one of his companions, at the beginning of his trip to the underworld and learns how Elpenor died after falling from the roof of Circe's palace and still lies unburied (*Od.* 11.51-80). Two details of Elpenor's encounter with Odysseus have suggested to scholars that Elpenor occupies a liminal position and has not yet gained full entry into Hades – a) that fact that Elpenor approaches Odysseus before any of the rest of the dead, even Tiresias,<sup>2</sup> and b) the fact that Elpenor is able to recognise and converse with Odysseus without drinking the blood from Odysseus' sacrifices to the gods of the underworld.<sup>3</sup>

Clarke, however, denies that these details need suggest that Elpenor is undergoing an "intermediate stage of admission to the afterlife."<sup>4</sup> Nowhere in his analysis does Clarke explain a). He accounts for b) by arguing that Odysseus himself appears not to understand the significance of the blood at this point and so we can hardly expect the

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<sup>1</sup> Clarke (1999) 187-189.

<sup>2</sup> Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 11.51-54; Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 64 n.161; and Johnston (1999) 9.

<sup>3</sup> Bremmer (1983) 89-90; Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 11.51-54; and Johnston (1999) 9.

<sup>4</sup> Clarke (1999) 189.

diegetic audience to be able to do so. There is no need, however, to assume identical knowledge on the part of the characters in the poem and the diegetic audience – the external audience may well be expected to understand more than Odysseus at this point. And in any case, Circe’s words at *Od.* 10.535-537 should strongly suggest to Odysseus – and to the diegetic audience – that the blood has some special significance among the dead, even though a full explanation is not forthcoming until *Od.* 11.147-149.

Clarke notes that there are other ghosts besides Elpenor who do not drink from the blood before speaking with Odysseus – both Achilles and Aias, he says, speak with Odysseus without it being explicitly stated that they drink first (*Od.* 11.467-567).<sup>5</sup> By this point, however, a clear pattern has been established, with Anticleia, the famous women, and Agamemnon all drinking before they converse with Odysseus, as Clarke himself comments.<sup>6</sup> More importantly, though Tiresias explicitly states only that the ghosts must ‘*approach the blood*’ (αἵματος ἄσσον ἴμεν, *Od.* 11.148) in order to speak with Odysseus, within a few lines it becomes clear that he must mean ‘*approach and drink the blood,*’ since it is the drinking that is crucial in allowing Anticleia to recognise Odysseus and speak with him (*Od.* 11.152-154). It is unnecessary, therefore, for Odysseus, in describing the scene, to repeat the detail of the drinking of the blood for every ghost, especially once a pattern has been established, and when the ghost of Achilles is eventually described as ‘*coming up*’ (ἦλθε δ’ ἐπί, *Od.* 11.467) we can assume that it ‘*comes up and drinks.*’

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<sup>5</sup> Clarke (1999) 193; this is in fact true only in the case Achilles (*Od.* 11.467-472). In the case of Aias, Odysseus speaks, but Aias walks away without replying (*Od.* 11.563-564).

<sup>6</sup> Clarke (1999) 193.

Another weakness in Clarke's analysis of the encounter between Elpenor and Odysseus arises from the fact that, at this point at least, he completely ignores the crucial evidence of Patroclus' words to Achilles at *Il.* 23.71-74.<sup>7</sup> Elsewhere, however, Clarke (correctly) interprets Patroclus' words to mean that Patroclus has not yet entered Hades and will only be able to do so when buried,<sup>8</sup> an interpretation difficult to accord with his rejection of a liminal status for Elpenor.

The only part of Elpenor's account of his fate that may suggest that he had already entered Hades are the words ψυχὴ...Ἄιδόσδε κατήλθε (*Od.* 11.65). The phrase is vague, however, and is not inconsistent with Patroclus' description of himself stuck outside Hades since ψυχὴ Ἄιδόσδε κατήλθε could just as well mean 'his soul went down to Hades' as 'his soul went down to *and entered* Hades.' The fact that Elpenor approaches Odysseus before any of the other ghosts does so – a fact ignored by Clarke – suggests that he is on the outskirts, and so favours the former interpretation.

In support of his argument against the possibility of liminal status for the unburied dead, Clarke is able to point to the fact that the suitors enter Hades in the *Deuteronekyia* of *Odyssey* 24 without being buried (*Od.* 24.1-14, 186-190),<sup>9</sup> though he wisely refrains from drawing any firm conclusions from the *Deuteronekyia* given its fragile status in the text, and the fragile status of the end of the *Odyssey* as a whole.<sup>10</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood has recently argued strongly, however, that the *Odyssey* originally had a different ending and

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<sup>7</sup> Quoted above, 76-77; given the similarity of the circumstances of Patroclus and Elpenor the two passages are usually, and rightly, read together; see Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) *ad Od.* 11.51-54; Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 63-64, with n. 161; Johnston (1999) 9.

<sup>8</sup> Clarke (1999) 212, with n. 102.

<sup>9</sup> Clarke (1999) 227.

<sup>10</sup> Clarke (1999) 225-228.

that the current ending (from *Od.* 23.297 on, or thereabouts) is a rewriting that draws on the original ending and on other, earlier versions, but also reflects later beliefs.<sup>11</sup> This analysis explains why the current ending is in many ways thematically integrated with the rest of the poem, but also accounts for many of its non-Homeric oddities, including the presence of the unburied suitors in Hades.

Clarke's rejection of an 'intermediate stage' for the unburied dead forms part of his analysis of the significance of cremation, and he is probably correct when he argues that entry into Hades does not depend upon the physical separation of the 'wraith' from the dead body through its being burnt.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, it is clear from the episodes involving Patroclus and Elpenor that the provision of funeral rites is in some way decisive in allowing full entry into Hades. Neither Patroclus nor Elpenor specifies which part of the rites is decisive – cremation or burial – or how, and the process should probably be viewed as a whole with no particular part taking precedence.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 94-106. Heubeck (Russo, Fernández-Galiano, and Heubeck (1992) *ad Od.* 23.297) provides a list of scholars who have rejected the ending of the *Odyssey* as un-Homeric, to which (in addition to Sourvinou-Inwood) may be added West (1989) and Johnston (1999: 14-16). Heubeck himself (Russo, Fernández-Galiano, and Heubeck (1992) *ad Od.* 23.297, pp. 353-355, and *ad Od.* 24.1-204) defends the authenticity of the ending of the *Odyssey* and provides a list of other scholars who do likewise (354), to which may be added Rutherford (1992) 14-16.

<sup>12</sup> Clarke (1999) 185-189.

<sup>13</sup> See Clarke's (1999: 186) interpretation of the verb θάπτω, as used by Patroclus at *Il.* 23.71, as referring to "the whole process of committing the corpse to the earth."

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